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s e r e n a  m a y e r i  
 
Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental 
Rights in the Age of Equality 
abstract.  The twentieth-century equality revolution established the principle of sex neutrality 
in the law of marriage and divorce and eased the most severe legal disabilities traditionally imposed 
upon nonmarital children. Formal equality under the law eluded nonmarital parents, however. 
Although unwed fathers won unprecedented legal rights and recognition in a series of Supreme Court 
cases decided in the 1970s and 1980s, they failed to achieve constitutional parity with mothers or with 
married and divorced fathers. This Article excavates nonmarital fathers’ quest for equal rights, until 
now a mere footnote in the history of constitutional equality law.  
Unmarried fathers lacked a social movement of their own, but various groups and interests 
fought for their own causes on the battleground of nonmarital parenthood. Nonmarital fathers’ claims 
posed a particular dilemma for feminists, who promoted gender-egalitarian parenting within marriage 
but struggled over the implications of unmarried fathers’ rights for women’s autonomy and for 
substantive sex equality. The Justices’ deliberations, in contrast, focused on the rights of men and on 
ensuring the smooth functioning of adoption procedures. The Court largely avoided the feminist 
dilemma, instead framing cases as disputes between husbands and unwed fathers. Denying 
nonmarital fathers’ request to be treated as “de facto divorced fathers,” the Court reaffirmed the legal 
supremacy of marital families. 
The Court’s failure to engage difficult questions about substantive sex equality reverberated 
beyond the parental rights cases to leave its mark on the twenty-first century jurisprudence of 
citizenship. As nonmarital parenthood becomes the American norm, recovering its constitutional 
history illuminates how and why marital status still delimits the boundaries of equality law.  
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introduction 
The twentieth-century constitutional equality revolution transformed the 
laws of marriage, divorce, and parenthood. As a matter of formal law, though 
not social reality, husbands and wives turned into spouses with identical rights 
and duties; divorcing mothers and fathers became parents with sex-neutral 
obligations of care and support. Formal equality under the law eluded 
nonmarital parents, however. Marital status remained a legitimate basis of 
legal differentiation. The legal primacy of marriage endured, even as rates of 
nonmarital cohabitation and childrearing soared. 
Today, sex neutrality in the law of parenthood depends upon marital 
status. Mothers and fathers generally enjoy formally equal rights to the 
custody, care, and control of their marital children. In contrast, a nonmarital 
father does not possess the same parental rights—or responsibilities—as his 
female counterpart. And although nonmarital fathers won unprecedented legal 
rights and recognition as parents, they never achieved parity with married and 
divorced fathers. 
Traditionally, fathers had few rights or responsibilities to their nonmarital 
children. In the early 1970s, nonmarital fathers seized upon emerging 
constitutional equality principles to challenge their inferior parental status. 
Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that 
first expanded and then contracted “unwed fathers’” constitutional rights. 
Behind the scenes, the Justices wrestled with, but to a surprising degree 
ultimately avoided, a central question presented by these cases: how the 
evolving jurisprudence of equal protection, which made marriage and divorce 
formally sex-neutral, should apply to the parental rights of nonmarital fathers. 
The Court also declined advocates’ invitation to treat nonmarital fathers like 
“de facto divorced fathers” and to condemn discrimination based on marital 
status. Today, the unwed fathers cases are a mere footnote to the story of the 
constitutional equality revolution. 
In the twenty-first century, as a widening “marriage gap” separates the 
well-off, highly educated haves from impoverished, less educated, have-nots, 
nonmarital parenthood is the dominant reality of American family life.1 Yet, as 
Clare Huntington observes, “the marital family serves as a misleading 
synecdoche for all families,” leaving family law ill equipped to address the 
 
1. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014) (describing the causes and consequences of the 
marriage gap). 
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needs of many families and communities.2 An economically stratified legal 
regime reproduces fault lines based on race, class, gender, and marital status: 
many elite, college-educated couples seek relatively egalitarian partnerships 
and negotiate under a default rule of shared parenting, while the state’s efforts 
to privatize dependency through stringent child support enforcement 
discourage parental involvement by poor fathers.3 
The anomalous legal treatment of unmarried fathers looms large for 
commentators who decry family law’s failure to protect nonmarital families.4 
Because parental rights and responsibilities are inextricably intertwined, 
mothers who bear the default burden of care and support also endure the 
consequences of sex and marital status inequality in parenthood.5 Nonmarital 
 
2. Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 
STAN. L. REV. 167, 167 (2015). 
3. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185, 
1222-24. Between these two poles are nonmarital families who operate in the “shadows” of 
the law. Id. at 1189. In these economically precarious families, mothers act as “gatekeepers,” 
often maintaining a modicum of control over family life by avoiding a formal paternity 
determination and acting as primary breadwinners and caregivers for their children. Id. at 
1207. For a discussion of maternal “gatekeeping” in impoverished urban communities, see 
KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER 
CITY 169-74 (2013).  
4. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 2, at 203-05 (focusing on nonmarital fathers’ inferior status 
as a paradigmatic example of how family law ill-serves the never-married); Solangel 
Maldonado, Perspective: Shared Parenting and Never-Married Families, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 632 
(2014) (describing barriers to shared parenting among the never-married); Melissa Murray, 
What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012) 
(critiquing the Court’s bias toward fathers who act like husbands). The unequal treatment 
of nonmarital fathers has made headlines recently. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, What 
Unmarried Fathers Have To Worry About, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (July 8, 2015,  
2:34 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/13/fathers-rights-and-womens 
-equality/what-unmarried-fathers-have-to-worry-about [http://perma.cc/KDQ4-BGDL] 
(arguing that it is “much harder” for unmarried than for married fathers “to sustain a 
relationship with their children” over a mother’s objection); Kevin Noble Maillard, A 
Father’s Struggle To Stop His Daughter’s Adoption, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2015), http://www 
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/paternity-registry/396044 [http://perma.cc/GVE6 
-S9BN] (recounting the travails of a nonmarital South Carolina father in gaining custody of 
his daughter); see also Child Welfare Info. Gateway, The Rights of Unmarried Fathers, U.S. 
CHILDREN’S BUREAU 2 (2014), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/E2CH-52DZ] ( “[I]n cases involving unmarried fathers whose legal relationship to 
a child has not been established, States have almost complete discretion to determine the 
parental rights for the purposes of termination or adoption proceedings.”). 
5. See, e.g., Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-
Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 66 (1995) (explaining 
that giving custody of nonmarital children to mothers reflects not “hostility to biological 
fathers” but the “patriarchal roots of family law,” which produce “devastating social and 
economic consequences” for women); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are 
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children, who are disproportionately poor and of color, suffer from the use of 
marital status as a proxy for parental legitimacy.6 Yet concerns about 
substantive sex equality left hardly a mark on the Court’s decisions, and marital 
status remains a legitimate determinant of parental rights. This Article 
investigates how and why this came to be. 
 
*** 
 
Before midcentury, the parental rights of nonmarital fathers barely 
registered as a question, much less a moral and constitutional dilemma. Unwed 
fathers, long deprived of legal rights and usually liberated from legal 
obligations, seemed largely irrelevant, except to the extent the state could call 
upon them to support children who otherwise would depend on public 
assistance.7 Profound legal and societal changes recast the problem of 
nonmarital fatherhood in the 1960s and early 1970s. Rates of nonmarital 
childbearing rose; women’s workforce participation grew; and divorce rates 
climbed. Whereas in earlier decades, most unmarried white mothers had 
relinquished their infants for adoption, more now raised them alone or with 
nonmarital partners. African-American women had long cared for nonmarital 
children with the support of extended families, largely excluded from public 
aid to the presumptively white “deserving poor” and from adoption 
opportunities. Now, poor women of color gained access to public assistance 
benefits, heightening anxieties about “promiscuity,” “illegitimacy,” and 
 
Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669 
(2000) (arguing that divesting nonmarital fathers of parental rights harms mothers who are 
exclusively charged with the care and support of children). Denigrating the rights of 
nonmarital fathers in the context of adoption may also redound to mothers’ detriment by 
furthering policies that prioritize speedy adoptions by affluent couples of poor children of 
color, and “condemn[ing]” or rendering “invisible” birth mothers. Bethany R. Berger, In the 
Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 295, 345 (2015) (citing LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF 
TRANSRACIAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 16-17 (2012)). 
6. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011). 
7. On early efforts to hold poor fathers responsible for child support, see Drew D. Hansen, 
Note, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early American 
Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123 (1999). 
 
the yale law journal 	 125 :229 2   20 16  
2298 
 
“welfare dependency.”8 Efforts to hold nonmarital fathers financially 
responsible for their children intensified.9 
In this golden age of social movements, previously disenfranchised groups 
organized and fought for recognition and redistribution. Civil rights advocates 
dismantled de jure racial segregation.10 Feminists attacked discrimination in 
education and employment, and sought reproductive freedom and equality in 
public and private life.11 Anti-poverty activists fought for welfare rights.12 
Defenders of a more traditional social order found these claims deeply 
threatening. Conservatives charged feminists with destroying the very 
foundation of American society. Punitive welfare regulations such as “suitable 
home” and “substitute father” exclusions sought to deter nonmarital sex, limit 
welfare expenditures, and force poor men and women of color into low-wage 
work.13 Many anti-illegitimacy laws were thinly veiled attacks on civil rights 
activism,14 but even those who embraced African-American civil rights often 
believed a patriarchal family structure essential to racial progress.15 
 
8. For a discussion of the evolving politics of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) at midcentury, see, for example, JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO 
WORKFARE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945-1965 (2005). 
9. See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 97-105 (2003). 
10. For a review of the literature on the civil rights movement’s impact on the law, see, for 
example, Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
2312 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012)).  
11. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION (2011). 
12. For a sampling of the rich scholarship on welfare rights advocacy, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, 
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); FELICIA 
KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN 
AMERICA (2007); PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: 
WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935-1972 (forthcoming 2016). 
13. See ELIZABETH H. PLECK, NOT JUST ROOMMATES: COHABITATION AFTER THE SEXUAL 
REVOLUTION 47-70 (2012); Alison Lefkovitz, Men in the House: Race, Welfare, and the 
Regulation of Men’s Sexuality in the United States, 1961-1972, 20 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 594 (2011). 
14. See ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED BROWN 
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009); Anders Walker, Legislating Virtue: 
How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board 
of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399 (1997). 
15. See MAYERI, supra note 11, at 41-42. 
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“Fatherlessness,” the corollary of “matriarchy,” emerged as a perceived threat 
to family and social stability.16 
Unlike divorced fathers, who mobilized to influence family law reform,17 
nonmarital fathers generally did not form organizations to advocate for their 
parental rights during this period. The plaintiffs in the unwed fathers cases 
were not handpicked for their sympathetic characteristics by advocacy 
organizations. Indeed, many of these men had checkered histories as partners 
or as parents and were represented by organizations with goals orthogonal to 
their own objectives and motivations. Various legal and social movements and 
interests buffeted the men who claimed the role of father outside of marriage. 
Feminists, civil libertarians, adoption advocates, child welfare organizations, 
lawmakers, and judges offered competing visions of the relationship between 
marriage, parenthood, and sex equality. 
For feminists, the question of sex neutrality in nonmarital parenthood was 
especially fraught. Many influential feminist advocates—most prominently, 
law professor and ACLU lawyer Ruth Bader Ginsburg—promoted an 
egalitarian model of marriage in which mothers and fathers shared caregiving 
and breadwinning responsibilities.18 In cases such as Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
which extended Social Security “mother’s insurance benefits” to widowed 
fathers, Ginsburg and her allies insisted on the importance of fathers’ roles as 
nurturers of children.19 The resulting constitutional sex equality canon 
primarily featured married couples or widowers seeking equal rights for 
husbands and wives.20 How this gender-egalitarian model applied to 
nonmarital families remained an open question and one about which feminists 
increasingly disagreed. 
The paramount importance of shared parenting to sex equality within 
marriage seemed evident. When feminists argued over the best way to promote 
 
16. See LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA (Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 
1998). On the racial dimension of “fatherlessness” in the late twentieth century, see Dorothy 
Roberts, The Absent Black Father, in id. at 145. 
17. See Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family 
Inequalities, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
18. On Ginsburg’s constitutional strategy, see MAYERI, supra note 11; Cary Franklin, The Anti-
Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010); 
Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2008). 
19. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
20. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating Social Security provisions 
that required widowers but not widows to prove financial dependence on their spouses); 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (overturning 
discrimination against military servicewomen and their spouses in the provision of housing 
and health benefits). 
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egalitarian marital parenting through post-divorce custody rules, they 
disagreed primarily about means rather than ends. When feminists challenged 
laws and policies that withheld public benefits and private rights from 
nonmarital families, they differed over matters of strategy but agreed that such 
practices subordinated women, who most often cared for and supported 
nonmarital children.21 Feminists’ dissension over sex equality in nonmarital 
parental rights was more profound. When parents had never married, a 
mother’s consent to a biological father’s relationship with her children could 
not so easily be assumed. Nonmarital parenthood crystallized a larger feminist 
dilemma: how to balance aspirations for a sex-neutral world with a social 
reality of persistent inequality. 
Feminist debates centered upon the consequences of nonmarital fathers’ 
rights for women’s autonomy and equal status and implicated growing 
concerns about the unjust termination of poor parents’ parental rights. The 
Justices, too, disagreed about nonmarital fatherhood but for very different 
reasons. Court deliberations focused on the rights of men who fathered 
children outside of marriage and on the smooth functioning of adoption 
procedures. The robust debate among feminists about the meaning of 
nonmarital fathers’ rights for substantive sex equality barely penetrated the 
Justices’ internal deliberations, much less the Court’s opinions. 
This Article excavates the history of nonmarital fathers’ constitutional 
equality claims. Part I explores the renaissance of interest in unwed fathers in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, as social scientists, social workers, and legal 
professionals reexamined longstanding assumptions about their rights, roles, 
and responsibilities. Using archival and other primary sources, this Part 
examines the landmark case of Stanley v. Illinois22 to reveal the surprising 
openness of the constitutional field for unwed fathers’ rights on the eve of the 
sex equality revolution. Stanley came to the Court as an equal protection case, 
and early draft opinions embraced expansive visions of sex and marital status 
equality. But the ruling focused primarily on due process and left uncertain the 
scope of this “revolution” in unmarried fathers’ rights. 
The half-dozen years after Stanley brought rapid and deeply contested legal 
and social change. Part II examines developments in constitutional law, 
marriage and divorce, and social movements such as feminism, antifeminism, 
and fathers’ rights that set the stage for conflict among feminists over the 
meaning of sex equality for nonmarital parenthood. As Part III recounts, these 
disagreements occurred largely behind the scenes in the 1970s, influencing 
 
21. On the 1970s feminist campaign against illegitimacy penalties, see Serena Mayeri, Marital 
Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015). 
22. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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amicus participation in Court cases about stepfather adoption but remaining 
below the Justices’ radar. 
In the 1980s, feminists’ disagreement about nonmarital fathers’ parental 
rights surfaced in two cases that reached the Court but produced no decision 
on the merits. These cases concerned biological fathers’ right to object to a 
mother’s decision to place her newborn infant up for adoption, and feminists 
filed briefs on both sides. As Part IV describes, the Court instead decided, on 
due process grounds, two other cases framed as contests between husbands 
and nonmarital fathers. The winner, by the end of the 1980s, was marital 
supremacy, as the Court rejected nonmarital fathers’ rights in favor of 
husbands’ and ignored feminists’ arguments both for and against sex 
neutrality. 
Part V examines how and why nonmarital fathers’—and feminists’—
campaigns for constitutional equality fell short. Whereas divorced fathers 
successfully mobilized to make child custody law formally sex-neutral, 
nonmarital fathers lacked comparable resources, cultural capital, and social 
movement support. Feminists and their allies attempted to shape the law of 
nonmarital parenthood, but the Justices’ debates and resulting jurisprudence 
reflected instead the values of the divorced fathers’ rights movement and 
traditionalist conservatism. After 1989, the Court largely withdrew from the 
constitutional regulation of nonmarital fathers’ parental rights, leaving states 
to go their own way. 
The Justices’ failure to engage difficult questions about the relationship 
between formal sex neutrality and substantive equality reverberated beyond the 
parental rights cases to leave its mark on equality jurisprudence. At the turn of 
the twenty-first century, when the Court considered discrimination against 
fathers in their ability to transmit citizenship to nonmarital children, the 
majority imported principles from the parental rights cases to reject fathers’ 
claims. More broadly, the unwed fathers cases helped to enshrine marital 
supremacy in constitutional law. Marital status still delimits the boundaries of 
constitutional equality in parenthood, even as nonmarital families become the 
American norm. 
The constitutional law of the family today stands at a critical turning point. 
The advent of marriage equality marks the final triumph of formal sex 
neutrality in the law of marriage, discarding archaic assumptions about the 
proper roles of husbands and wives. Same-sex relationships have also 
disrupted conventional definitions of parenthood, demoting formal indicia 
such as marriage and biology in favor of more intent-based and functional 
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criteria.23 Whether marriage equality heightens or diminishes the legal and 
constitutional significance of marital status, however, remains to be seen. For 
those who hope to reshape the law to meet the needs of nonmarital families, 
unwed fathers’ attack on marital supremacy illuminates the challenges ahead. 
i .  a  legal renaissance for unw ed fathers,  19 6 0 -19 7 2  
The social and legal revolutions of the 1960s and early 1970s transformed 
unwed fathers from personae non gratae into individuals with constitutional 
rights and obligations. An array of social movements, animated by issues from 
civil rights to reproductive freedom to women’s equality, provided new 
constitutional weapons for men who resisted the presumption that nonmarital 
fathers were at best, irrelevant, and at worst, irresponsible derelicts. 
Challenging decades of exclusive focus on unwed mothers, a small but 
influential cadre of social work professionals and social scientists sought to 
rehabilitate unmarried fathers and show them worthy of study and support. 
On the eve of the constitutional sex equality revolution, when the Supreme 
Court considered its first unwed father lawsuit, observers and litigants viewed 
Stanley v. Illinois24 as presenting fundamental questions about equality between 
men and women, and between marital and nonmarital parents. The field was 
wide open: the Court had just begun to question “illegitimacy”-based 
classifications and had yet to hold that any legal distinction between men and 
women violated equal protection. Early draft opinions challenged 
discrimination based on sex and marital status head-on, suggesting that any 
differential treatment of mothers and fathers or of married and unmarried 
parents might be constitutionally suspect. In the end, Stanley was decided 
primarily on due process grounds. And while even the ultimately narrower 
decision in Stanley initially seemed “revolutionary,” its implications for unwed 
fathers’ rights and for the development of equality jurisprudence remained 
uncertain. 
A. “An [E]lusive Ghost”: Social Workers and Lawyers Discover the Unwed 
Father 
Nonmarital parenthood poses a conundrum in a society that privatizes 
dependency in the nuclear family, channels government benefits through 
marriage, provides minimal state support for caregiving, and engages in 
 
23. For pathbreaking work on this phenomenon, see Douglas NeJaime, Marriage and the New 
Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
24. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. 
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limited wealth redistribution. By the middle decades of the twentieth century, 
American policymakers had constructed a social and legal infrastructure that 
presumed wives and mothers would provide primary care for children and 
other dependents, while husbands and fathers furnished financial support and 
social insurance benefits through gainful employment.25 “Unwed mothers” 
who kept and raised their children without a man’s support threatened not 
only the public fisc, but also a political and legal system that assumed that 
marital households are the basic economic unit of society and the primary site 
of social provision. Thus the ideal cure for the “problem of illegitimacy” was 
the marriage of the child’s parents or adoption into a two-parent marital 
family. 
At common law, an “illegitimate”26 child was filius nullius, a “child of no 
one,” and her parents largely escaped legal responsibility for her care and 
financial support. Whereas guardianship and custody of marital children 
belonged to the father (eroded in practice by the “tender years” 
presumption),27 nonmarital children traditionally were mothers’ responsibility 
by default. In the nineteenth-century United States, legal reforms afforded 
nonmarital children the right to support and to inheritance from their 
mothers.28 Fiscal concerns spurred the enactment of statutes imposing some 
financial liability on “natural” fathers when paternity was proven, though 
enforcement was sporadic at best.29 But in the mid-twentieth-century United 
States, illegitimate children’s paternal inheritance rights remained limited,30 
and nonmarital fathers enjoyed parental rights decidedly inferior to those of 
unmarried mothers and of married or divorced fathers.31 To many, this seemed 
 
25. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000); ALICE 
KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC 
CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001).  
26. I use the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” because they describe distinctive legal 
categories not captured by neutral terms such as “marital” and “nonmarital.” However, I do 
not endorse their denigration of nonmarital families. See Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1279 n.4.  
27. The tender years doctrine held that during a child’s early development the mother should 
have custody, despite competing doctrines entrenching paternal primacy. See MICHAEL 
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY 
AMERICA 248 (1985). 
28. See id. at 207-15. 
29. On child support enforcement generally in nineteenth-century America, see Hansen, supra 
note 7. 
30. See Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act on 
Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829, 854-56 (1966). 
31. For a contemporaneous account of nonmarital fathers’ inferior legal rights with respect to 
custody, visitation, adoption, and parental status, see Freda Jane Lippert, The Need for a 
Clarification of the Putative Father’s Rights, 8 J. FAM. L. 398, 403-14 (1968). 
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unremarkable: after all, if nonmarital fathers bore little or no responsibility for 
their nonmarital children, then awarding sole rights to mothers was only fair 
compensation for their social and economic burdens. Some feminists, in 
contrast, had long protested the default assumption of maternal responsibility, 
noting that it enabled nonmarital fathers to escape both the moral opprobrium 
and the financial obligations of unwed parenthood.32 
As rates of “illegitimacy” rose and became politically salient at mid-
century,33 social scientists and social work professionals focused their efforts on 
studying and “rehabilitating” unwed mothers.34 Experts analyzed young 
women who became pregnant outside of marriage in racially differentiated 
terms, often explaining nonmarital childbearing among young white women as 
an individual neurosis and among young black women as cultural pathology.35 
Fathers seemed largely irrelevant, except to the extent they could financially 
support children not relinquished for adoption.36 Social worker and adoption 
expert Leontine Young’s 1954 book Out of Wedlock devoted a single, short 
chapter to “the unmarried father,” calling him “in almost every case a 
counterpart of the neurotic personality of the mother.”37 In 1960, sociologist 
Clark E. Vincent estimated the ratio of studies probing unmarried motherhood 
versus fatherhood at twenty-five to one.38 With adoption by strangers the 
favored solution to nonmarital childbearing among young white women, 
fathers were cast as shadowy villains who had little to offer the women they 
 
32. See Collins, supra note 5, at 1694-97. 
33. See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Historicizing the “End of Men”: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 729 (2013) (describing reaction to the 1965 Moynihan Report, which posited a “tangle 
of pathology” in the “Negro family”). 
34. On these efforts, see REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED 
MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890-1945 (1993); RICKIE 
SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE 
(1992). See also REUBEN PANNOR ET AL., THE UNMARRIED FATHER: NEW HELPING 
APPROACHES FOR UNMARRIED YOUNG PARENTS 2 (1971) (“The mother is the person who has 
stood out in bold relief—subject to pity, scorn, mysterious disappearance, even casual 
acceptance and, in some measure, to professional care and mature attention.”). 
35. See SOLINGER, supra note 34; Regina G. Kunzel, White Neurosis, Black Pathology: Constructing 
Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy in the Wartime and Postwar United States, in NOT JUNE CLEAVER: 
WOMEN AND GENDER IN POSTWAR AMERICA, 1945-1960, at 304 (Joanne Meyerowitz ed., 
1994). 
36. See, e.g., Education Is Urged for Unwed Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1961, at 5 (“The Federal 
Government . . . says unmarried fathers should be found and given educational help with 
the aim of making them able to assume family responsibilities.”).  
37. LEONTINE YOUNG, OUT OF WEDLOCK: A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE UNMARRIED 
MOTHER AND HER CHILD 134 (1954). 
38. Clark E. Vincent, Unmarried Fathers and the Mores: “Sexual Exploiter” as an Ex Post Facto 
Label, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 40, 40 (1960).  
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impregnated or the children their illicit liaisons produced. As social worker 
Linda Burgess wrote in 1968, “[T]he unmarried father has remained an illusive 
ghost in most adoption placements.”39 
The problem of unwed fatherhood gained prominence in the following 
decade, thanks to a confluence of factors. As previously excluded families of 
color gained access to Aid to Families with Dependent Children, growing 
concerns about welfare expenditures and illegitimacy spurred punitive 
attempts to hold the sexual partners of impoverished African-American women 
financially responsible for their nonmarital children, including through 
“substitute father” provisions withholding public assistance from households 
containing a “man in the house.”40 At the same time, norms surrounding 
nonmarital childbearing shifted: unmarried, middle-class white women less 
frequently entered maternity homes and relinquished their infants for 
adoption.41 Gradually, sociologists and social workers began to investigate the 
emotional, psychological, and social needs of young unmarried fathers. An 
early pilot program in Los Angeles, launched in 1963 and supported by the 
U.S. Children’s Bureau, studied close to one hundred unmarried fathers 
receiving services formerly reserved for mothers from a Jewish social service 
agency. The results purported to defy “stereotypes” about feckless unwed 
fathers, finding many young men to be receptive to counseling and interested 
in participating in decisions about their child’s life.42 Other programs began to 
serve young unmarried fathers of color in urban, high-poverty areas. In 1969, a 
Harlem social worker told the New York Times that “working with putative 
fathers is very fashionable now.”43 
Unmarried fathers, long typecast as sexual exploiters of vulnerable, young 
women who abandoned their children,44 began to appear in more varied 
guises: the cohabiting parent-partner, functionally indistinguishable from his 
 
39. Linda C. Burgess, The Unmarried Father in Adoption Planning, 15 CHILDREN 71, 71 (1968). 
40. See Lefkovitz, supra note 13, at 597. 
41. See, e.g., REUBEN PANNOR ET AL., THE UNMARRIED FATHER: NEW HELPING APPROACHES FOR 
UNMARRIED YOUNG PARENTS xii (1971) (reporting that in 1970 “[m]any, including an 
increasing number of middle-class Caucasian girls, chose to keep their babies outside of 
marriage”).  
42. See id. at 44-63.  
43. Judy Klemesrud, The Unwed Father, Long Ignored, Now Gets Counseling, Too, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 1969, at 56. 
44. See, e.g., PANNOR ET AL., supra note 41, at 15 (“When the father is thought of at all, he is often 
imagined to be an older sophisticate who has lured a young innocent girl into a 
compromising situation . . . . Or, perhaps the father is viewed as a sower of wild oats, and as 
such is surreptitiously regarded as having behaved in a manner that is to be expected of red-
blooded youth.”). 
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married counterpart but barred from a licit relationship because of an inability 
to end a prior marriage; the well-intentioned young man willing to marry the 
mother of his child but rejected by her; the poor but sympathetic teenaged 
boyfriend, suffering from a dearth of parental supervision and paternal role 
models;45 the father genuinely interested in maintaining a relationship with his 
child after the breakdown of a nonmarital romance; the eager father bereft over 
a mother’s decision to give up her child for adoption.46 One 1966 study 
concluded that “[a] majority of young men who get girls pregnant out of 
wedlock are neither irresponsible nor casual about their obligations to the girls 
and their babies,” prompting a reporter’s observation that “unwed fathers are 
more emotionally involved with the women they impregnate than is popularly 
believed.”47 A 1969 article reported caseworkers’ newfound perception that 
nonmarital pregnancies often “resulted not from a casual encounter but from a 
long-term, meaningful relationship in which the young people expressed love 
and affection for each other.”48 And social workers at a 1970 workshop on 
unmarried teenage parents “testified that not only did the mothers want to 
keep their babies but that unmarried fathers were also very concerned about 
what happened to the children.”49 
As social scientists and social work professionals began to show greater 
interest in unmarried fathers, Vincent warned that legal rights could not be far 
behind. “[A]s the father is given greater public visibility and receives some 
services,” Vincent wrote, “greater attention will be given to his ‘rights,’ legal 
and otherwise.”50 Vincent proved prescient, forecasting a development aided by 
 
45. See, e.g., Lynn Lilliston, Now What About the Unwed Father?, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1967, at 
H2.  
46. See, e.g., Lynn Lilliston, Father Vies for Custody of His Baby, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1972, at G1 
(describing case of twenty-seven-year-old man who sought custody of baby born to his 
seventeen-year-old former girlfriend, who declined to marry him). 
47. Unemployment a Factor in Illegitimate Births, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Mar. 18, 1967, at 11; see 
also Klemesrud, supra note 43 (“In unmarried pregnancies, people often think it’s the poor 
girl and the ruthless seducer . . . . But very often it’s a frightened boy and an aggressive 
girl.”). 
48. Klemesrud, supra note 43. 
49. Deirdre Carmody, Council Studying Teen-Age Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1970, at 39. 
50. Clark E. Vincent, Illegitimacy in the Next Decade: Trends and Implications, 43 CHILD WELFARE 
513, 518 (1964); see also Rita Dukette & Nicholas Stevenson, The Legal Rights of Unmarried 
Fathers: The Impact of Recent Court Decisions, 47 SOC. SERV. REV. 1, 1 (1973) (quoting 
Vincent, supra); Harry D. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana—
First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 358 (1969) (“No 
rational legislative reason justifies not hearing the interested father who fairly and regularly 
contributes to the support of his child on issues such as the child’s general welfare, 
including his custody and education.”). 
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larger social and legal shifts in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The no-fault 
divorce revolution created a growing contingent of noncustodial fathers whose 
varying levels of post-divorce contact with their children raised questions about 
the presumed correlation between marital status and paternal engagement. 
Pressure began to build for more robust child support enforcement efforts as 
divorce and nonmarital childbearing produced more impoverished single-
parent households.51 
At the same time, feminist attacks on sex-based stereotypes about women’s 
natural superiority as mothers and inferiority as economic and political actors 
undermined the notion that only mothers could nurture and form strong 
psychological bonds with children. Some feminists, including leading legal 
scholars and strategists, envisioned a more gender-neutral approach to the 
family and to family law, arguing that men and women should be free to defy 
traditional gender roles and build egalitarian marriages where both partners 
shared breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities. Fatherhood itself “lost 
cultural coherence,” in the words of historian Robert Griswold, as feminism 
and the entrance of married women and mothers into the workforce in 
unprecedented numbers “prompted a far-reaching cultural debate about 
fatherhood never before known in American history.”52 
Further, as the “best interests of the child” standard began to displace the 
traditional maternal preference in child custody determinations at divorce, the 
definition of children’s best interests evolved. A small but growing body of 
literature suggested that a child’s relationship with his “natural” father was 
crucial as a matter of psychological health as well as financial stability.53 
Influential illegitimacy expert Harry Krause, a law professor at the University 
of Illinois, declared in 1967 that it was “time that the matter be considered 
from the standpoint of the child!”54 In the late 1960s, Krause collaborated with 
the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and other advocates to attack legal 
classifications based on illegitimacy. As I have described in detail elsewhere, 
plaintiffs in these early illegitimacy cases were African-American women and 
their children; opponents of illegitimacy penalties argued that laws excluding 
illegitimate children from wrongful death and workers’ compensation 
payments, from public assistance benefits, from parental inheritance, and from 
 
51. See generally CROWLEY, supra note 9 (describing efforts by social workers, conservatives, and 
feminists to enact and enforce child support laws). 
52. ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 244-45 (1993). 
53. In her history of child custody, Mary Ann Mason notes that, until the 1970s, “the literature 
on fatherhood had been scant.” MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 171 (1994). 
54. Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 484 (1967). 
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child support laws constituted discrimination based on race and poverty. They 
also argued that children should not be penalized based on the marital status of 
their parents, a matter wholly outside their control. By 1972, the Court had 
decided a handful of illegitimacy cases in the plaintiffs’ favor, on decidedly 
child-focused grounds. Without questioning the legitimacy of promoting 
marriage and discouraging nonmarital childbearing, the Court ruled that 
“hapless” and “innocent” children should not suffer for their parents’ 
transgressions.55 
The emerging consensus that punitive anti-illegitimacy measures should 
not be permitted to harm blameless children papered over profound 
disagreement about sex, gender, and the problem of illegitimacy. Whereas 
some civil libertarians, anti-poverty advocates, and later feminists questioned 
marital supremacy, championed sexual liberation, and viewed illegitimacy 
penalties as unjustly subordinating women, Krause and other more 
conservative reformers set out to rescue children from the scourge of 
fatherlessness. The nonmarital child’s best interests, Krause believed, required 
eliminating the legal disabilities that prevented illegitimate children from 
calling upon their fathers’ resources. His proposed Uniform Parentage Act, 
ultimately promulgated in 1973, recommended presumptions for determining 
paternity with the aim of establishing legal relationships between nonmarital 
children and their fathers.56 The fiscal imperative to secure all available private 
sources of support for nonmarital children fused with a growing sense that 
nonmarital fathers could provide less tangible benefits to their offspring—an 
intact sense of self, a stable authority figure, even a sometime caregiver.57 
By the early 1970s, many policymakers and social work professionals 
agreed that previously overlooked nonmarital fathers warranted further study 
and regulation.58 But there was little consensus about how to approach legal or 
social reform of nonmarital fatherhood. Most could agree on the desirability of 
securing paternal financial support from nonmarital fathers, though they 
struggled over the practicalities of holding impecunious fathers responsible. 
 
55. See Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1280. 
56. On Krause’s involvement in drafting the Uniform Parentage Act, see Martha F. Davis, Male 
Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73 (2003). For more on 
Krause and his critics, see Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1288-89. 
57. See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971) (setting out a 
comprehensive case for judicial and legislative reform of the law governing illegitimacy). 
58. See PANNOR ET AL., supra note 41; Harry D. Krause, The Bastard Finds His Father, 3 FAM. L.Q. 
100 (1969); Deborah Shapiro, Effective Services for Unmarried Parents and Their Children: 
Innovative Community Approaches, 43 SOC. SERV. REV. 109 (1969) (book review); Pearl S. 
Weisdorf, Illegitimacy: Data and Findings for Prevention, Treatment, and Policy Formulation, 40 
SOC. SERV. REV. 112 (1966) (book review). 
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But custody and control of children were another matter entirely. Should the 
law continue to assume that nonmarital fathers would routinely shirk their 
parental obligations, rendering them presumptively unfit to participate in their 
children’s upbringing? Or did changing family structures warrant a rethinking 
of nonmarital fathers’ roles? What would nonmarital fathers’ rights mean for 
adoption law and practice? How should disputes between unmarried parents 
be adjudicated? And if feminists hoped to remake marital families in a gender-
egalitarian image, what did sex equality require in the absence of marriage? 
B. “Much is Not Challenged Until Now”: The Court Confronts Equality for 
Unwed Fathers in Stanley v. Illinois 
In the spring of 1970, less than two years after the death of his “common-
law wife” of eighteen years, Peter Stanley looked on helplessly as a judge 
declared his two young children wards of the state, condemning them to a 
series of foster placements and their father to years of legal turmoil. Illinois’s 
definition of “parent” excluded “natural” fathers of illegitimate children, thus 
denying Stanley even a hearing to determine whether he was fit to parent the 
children he loved and had helped to raise from birth. 
These were the stark facts that Peter Stanley’s lawyers presented to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1971. The reality of Stanley’s legal status and of his record as 
a father was more complicated.59 But if Stanley had been a woman, married or 
unmarried, or if he had been able to produce proof of a valid marriage to the 
children’s mother, he would have been their legal parent and would almost 
certainly not have lost his parental rights. 
Stanley’s inability to produce a marriage certificate made him a legal 
stranger to Kimberly, age two-and-a-half, and Peter Jr., age one-and-a-half.60 
In some states, Stanley could have presented proof of a common law marriage, 
but Illinois abolished that institution early in the twentieth century.61 Instead, 
Stanley’s attorneys argued that Stanley “did build up and develop a father 
 
59. For one thing, Stanley’s fitness as a parent had in fact been questioned. See infra note 63 and 
accompanying text. 
60. Claiming that he and Joan had married in November of 1950, Stanley asked his attorneys to 
request a continuance in order to search the public records of Illinois and Indiana for 
evidence. See Appendix at 12, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 654 (1972) (No. 70-5014) 
[hereinafter Stanley Appendix].  
61. On the decline of common law marriage in the twentieth century, see LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 44-55 (2005). See also 
Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal To Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. 
REV. 709, 711 (1996) (arguing that common law marriage protected the interests of women, 
especially poor women and women of color).  
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relationship” with his children. “[W]e feel,” said Fred Meinfelder of Legal Aid, 
that “while he was not legally married to his wife that that should not be a 
basis for removing those children from him . . . .”62 State officials told the 
judge that Stanley was “not in a position to provide financial support” for his 
children but that “if he did have some progress and was to marry and establish 
an orderly family situation” he might be able to petition for custody later.63 His 
lawyers emphasized that if Stanley were not a legally recognized parent, he 
would have no standing to petition later for custody or any other rights. And 
while he might be able to find a wife and “establish an orderly family situation” 
in the future, under Illinois law Stanley could do nothing to change his legal 
parenthood status with regard to Kimberly and Peter, Jr. As an amicus brief 
later put it, “there is no way to marry a dead person.”64 
Before the Illinois Supreme Court, Stanley’s lawyers argued that the 
exclusion of fathers of illegitimate children from the category of “parent” 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.65 In a cryptic opinion, the Illinois court 
ruled that unmarried fathers had no rights to their natural children unless such 
rights were granted to them by a court in an adoption or guardianship 
proceeding.66 Stanley had not sought guardianship or custody of his children, 
preferring to leave them in the care of a married couple whom he had asked to 
look after Kimberly and Peter Jr. a few months earlier. Pursuing an adoption 
would have been risky, as Stanley would have been required to meet a much 
higher standard than mere fitness—he would have had to prove himself a 
“suitable” parent.67 As a practical matter, then, the court’s ruling meant that he 
could be denied all access to the children—and indeed, he later petitioned for 
visitation to no avail.68 
 
62. Stanley Appendix, supra note 60, at 14. 
63. Stanley Appendix, supra note 60, at 29-30. 
64. Brief for Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law as Amicus Curiae at 8, Stanley, 405 U.S. 
654 (No. 70-5014). 
65. In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970), rev’d, Stanley, 405 U.S. 654. 
66. Id. 
67. See Brief for the Petitioner at 7, Stanley, 405 U.S. 654 (No. 70-5014) (noting that suitability 
to parent was “no where defined”). 
68. Stanley’s visitation rights were apparently restored after he appealed to the Illinois Supreme 
Court, but his lawyer reported that “[e]ach time the children would finish seeing their 
father, they would become upset and complain to the foster parents that they wanted to stay 
with their real father.” Fredric Soll, Father Has Hopes of Getting Kids Back, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 
1972, at 3. Kimberly and Peter, Jr. lived in five different foster homes in three years. See id. 
According to Peter Stanley’s attorney, they were eventually reunited with their father and 
his new wife, after several years of instability. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Stanley v. Illinois’ 
Untold Story, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2016). 
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1. Sex and the Single Father: Stanley Before the Supreme Court 
Stanley’s case reached the Supreme Court at a turning point in the law of 
sex equality. The Court’s most recent ruling on a sex-based equal protection 
claim had upheld Florida’s exemption of women from jury duty on the ground 
that the “woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.”69 In 
1971, the Court had yet to extend the umbrella of equal protection to forbid sex 
discrimination against women, much less against men.70 But lower courts were 
beginning, in fits and starts, to rule for sex discrimination plaintiffs, and with 
the women’s movement resurgent, the political climate seemed increasingly 
hospitable. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was before Congress; 
advocates for abortion law reform argued that reproductive freedom was 
central to sex equality;71 Ginsburg brought a lawsuit on behalf of a man who 
cared for his elderly mother but was denied Social Security benefits awarded to 
similarly situated female caregivers;72 and feminist lawyers from the Center for 
Constitutional Rights demanded equal parental-leave benefits for a husband 
who wished to stay home to care for his newborn child.73 Although feminists 
who had long challenged women’s legal, political, and economic disabilities 
were beginning to represent male plaintiffs disadvantaged by sex stereotypes, 
nonmarital fathers’ claims under the Constitution were new.74 
Illinois’s custody statute discriminated based on both marital status and 
sex: the category of “legal parent” included unmarried mothers but not 
unmarried fathers; marital fathers were parents, but nonmarital fathers were 
not. Peter Stanley’s case, argued the same day as Reed v. Reed,75 a sex equality 
challenge to Idaho’s preference for male estate administrators, struck many as 
primarily involving a question of sex discrimination—or “sex discrimination in 
reverse,”76 in one reporter’s characterization. A typical headline the day after 
 
69. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). For more on Hoyt, see LINDA K. KERBER, NO 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 177-83 (1998). 
70. For more on this pivotal period, see MAYERI, supra note 11, at 9-75; and Serena Mayeri, 
Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 755, 801-19 (2004). 
71. See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and 
Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 815 (2007). 
72. On Moritz, see Franklin, supra note 18, at 122-24. 
73. See Danielson v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
74. Constitutional sex equality arguments against illegitimacy penalties had yet to emerge fully 
in the early 1970s. See Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1344-45.  
75. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
76. John P. MacKenzie, Supreme Court Rules for Working Mothers, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1971, at 
A2. Justice Blackmun’s clerk Robert E. Gooding, Jr. initially characterized the question 
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oral arguments announced, “Supreme Court Asked to Upset ‘Sexist’ Laws in 
Illinois, Idaho.”77 Justice Blackmun’s clerk Robert E. Gooding, Jr. thought 
Stanley should have argued that sex was a suspect classification as Ginsburg 
and her ACLU colleagues were contending in Reed.78 Stanley’s briefs instead 
focused on a “biological and cultural” father’s fundamental interest in his 
children as triggering the compelling state interest test. Illinois’s interest, the 
lawyers argued, was not sufficiently compelling to justify the “drastic means” 
of extinguishing an unmarried father’s parental rights upon the death of his 
children’s mother.79 Even under rational basis review, Stanley’s lawyers 
argued, exclusion of unwed fathers from the legal definition of a parent did not 
serve the interests asserted by the state—protecting the welfare of illegitimate 
children and promoting “the procreation of the species by and through the 
marriage relationship.”80 And if the state sought to promote marriage, why 
were unmarried mothers not similarly excluded?81 
Although Stanley’s supporters did not use the language of stereotyping that 
soon would become prevalent in the Court’s sex equality jurisprudence,82 they 
did contend that individuals should not be judged by group-based 
 
presented in Stanley as “whether the Ill statutory scheme, which discriminates . . . solely on 
the basis of the parent’s sex, denies the surviving natural father equal protection of the law.” 
Memorandum from Robert E. Gooding, Jr., Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun (Nov. 18, 1970) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, 
Box 143, Case No. 70-5014 [hereinafter Harry A. Blackmun Papers]). 
77. Glen Elsasser, Supreme Court Asked To Upset “Sexist” Laws in Illinois, Idaho, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 
20, 1971, at D6; see, e.g., Father of 2 Asks Court for Children, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 1971, at 5; 
Fred P. Graham, High Court Bars Sex Bias in Hiring in Test of ‘64 Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
1971, at 1; MacKenzie, supra note 76, at A2. 
78. Gooding observed that it was “not always clear whether pet[itione]r is complaining of 
discrimination as between sole surviving fathers of illegitimate children and sole surviving 
mothers, or as between fathers of illegitimate children and married fathers, or both.” 
Memorandum from Robert E. Gooding, Jr., Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun, supra note 76. 
79. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 67, at 19. 
80. See id. at 23-36. Some saw this test of “means-ends rationality” as a way for the Court to 
avoid difficult substantive questions in equal protection cases. See Gerald Gunther, 
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-24 (1972).  
81. As one Justice told Illinois Attorney General Morton Friedman during oral argument in 
Stanley, “[Y]ou still have to reach the question of why does Illinois treat the man different 
from the woman in this respect? I mean, this is sort of a bootstrap argument. We do not 
make him responsible, therefore, we treat him differently and because we make the woman 
responsible we can treat her differently?” Oral Argument at 28:45, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 654 (1972) (No. 70-5014) http://apps.oyez.org/player/#/burger3/oral_argument_audio 
/16813 [http://perma.cc/K9BV-NRBE] [hereinafter Stanley Oral Argument].  
82. See Franklin, supra note 18, at 91-114. 
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generalizations. Even if most unmarried fathers did not develop stable and 
caring relationships with their illegitimate children, some did, and presuming 
otherwise was unjust and unconstitutional. And even married fathers 
frequently did not develop strong and sustained bonds with their children, 
especially if the marriage had dissolved. Why, they asked, should divorced 
fathers who had not seen their children in years enjoy parental rights while 
devoted, never-married fathers were legal strangers? 
Stanley’s lawyers resisted attempts to frame the equal protection issue as 
one of simple sex discrimination, emphasizing that Illinois singled out unwed 
fathers for discriminatory treatment.83 Illinois’s defense, too, inextricably 
intertwined marital status and sex. Mothers, the state maintained, generally 
assumed legal and social responsibility for their children regardless of 
legitimacy.84 A mother who abandoned her child at birth without arranging for 
its care committed a crime; fathers of nonmarital children did the same with 
impunity.85 Imposing “the full range of parental duties” on mothers and on 
married fathers warranted granting them “the full range of parental rights.”86 
Mothers, by definition, were present from birth. And “[m]othering,” the state 
contended, “is the result of the primary sexual drives of females.”87 
Fathers, on the other hand, required a state-sanctioned legal structure to 
impress them into the bonds of parenthood. To accomplish this feat, Illinois 
concluded, “[t]he chosen institution of the state is marriage.”88 To earn equal 
status with a child’s mother, the state reasoned, a father must demonstrate his 
commitment to the family by marrying her.89 Under Illinois law, in fact, 
marriage was the only way, short of adoption, for a man affirmatively to 
assume parental duties and obtain parental rights. Tying fatherhood to 
marriage, Illinois had developed a “comprehensive statutory pattern” designed 
to ensure that children were cared for by fit and responsible adults.90 Marriage 
conferred parental rights, the state argued, because it entailed non-negotiable 
 
83. At oral argument, one Justice asked whether the equal protection argument boiled down to 
the father/mother distinction, and Legal Aid attorney Pat Murphy replied, “That is the 
narrow equal protection argument. We think it is broader than that. We think the lines are 
just so arbitrarily drawn, in other words why treat Stanley any different than you would a 
wed father in similar circumstances?” Stanley Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 14:31. 
84. Brief for Respondent at 26-27, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014). 
85. See id. at 15-16 (noting that under then-current Illinois statutes unmarried fathers were not 
“parents” and so could not be held criminally liable for abandonment). 
86. Id. at 27 n.25. 
87. Id. at 25. 
88. Id. at 26. 
89. Id. at 27-29. 
90. Id. at 32. 
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duties. Married fathers assumed responsibility for children by virtue of the 
marital bond—indeed, most states conclusively presumed husbands to be the 
fathers of their wives’ children regardless of biology. In contrast, “[t]he 
putative father normally does not live with the mother of his illegitimate 
children on a permanent basis,” the state contended.91 “He establishes no fixed 
family unit, but only a transient relationship . . . .”92 Moreover, unlike a 
legitimate father, he “often has no responsibilities” to his children or their 
mother.93 Even imposing the “pecuniary obligation of support” required legal 
action by the mother.94 
Illinois defended marital primacy both as consonant with children’s best 
interests and as an end in itself. Unmarried fathers rarely took an interest in 
their children, Illinois contended, and when they did, their motives were 
suspect: in Stanley’s case, the state suggested that he wanted access to his 
children’s Social Security survivors benefits but had no desire to assume 
responsibility for their care.95 To ensure that unfit fathers could not manipulate 
the system at their children’s expense, the state required them affirmatively to 
demonstrate commitment and fitness by adopting their children.96 
Stanley’s case against the exclusion of unwed fathers from parental status 
challenged the Court to overturn decades, even centuries, of precedent denying 
any legal relationship between a father and his illegitimate child. He attacked 
the premise that marital status was a proxy for parental fitness. But in another 
sense, Stanley did not radically challenge marital supremacy. His attorneys 
emphasized how Peter and Joan Stanley had lived together in a marriage-like 
relationship, referring to Joan as Peter’s “common-law wife.”97 Peter’s 
relationship with Joan and their children was no different from that of a 
husband and legitimate father, they said, and it was irrational to treat him as if 
he were uninterested and irresponsible. “The fact [that] Peter Stanley was a 
voluntarily acknowledging and supporting father who had created and 
 
91. Id. at 24. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. See id. at 6 (“Peter Stanley . . . expressed his interest in continuing to receive the Social 
Security benefits due Peter Jr. and Kimberly Stanley. No question of custody was raised.”). 
96. The Child Care Association of Illinois worried that giving unwed fathers equal rights with 
mothers would impede the efficiency and finality of adoption proceedings, to the detriment 
of children. See Brief for the Child Care Ass’n of Illinois as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 2, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014). 
97. E.g., Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 67, at 9. Illinois had abolished common law 
marriage in 1905. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 663-64 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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maintained a family is not changed by the mere presence or absence of a 
marriage certificate.”98 
Indeed, Stanley’s lawyers suggested, couples who cohabited without 
marriage were different from men and women whose casual liaisons produced 
children.  
Except for the legal factor, this may be a family like any other. . . . The 
very fact that they are parents in the social and emotional as well as the 
biological sense distinguishes them immediately from the unmarried 
mother and the unmarried father who establish no real or lasting 
relationship with each other.99  
In other words, the brief implied, the quality of a father’s relationship to the 
mother of his children was indeed relevant to determining his parental fitness, 
but sociological reality, rather than legal formality, should guide recognition of 
family status. Notably, such a functional definition of family still relied on 
marriage as a model, maintaining the privatization of dependence and linking 
parental rights to obligations. Even so, Stanley challenged fundamental 
assumptions about sex and marital status as determinants of legal parenthood. 
2. “The Mother-Father Dichotomy”: Sidestepping Sex Equality in the 
Supreme Court 
Internal correspondence reveals how much was up for grabs as the Justices 
grappled with questions of sex equality, the significance of marital status, and 
contested assumptions about unmarried fatherhood. Some early drafts of 
Justice Byron White’s opinion in Stanley decried the Illinois law as sex 
discrimination, pure and simple.100 A draft opinion by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall excoriated the equation of nonmarital fatherhood with paternal 
dereliction.101 Ultimately, however, White’s sex equality analysis did not 
survive, Marshall never filed his opinion attacking marital status 
discrimination, and Stanley’s legacy for equal protection law remained 
 
98. Id. at 22; see also Murray, supra note 4, at 399-413 (arguing that fathers who acted like 
husbands elicited more sympathy from the Court than those who never lived with their 
children’s mothers). 
99. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 67, at 22 (quoting YOUNG, supra note 37, at 147) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
100. See sources cited infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text. 
101. See sources cited infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text. 
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ambiguous.102 In the end, a case that seemed clearly to present questions of 
discrimination based on sex and marital status became a due process case only 
nominally decided on equal protection grounds. 
The Stanley Court was a Court in transition. Since the first illegitimacy 
cases in 1968, President Richard Nixon had replaced Earl Warren with Warren 
Burger as Chief Justice. Abe Fortas, who, like Warren, voted with the plaintiffs 
in those cases, resigned from the Court; Harry A. Blackmun took his place in 
late 1970. Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan, two of the Justices who voted 
against the illegitimacy plaintiffs, retired from the Court in September 1971, 
and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist were confirmed for their 
seats in December. Because Stanley was argued in October 1971, neither Powell 
nor Rehnquist participated; the case was heard and decided by a seven-
member Court.103 
Framing Stanley as a sex discrimination case might have seemed a 
promising strategy to overcome the Court’s apparent ambivalence about 
nonmarital fatherhood. In the 1971 case Labine v. Vincent, the Court appeared 
to retreat abruptly from its 1968 decisions in Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. 
American Guarantee & Liability Co. recognizing the rights of illegitimate 
children to equal protection of the laws.104 Newly minted Justice Blackmun had 
cast one of his first Supreme Court votes in Labine to uphold an inheritance law 
that distinguished between the legitimate and illegitimate children of fathers 
who died intestate. Yet Blackmun was inclined to sympathize with Stanley’s 
plight. “This is a very appealing case on its facts,” he wrote in an internal 
memo. “Those facts, of course, make it difficult to affirm if one is going to be 
at all emotional.” After reading his clerk’s bench memo, Blackmun tentatively 
changed his mind, but noted that he could “be persuaded otherwise.”105 
 
102. The Court’s decision in his favor did not guarantee Stanley parental rights. The day after the 
ruling, the Chicago Tribune reported that Stanley had married a divorcée with three children 
of her own and that his lawyer believed his “chances of regaining custody of [his] children 
are good.” Soll, supra note 68. Almost a year later, he had not regained custody, as the State 
of Illinois tried to prove Stanley was an unfit parent. See Father’s Custody Fight Continues, 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1973, at 5. In July 1973, a judge “declared the children were neglected . . . 
after Karen Stanley, 21, another daughter, charged that Stanley assaulted her and made 
sexual advances after the mother’s death in 1969.” Joseph Sjostrom, Unwed Dad Loses Rights 
to Children, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1973, at A16. In September of that year, Kimberly and Peter 
became wards of the state. Id.  
103. The same was true of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
104. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537-39 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona 
v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). For more on Labine, see Mayeri, supra 
note 21, at 1300-05. 
105. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1-2 (Aug. 17, 1971) (on file with Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 76). At various points, Blackmun was persuaded otherwise, 
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At first, it seemed this “close and interesting” case would be dismissed on 
procedural grounds.106 At conference, four of the seven sitting Justices—Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stewart—voted to dismiss 
the petition as improvidently granted due to uncertainty about the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s vague opinion interpreting the state law. Brennan drafted a 
brief per curiam opinion to this effect.107 
However, the other three Justices soon circulated dissents from the 
proposed dismissal, some advancing views of the case not presented by the 
litigants. Justice William O. Douglas, recently the author of the Court’s first 
decisions invalidating illegitimacy-based discrimination,108 initially saw the 
Illinois law not as “an invidious discrimination against unwed fathers, but 
rather a protection of illegitimate children.” Most unmarried fathers, Douglas 
opined, “are not present at their children’s births and like hit-and-run drivers 
are difficult to locate.”109 Most unmarried mothers did not remain involved in 
their children’s lives, either, he believed, but rather “decide[d] to place their 
offspring in the care of the state.”110 Given children’s interest in “swift and 
certain placement in adoptive homes,” and prospective parents’ likely 
reluctance to adopt if a father might “later demand custody or visiting 
privileges,” Douglas thought the Illinois scheme reasonable.111 Even when 
unwed fathers volunteered for parental duty, Douglas, like Illinois’s lawyers, 
suspected their motives might be more pecuniary than paternal.112 In any event, 
he could not imagine “an alternative system which might more meticulously 
tailor [the challenged law] to its legislative objective of ensuring the welfare of 
illegitimate offspring.”113 
 
though he eventually joined Burger’s dissent. See generally Memorandum from Justice Harry 
A. Blackmun to Justice Byron R. White (Nov. 18, 1971) (on file with Thurgood Marshall 
Papers, Library of Congress, Box 91, Folder 6 [hereinafter Thurgood Marshall Papers]). 
106. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105. 
107. Josh Gupta-Kagan suggests that Brennan may have voted to dismiss the petition as 
improvidently granted to avoid a ruling against Stanley. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 68, at 5.  
108. Levy, 391 U.S. at 68; Glona, 391 U.S. at 73. 
109. Justice William O. Douglas, First Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 4 (Nov. 4, 1971) (on file 
with William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1556, Case No. 70-5014(d) 
[hereinafter William O. Douglas Papers]). 
110. Id. The reality was more complicated and varied significantly by race and class. See generally 
SOLINGER, supra note 34. 
111.  Justice William O. Douglas, First Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois, supra note 109. 
112. Justice William O. Douglas, Second Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 4 (Nov. 5, 1971) (on 
file with William O. Douglas Papers, supra note 109). 
113. Id. at 5. 
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Douglas’s draft cast unmarried fathers as callous, irresponsible, and 
opportunistic, in implicit contrast to married fathers, whose legal responsibility 
for their legitimate children presumptively entitled them to parental rights.  
His focus on adoption suggests that the mothers and children Douglas had  
in mind were white (as the Stanleys were).114 Marshall likely perceived the  
legal treatment of nonmarital parenthood as particularly affecting African-
American families. His draft opinion115 called the use of marital status as a 
proxy for parental fitness an “overinclusive stereotype.”116 To presume that  
an unwed father was “most likely to have weak emotional and practical ties  
to his children, and little ability or willingness to assume parental 
responsibilities” was to make a “judgment” that “suffers from the deficiencies 
 
114. Douglas, who authored the Court’s opinion in the first two “illegitimacy” cases in 1968, may 
have been aware that adoption rates for nonwhite nonmarital children, especially African 
Americans, were much lower than those for white nonmarital children. See Mayeri, supra 
note 21, at 1291 (discussing, inter alia, the NAACP LDF’s brief in Levy v. Louisiana, which 
pointed to the disparity in adoption rates to underscore the racially disparate impact of anti-
illegitimacy laws). 
115. Marshall’s draft apparently was initially conceived as a dissent from Brennan’s per curiam 
opinion dismissing the opinion as improvidently granted, but by the time it circulated, 
White’s draft dissent from the dismissal had become the majority opinion. 
116. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois 6 (Nov. 1971) (on file with 
Thurgood Marshall Papers, supra note 105, at Box 91, Folder 5). At oral argument, Marshall 
had pressed Illinois Attorney General Morton Friedman on the relevance of marriage to a 
father’s relationship with his children: 
Marshall:  Mr. Friedman, suppose Stanley had married this woman he had been 
living with two days before she died, what would his position be? 
Friedman:  Mr. Justice Marshall, he would then be classified as a legal parent and 
entitled automatically to custody and control of them. 
Marshall:  The same man? 
Friedman:  Yes, sir. He would be— 
Marshall:  But he changed, when he married he changed? 
Friedman:  No, he did not change one bit. He performed a legal act that imposed 
on him by law responsibility for the children beyond mere money 
payments by the act of marriage. 
Marshall:  I do not see any change of anything. 
Friedman: He changed not at all but by the act the marrying the woman he 
became liable under law for more responsibilities than he had before. 
He became liable for the schooling, for sending the child to school. 
Marshall:   That makes him [a] more fit parent? . . . [Y]ou said primary interest 
of the child, I thought I understood you. 
Friedman:  That is correct sir. 
Marshall:  Well as to the child, what difference?  
Stanley Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 43:09. 
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of any stereotype.”117 The leap from illegitimacy to unfitness, Marshall argued, 
was wholly unwarranted. “There are many reasons for illegitimacy in our 
society . . . ,” he wrote, including incentives created by welfare programs.118 A 
father “might decline to marry the mother of his children in order to maximize 
the family’s eligibility for financial assistance,” in which case “the fact of 
illegitimacy provides no support whatever for the inference that the father lacks 
concern for his children; indeed, it may tend to suggest the contrary 
conclusion.”119 Or, like Stanley, a father might have lived with his children and 
their mother in what would, in some states, be a common-law marriage.120 
Given the “enormous magnitude” of the deprivation suffered by fathers who 
developed relationships with their children, and the low cost of giving fathers 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, Marshall argued that Illinois law denied 
unwed fathers equal protection.121 
Of the three draft dissents from dismissal, only White’s survived, though 
his eventual majority opinion in Stanley differed significantly from earlier 
versions. White’s first draft castigated the state for “impos[ing] the 
presumption that if a father did not engage in the formal ceremony which 
would have bound his relationship with the now deceased mother until death 
or divorce, that therefore he is now unfit to raise his children.”122 That 
presumption, White insisted, “risks running roughshod over the interests of 
both the surviving father and the children.”123 It also violated Stanley’s right to 
due process, since “there is nothing in this record lending any assurance, much 
less substantial assurance, to the proposition that Peter Stanley, having lived 
with and supported his children all their lives, is an unacceptable father solely 
because of his failure to participate in a marriage ceremony.”124 Before Stanley 
 
117. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois, supra note 116, at 5. 
118. Id.  
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 5-6. 
121. Id. at 6. 
122. Justice Byron R. White, First Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 4-5 (Nov. 8, 1971) (on file 
with Byron R. White Papers, Library of Congress, Box 227, Folder 8 [hereinafter Byron R. 
White Papers]). The first part of White’s draft opinion explained why the per curiam 
opinion was wrong to suggest that Stanley could just adopt, or that he could seek custody 
and control. Adoption, for a poor father without a plan to change his circumstances, was not 
a real option, and custody and control (guardianship) would not give Stanley full parental 
rights. In any event, White wrote, “[T]o give an unwed father only ‘custody and control’ 
while an unwed mother or a married father retained the rights of natural parenthood, would 
still be to leave the unwed father prejudiced by reason of his status.” Id. at 4.  
123. Id. at 5. 
124. Id. at 6-7.  
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could be deprived of his children, White wrote, he must at least have “the 
opportunity . . . to demonstrate that he has not been a neglectful parent.”125 
Unlike his final opinion, White’s first draft also tackled Stanley’s equal 
protection claim head-on, framing the Illinois law as discriminating against 
unmarried fathers as compared with all other biological parents. “It may be,” 
White wrote, 
that in general there is some relationship between unwed fathers and 
incompetent fathers. It is plausible that the relationship between the set 
of unwed mothers and the set of incompetent mothers is weaker than 
the relationship between the counterpart sets of fathers. It even may be 
that separated or divorced fathers are more likely to be competent than 
are unwed fathers.126 
White “doubt[ed] all these propositions. But even if they are all in general well 
taken, some unwed fathers are fit parents, some married fathers and unmarried 
mothers totally unfit.”127 The stereotype might have some basis, in other 
words, but “convenient administrative discrimination of this nature cannot be 
tolerated when the issue at stake is the potential dismemberment of a 
family.”128 
White’s draft apparently persuaded Douglas, who circulated a new draft of 
his own, much shorter than the first, agreeing that Illinois’s presumption of 
unfitness violated procedural due process.129 Douglas did not agree with 
White’s equal protection analysis, however: he read White’s draft to forbid 
states from “requir[ing] a stricter showing of parental fitness” from unwed 
fathers than from other parents.130 
White’s second draft—now styled as an opinion for the Court—possibly 
appealed even less to Douglas, for it framed the equal protection claim as a sex 
discrimination issue: 
[O]n the death of a spouse, unwed fathers lose their children but 
unwed mothers suffer no diminution of control. This discrimination 
between natural parents according to the superficial mother-father 
 
125. Id. at 7. 
126. Id. at 8. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 9.  
129. Justice William O. Douglas, First Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 20, supra note 109. 
130. See id.; Memorandum from William H. Alsup, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice 
William O. Douglas (Nov. 10, 1971) (on file with William O. Douglas Papers, supra note 
109). 
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dichotomy unnecessarily ignores and impermissibly overrides the 
relevant criterion of a parent’s capacity to raise his child. Under this 
standard, capable men . . . are separated from [their children], simply 
because they are men. Such a division of the class of biological parents 
into two groups, each defined by an immutable characteristic that does 
not reliably reflect the underlying realities with which the State is 
concerned, cannot pass muster in the face of constitutional standards 
long established and recently reiterated by this Court.131 
White’s draft went on to quote at length from Chief Justice Burger’s yet-to-be-
released opinion in Reed v. Reed, which struck down Idaho’s preference for 
male estate administrators and for the first time invalidated sex discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause.132 
White’s sweeping sex discrimination argument was risky, as it implied that 
mothers and fathers should have equal rights to their children, perhaps 
regardless of marriage or other factors. Neither Stanley nor his amici had gone 
this far, and it seemed unlikely that this view could command a plurality, much 
less a majority of the Court. Indeed, in his never-published draft opinion, 
Marshall did not opine on whether nonmarital fathers were entitled to equal 
rights with mothers in a custody dispute between parents; Stanley’s suit was, 
crucially, “a contest with the state,” not with a mother or a married father.133 
Neither White’s full-blown sex neutrality rationale nor Marshall’s 
emphasis on marital status equality garnered a majority.134 In the end, White’s 
 
131. Justice Byron R. White, Second Draft Opinion for the Court in Stanley v. Illinois 8 (Nov. 
18, 1971) (on file with Byron R. White Papers, supra note 122, at Box 227, Folder 8).  
132. 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971). Reed v. Reed was handed down several days later, on November 22, 
1971. Id. at 71.  
133. Justice Thurgood Marshall, supra note 116, at 7 n.4. Marshall wrote: 
This case does not present the question whether the father and the mother are 
entitled to equal rights in a custody contest between them, and we intimate no 
views on that question, which may involve considerations quite different from 
those presented by this case. Here we are concerned only with the question 
whether the father of an illegitimate child, in a contest with the State, is entitled 
to the same recognition as a parent that would be afforded by the State to the 
father of a legitimate child, or to the mother of any child. 
Id. In Justice Marshall’s second draft, the text of this footnote appeared in the body the 
opinion. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Second Draft Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois 3-4 (Nov. 
1971) (on file with Thurgood Marshall Papers, supra note 105, at Box 91, Folder 6). 
134. The stronger due process holding in Justice White’s final opinion apparently persuaded 
Marshall to join him and leave his own draft opinion unpublished. See Gupta-Kagan, supra 
note 68, at 38; Memorandum from Barbara Underwood, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to 
Justice Thurgood Marshall 1 (Feb. 4, 1972) (on file with Thurgood Marshall Papers, supra 
note 105, at Box 91, Folder 5) (“I think Justice White’s revised opinion is a great 
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opinion for the Court focused almost entirely on due process, affirming 
Stanley’s “interest . . . in the children he has sired and raised” but leaving open 
many questions about the ruling’s scope.135 A lengthy passage about parental 
rights consigned to a footnote in earlier drafts appeared prominently in the text 
of the finished opinion. “The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have 
been deemed ‘essential,’” White wrote.136 The interest of a “man in the children 
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection.”137 White used the early illegitimacy cases 
to support the extension of this solicitude to unmarried fathers. “Nor has the 
law refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage 
ceremony,” he wrote, characterizing the “familial bonds” of nonmarital families 
as “often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more 
formally organized family unit.”138 Even if granting procedural protections to 
unmarried fathers would be costly and time-consuming, “the Constitution 
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency,”139 White concluded, and to 
deprive unwed fathers of a fitness hearing available to all other custodial 
parents denied them equal protection.140 As constitutional scholar Gerald 
Gunther observed, the Court’s decision relied only “marginally” on equal 
protection, a back door through which to decide the case without relying on an 
argument not raised in the state courts below.141 
The Court’s opinion in Stanley sidestepped the questions White had faced 
head-on in his earlier draft: could states deny unmarried fathers rights they 
granted to unmarried mothers? How did the nascent jurisprudence of sex 
 
improvement over his first draft. While I still prefer our approach . . . . I see no compelling 
reason not to join Justice White’s opinion.”). 
135. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Gupta-Kagan suggests that White dropped 
most of the equal protection language and strengthened his due process holding in an effort 
to command a majority. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 68, at 27-39. 
136. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
137. Id.  
138. Id. at 651-52. 
139. Id. at 656.  
140. Id. at 649 (“We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a 
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and that, by 
denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children 
is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
141. Gunther, supra note 80, at 25. The Court’s analysis also avoided wading too deep into 
substantive due process, a concern Marshall clerk Barbara Underwood expressed about 
Justice White’s earlier drafts. See Memorandum from Barbara Underwood, Clerk, U.S. 
Supreme Court, to Justice Thurgood Marshall 2 (Nov. 22, 1971) (on file with Thurgood 
Marshall Papers, supra note 105, at Box 91, Folder 6). 
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equality apply, if at all, to unwed parents’ rights and duties? Burger—author of 
the cryptic opinion in Reed, which revitalized sex-based equal protection law—
made his views clear in dissent. He thought states were “fully justified in 
concluding, on the basis of common human experience, that the biological role 
of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds between 
her and the child than the bonds resulting from the male’s often casual 
encounter.”142 White’s majority opinion did not speak directly to this sex 
discrimination question, which many believed to be central to the case.143 
Stanley’s effect on marital primacy also remained nebulous. Certainly, 
granting any rights to unwed fathers made paternal prerogatives less 
dependent upon marital status than they traditionally had been.144 As Chief 
Justice Burger wrote in an early draft of his dissent, “Unmarried fathers are not 
recognized, they are given no rights, and they are burdened with no 
responsibilities. . . . This has been the pattern of society’s dealing with the 
support and paternity of illegitimate children for centuries and never 
challenged until now.”145 In the margin of his copy, Justice Blackmun, who 
eventually joined Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, wrote: “Well, much is not 
challenged until now,” and cited Reed v. Reed.146 Although it opened the door 
to further erosion, Stanley declared an end neither to the “mother-father 
dichotomy” nor to the privileging of marital families. 
Many saw Stanley as “revolutionary” in its unprecedented embrace of 
biological fathers’ due process rights, and its declaration that children could 
not be removed from a parent’s custody without a hearing to determine fitness. 
But whether Stanley portended more than nominal parental rights for 
nonmarital fathers remained to be seen.147 Stanley pitted an apparently involved 
 
142. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Burger sarcastically noted in a 
memo to the conference that his dissent contained “unacknowledged plagiarizing” from 
Douglas’s “excellent” original opinion. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
to the Conference (Dec. 2, 1971) (on file with Thurgood Marshall Papers, supra note 105, at 
Box 91, Folder 6). 
143. Contemporaneous commentary recognized this limitation. See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, Male 
Lib: No Relief for the Chauvinist Pigs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1972, at E9. 
144. The Court’s contemporaneous decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, extending constitutional 
protection to unmarried individuals and couples who sought access to contraception, 
seemed to bode well for equal protection challenges to law that discriminated based on 
marital status, but it, too, had ambiguous ramifications. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (applying 
rational basis review under the equal protection clause). 
145. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 8 (Dec. 2, 1971) (on file 
with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76).  
146. Id. 
147. On the questions left open by Stanley, see, for example, KENNETH DAVIDSON, RUTH BADER 
GINSBURG & HERMA HILL KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
the yale law journal 	 125 :229 2   20 16  
2324 
 
father against the state; when the interests of mothers, husbands, marital 
fathers, or adoptive parents weighed in the balance, granting rights to unwed 
fathers seemed more like a zero-sum game.148 
i i .  the emergence of a  feminist  dilemma: parenthood, 
(non)-marriage,  and the sex equality  revolution,   
19 7 2 -7 7  
The 1970s were transformative for feminism, family law, and not 
coincidentally, the rise of conservative movements to reassert traditional 
values. This Part describes developments in feminist legal advocacy, sex 
equality law, marriage and divorce, fathers’ rights, and anti-feminism that 
shaped how advocates and legal decision makers viewed nonmarital 
fatherhood. Feminists agreed that sex neutrality for married parents served the 
goals of women’s equality and liberation from traditional gender roles, and 
they persuaded the Court to endorse their egalitarian vision of marital 
parenthood. However, feminists were ambivalent about sex neutrality in 
nonmarital parenthood, at least where the interests of mothers and fathers 
diverged. 
Second-wave feminist legal advocates set out to transform the traditional 
marital bargain in which husbands supported wives and children in exchange 
for wives’ caregiving labor and personal services. In the years after Stanley, 
Ginsburg and her allies largely succeeded in persuading the Supreme Court to 
require governmental neutrality with respect to the gendered division of labor 
within marital households. Expanding fathers’ caregiving roles was a key 
component of Ginsburg’s vision of egalitarian marriage, in which husbands 
and wives enjoyed the freedom to choose nontraditional roles and to become 
interdependent, even interchangeable spouses. A less visible and less successful 
strand of feminist legal advocacy attacked illegitimacy penalties as an affront to 
sex equality. Fathers played a more complicated role in this strand of advocacy, 
depending on the context of the rights or benefits fathers claimed as rightfully 
theirs. Feminism’s relationship to the movement for divorced fathers’ rights 
was similarly complex. And increasingly, feminists disagreed among 
themselves over the meaning of sex equality for nonmarital parenthood. 
 
366-71 (2d ed. 1981); KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF FAMILY LAW 73 (1982); 
and David S. Baron, Constitutional Law—Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection—Rights of 
the Unwed Father—Consent to Adoption, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 312, 316 (1976). 
148. Cf. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977) 
(Brennan, J.) (noting the difficulty of finding a constitutionally protected liberty interest for 
one individual when doing so would “derogat[e] from the substantive liberty of another”). 
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A. “An Ideal Case”: Married Fathers as Equal Parents in Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld 
In the years following Stanley, many of feminists’ greatest advances toward 
constitutional sex equality came in cases involving sex-based classifications in 
the provision of government benefits to married couples. Ginsburg’s 
“grandmother brief” in Reed v. Reed contained a now-famous Appendix that 
listed hundreds of sex-based distinctions in state and federal marriage laws.149 
Many feminist legal advocates saw marriage as a primary vehicle for the 
perpetuation of sex and gender roles that confined women to a stifling 
domesticity and deprived them of political and economic power. Marriage also 
loomed as a central locus of government complicity in sex inequality. Feminists 
argued that by casting husbands as breadwinners and wives as dependent 
caregivers, the state devalued women’s wage-earning and men’s caregiving 
work, rewarding gendered division of labor in marital households and 
penalizing couples who failed to conform to traditional gender roles. 
Accordingly, many of the cases in the growing constitutional sex equality 
canon involved married couples or widowers challenging the government’s 
previously unquestioned prerogative to distinguish between husbands and 
wives for the purposes of awarding government benefits. Ginsburg’s litigation 
campaign convinced a majority of the Court that the government should 
remain neutral toward gender roles in the marital family. In cases such as 
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) and Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), the Court struck 
down government benefit schemes that assumed wives’ and widows’ 
dependence and deprived the families of women wage-earners of advantages 
available to their male counterparts.150 Backed by a robust social movement 
seeking equality on many fronts, including legislative and constitutional 
amendment advocacy at the state and federal levels, these cases helped 
feminists to achieve through litigation what they had originally sought to 
accomplish through an equal rights amendment.151 
Feminists’ vision of gender-egalitarian marriage extended beyond 
breadwinning wives; they took care also to spotlight the abilities and 
importance of fathers as caregivers and nurturers of children. Ginsburg and her 
colleagues believed that encouraging husbands to take on greater 
 
149. Brief for Appellant at 69-88, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4). This appendix 
was cited in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). 
150. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-
91 (1973); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282 (1979) (requiring alimony statutes to be sex-
neutral). 
151. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: 
The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323-24 (2006). 
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responsibilities at home was integral to enabling women to pursue rewarding 
careers without sacrificing family relationships or well-being. Such active 
fatherhood also benefited men and children, who would enjoy richer 
relationships liberated from the traditional gender roles that, as Ginsburg often 
emphasized, limited men as much as women. In Ginsburg’s “ideal case,”152 
Stephen Wiesenfeld, widowed by his wife’s death in childbirth, challenged his 
exclusion from Social Security “[m]other’s insurance”153 benefits, which would 
have allowed a widowed mother to reduce her working hours and receive 
government support to care for a child at home. 
In a rare unanimous decision, the Justices agreed. Justice Brennan’s 
majority opinion, drafted by his first female law clerk, Marsha Berzon, 
embraced both of Ginsburg’s arguments. Men were, to be sure, “more likely 
than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children,” 
Justice Brennan wrote.154 “But,” he continued, “such a gender-based 
generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration . . . of women who do 
work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.”155 
Paula Wiesenfeld, a schoolteacher and, for a time, the family’s primary 
breadwinner, received fewer benefits from her hard-earned wages than a 
similarly situated man, whose family could have collected “mother’s insurance” 
benefits, would have. Further, the statute discriminated “among surviving 
children solely on the basis of the sex of the surviving parent.”156 It was “no less 
important for a child to be cared for by its sole surviving parent when that 
parent is male rather than female,” Justice Brennan continued.157 “And,” he 
wrote, quoting Stanley, “a father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally 
protected right to the ‘companionship, care, custody, and management’ of ‘the 
children he has sired and raised, (which) undeniably warrants deference and, 
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’”158 
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger, agreed 
that the “statutory scheme . . . impermissibly discriminates against a female 
wage earner,” but attached “less significance” than the majority did to a father’s 
nurturing role.159 “In light of the long experience to the contrary,” Justice 
Powell wrote, “one may doubt that fathers generally will forgo work and 
 
152. An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2004). 
153. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1970)). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 651. 
157. Id. at 652.  
158. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).  
159. Id. at 654 (Powell, J., concurring).  
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remain at home to care for children to the same extent that mothers may make 
this choice.”160 Privately, Justice Powell disapproved of fathers who would 
abdicate the breadwinner role. When his clerk, Penny Clark, speculated that 
fathers who elected to stay home with children would be “a small class, no 
doubt,” Powell wrote in the margin of her memo, “I would hope so—though 
the ever-increasing welfare rolls even in prosperous times suggest a high level 
of indolence.”161 Wiesenfeld marked a triumph for the feminist vision of 
egalitarian marriage and shared parenting, even as it exposed continuing 
ambivalence among the Justices about the proper roles of mothers and fathers. 
B. Fiallo v. Bell and the Feminist Argument for Nonmarital Parents’ Rights 
As Ginsburg and her colleagues sought to encourage an egalitarian division 
of labor at home and in the workplace, another strand of feminist legal 
advocacy focused on alleviating discrimination against mothers of nonmarital 
children. Far less coordinated than Ginsburg’s litigation strategy, the campaign 
against illegitimacy penalties enlisted an assortment of self-identified feminist 
advocates as well as civil rights, anti-poverty, and legal aid lawyers during the 
1970s.162 Feminists argued that laws, policies, and practices that penalized 
nonmarital childbearing had particularly devastating consequences for women, 
who, as a matter of law and of custom, had long borne primary if not exclusive 
responsibility for the care and support of nonmarital children.163 They attacked 
laws that excluded illegitimate children from public benefits, from workers’ 
compensation, from recovery for parents’ wrongful death, and from paternal 
child support and inheritance.164 And they challenged prohibitions on the 
employment of “unwed mothers,” mandatory paternity disclosure 
requirements that forced mothers to reveal the names of their nonmarital 
children’s fathers, and the exclusion of never-married mothers from the Social 
Security survivors’ benefits the Court had extended to marital fathers in 
Wiesenfeld.165 
 
160. Id.  
161. Mayeri, supra note 18, at 1813 (quoting Memorandum from Julia “Penny” Clark, Clerk, U.S. 
Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 3 (Jan. 17, 1975) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. Papers, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 168, Case No. 73-1892, http:// 
law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/73-1892_WeinbergerWeisenfeld.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/U9YJ-H27Q] [hereinafter Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers]). 
162. I have explored feminist and other arguments against illegitimacy penalties in depth 
elsewhere. See Mayeri, supra note 21. 
163. See id. at 1319.  
164. See id. at 1279-80. 
165. See id. at 1318, 1323. 
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Nonmarital fathers appeared in various guises in feminist advocacy against 
illegitimacy penalties. In litigation challenging Texas’s exclusion of nonmarital 
fathers from civil and criminal liability for child nonsupport, these men were 
deadbeats who, aided and abetted by the state, avoided the pecuniary 
responsibilities of fatherhood. In other cases, such as employment bans that 
singled out women with nonmarital children, advocates noted that mothers 
who embraced the responsibilities of parenthood suffered while fathers who 
abandoned their families escaped scot-free. Mandatory paternity disclosure 
cases painted an especially unflattering picture of unwed fathers, with mothers 
expressing their reluctance to involve fathers who might resent being called to 
account, and might even resort to violence. 
But in most illegitimacy penalty cases, the interests of nonmarital mothers 
and fathers were not necessarily opposed. Laws that created obstacles to 
paternal inheritance for illegitimate children thwarted fathers who might have 
intended to provide for their nonmarital offspring. Excluding illegitimate 
children from public benefits or private compensation available to legitimate 
children injured the parent or parents with primary responsibility for those 
children regardless of sex. Even employment bans that did not directly affect 
fathers arguably discouraged them from maintaining potentially salutary 
relationships with their nonmarital children. 
Some of the 1970s cases involved illegitimacy and sex-based discrimination 
that directly disadvantaged nonmarital fathers and, less obviously, harmed 
mothers. One such lawsuit, Fiallo v. Bell, challenged several laws that denied 
certain citizenship and immigration privileges to nonmarital fathers and their 
children, but not to nonmarital mothers and their children.166 Each of the 
plaintiff families in Fiallo included fathers who had supported and nurtured 
their nonmarital children.167 Their briefs used Stanley, Wiesenfeld, and the 
growing social science literature on fatherhood to extol the virtues of 
unmarried fathers who defied stereotypes to participate fully in raising their 
children, only to be unjustly denied the opportunity to transmit or receive 
citizenship status on the basis of the parent-child relationship. 
Fiallo presented a largely foregone opportunity to advance an explicitly 
feminist argument for nonmarital fathers’ rights. Indeed, a footnote in the 
plaintiffs’ brief in Fiallo suggested that eliminating the sex-based 
discrimination in the challenged laws would actually benefit nonmarital 
mothers.168 A U.S. citizen who fathered a child by a noncitizen could rest 
assured that, if he could not care for his illegitimate U.S.-domiciled child, “that 
 
166. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
167. Id. 
168. See Brief for Appellants at 24 n.17, Fiallo, 430 U.S. 787 (No. 75-6297). 
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child can be united in this country with the other parent, the mother.”169 But a 
U.S. citizen mother in the same circumstance “has no similar assurance . . . 
since the father is effectively barred from entering this country.”170 Just as 
Paula Wiesenfeld’s Social Security benefits were worth less to her family than a 
husband’s would have been, so a mother’s U.S. citizenship did not guarantee 
her and her children the care of their “sole surviving parent.”171 Ginsburg 
wanted to file an amicus brief in Fiallo, presumably in order to make just such 
an argument, but despite the support of several colleagues, ACLU Legal 
Director Mel Wulf rejected the idea for reasons that are not clear.172 
Some jurists did see the challenged distinctions between fathers and 
mothers in Fiallo as constitutionally problematic because of their harm to 
fathers and nonmarital children, as opposed to mothers. Judge Weinstein 
dissented from the three-judge district court ruling upholding the laws, and 
Powell’s clerk J. Philip Jordan initially called the laws “totally arbitrary sex 
discrimination,” before concluding that Congress’s plenary immigration power 
nonetheless counseled against striking them down.173 Powell ultimately wrote 
the majority opinion upholding the provisions. His clerk Gene Comey 
recommended that Powell avoid endorsing the government’s contention that 
“natural fathers and illegitimate children” were less likely to have a “strong 
interest in intimacy” than other parents and children.174 Comey saw “no reason 
to rely on this somewhat ‘distasteful’ argument,” which contravened the 
Court’s recent shift toward “a position where legitimate and illegitimate 
families are generally considered to have a strong degree of family intimacy and 
unity.”175 Justice Powell rejected Comey’s advice, referring in his opinion to “a 
 
169. Id. The footnote continued by noting that a citizen or permanent resident mother “could not 
be assured that upon her death her children would be supported and cared for in this 
country.” Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 35. The brief also cited Wiesenfeld throughout. See, e.g., id. at 20, 23, 25. 
172. For more, see Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1329-30, 1329 n.328. 
173. See id. at 1328, 1330 & n.330 (quoting Preliminary Memorandum to Justice Powell 1 (May 10, 
1976) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 186, Case No. 75-6297, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/FialloBell.pdf [http://perma.cc/F3NH 
-WRWY])); see also Kristin A. Collins, Deference and Deferral: Constitutional Structure and the 
Durability of Gender-Based Nationality Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE 
LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine G. Young eds., forthcoming 2016) 
(describing interbranch dialogue about Fiallo and the plenary power doctrine). 
174. Memorandum from Gene Comey, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. 4 (Dec. 6, 1976) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 186, Case 
No. 75-6297, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/FialloBell.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/F3NH-WRWY]). 
175. Id.  
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perceived absence in most cases of close family ties” between fathers and their 
nonmarital children as a legitimate rationale.176 Justice Marshall’s dissent in 
Fiallo condemned the challenged provisions, citing the sex equality cases, the 
illegitimacy cases, and the “fundamental ‘freedom of personal choice in matters 
of marriage and family life.’”177 He saw the majority’s position as sanctioning 
“invidious discrimination” against nonmarital fathers and children, contrary to 
precedents such as Stanley and Wiesenfeld.178 
In cases such as Stanley, Wiesenfeld, and Fiallo, fathers’ constitutional claims 
dovetailed with feminists’ desire to encourage paternal caregiving and to 
combat sex-stereotypes about maternal superiority that threatened women’s 
status as full citizens. In these cases, the interests of mothers and fathers, 
married or not, coincided: fathers’ rights served mothers’ rights. In the 
increasingly contentious arena of divorce reform and child custody, however, 
the story was quite different. 
C. “The Cart Before the Horse”: Divorce, Fathers’ Rights, and the New 
Nonmarital Bargain 
Although unmarried fathers did not organize in large numbers during the 
1970s, divorced fathers did. Legal historian Deborah Dinner has uncovered a 
robust and influential mobilization of fathers’ rights activists intent on shaping 
a new “divorce bargain” in the wake of the no-fault revolution.179 As Dinner 
describes, rising divorce rates and feminist self-assertion threatened the 
patriarchal ideal to which many fathers’ rights leaders subscribed.180 At the 
same time, economic recession, wage stagnation, and rising unemployment 
combined with increasingly vigorous child support enforcement efforts to put 
financial pressure on divorced fathers.181 Fathers’ rights activists capitalized on 
the rise of formal sex equality to argue for their own brand of gender neutrality 
at divorce. Divorced fathers sought to minimize their financial obligations to 
ex-wives and children, arguing that sex equality meant women should support 
themselves post-divorce.182 Ex-wives, they argued, had no claim on their 
former spouses’ income since they were no longer providing the homemaking 
 
176. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799. 
177. Id. at 810, 813-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). 
178. Id. at 810. 
179. See Dinner, supra note 17. 
180. See id. at 93-94. 
181. See id. at 105, 112. 
182. See id. at 110-11. 
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services that underpinned the marital bargain. Moreover, fathers’ rights 
advocates challenged maternal preferences in child custody as unjust sex 
discrimination that deprived fathers of cherished relationships with children.183 
Many feminists, too, scorned the maternal preference, but for very different 
reasons. As Dinner recounts, “[f]eminists argued that the [maternal] 
presumption entrenched gender ideologies that maintained mothers’ primary 
responsibility for caregiving.”184 
Since at least the late 1960s, some feminists had expressed misgivings 
about the no-fault revolution’s consequences for women and children. Fault-
based divorce, they believed, gave wives a valuable bargaining chip: the ability 
to withhold consent if their husbands did not agree to fair financial and 
custody arrangements. Easier divorce, they worried, would not liberate women 
so long as courts did not ascribe value to wives’ homemaking and caregiving 
labor when distributing property and fashioning alimony awards. Instead, men 
would be free to discard their wives, abandon their children, and start life anew 
while newly single mothers with few marketable job skills languished in 
poverty. The decline of the maternal presumption in child custody decision 
making also seemed to undermine women’s bargaining position. Whereas 
maternal preferences placed the onus on fathers who genuinely desired 
custody, the “best interests of the child” standard apparently penalized the 
parent who most feared losing custody, pressuring her to trade away financial 
support in exchange for uncontested custody rights.185 
Anti-feminist activism also pushed more feminists to address the plight of 
women who had devoted their lives to homemaking and motherhood, only to 
find themselves in dire economic straits when their marriages ended. Phyllis 
Schlafly’s campaign against the ERA excoriated the amendment’s proponents 
for abandoning homemakers to the penury of divorce on demand, which, in 
the colorful rhetoric of opponents, allowed husbands to abandon their wives 
and children with impunity.186 Schlafly’s core constituency included women 
who had counted on the traditional marital bargain, only to feel that feminists 
had pulled the rug out from under them. ERA opponents argued that 
egalitarian marriage threatened financial and existential insecurity for women 
who had already chosen to specialize in caregiving. As the ERA ratification 
battle wore on, proponents increasingly emphasized how fragile the traditional 
 
183. See id. at 113-16. 
184. Id. at 114. 
185. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 979 (1979).  
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marital bargain had been under the old regime of title-based property 
distribution and unpredictable alimony awards. They framed the ERA as a tool 
for equalizing the financial consequences of divorce by valuing homemakers’ 
contributions to the marital household and enforcing divorced fathers’ child 
support obligations.187 
By the mid- to late- 1970s, some had begun to question whether feminists 
had put the cart before the horse, as ACLU Juvenile Rights Project director  
and self-described feminist Rena Uviller suggested. “If sex-neutral custody 
laws presently either reflected a reality of pervasive shared child care during 
marriage or helped eliminate persistent sexual stereotyping in the job market, 
they would be a legitimate feminist objective,” wrote Uviller.188 But the 
economic and social reality of the late 1970s and early 1980s was no egalitarian 
utopia. “The practical fact remains that the male-dominated working world  
is not yet prepared to receive women on equal terms. Nor are fathers in 
meaningful numbers assuming equal child care responsibilities during 
marriage.”189 Fathers’ rights organizations might couch their arguments in 
terms of sex neutrality and children’s best interests, but Uviller detected 
“misogynist[ic] overtones” in their “excoriat[ion]” of wives as “blood-sucking 
parasites” and alimony as “an undiluted evil.”190 In light of severe and 
persistent inequalities in the workplace and at home, maintaining the maternal 
presumption was more like affirmative action than invidious discrimination. 
“[A]t this point in history,” Uviller concluded, “the law should recognize a 
woman’s option to keep the children whose daily care she has so 
disproportionately assumed.”191 
Rising divorce rates converged with nonmarital childbearing to increase the 
number and visibility of single mothers and female-headed households in the 
1970s, plunging even formerly middle-class women and children into poverty. 
Some feminists argued that for many poor women shared parenting was a pipe 
dream. “[T]he vast majority of mothers below the poverty line are single: 
either never married, separated, or divorced,” Uviller wrote in 1978. “For them, 
the notion of shared child care . . . is sheer abstraction.”192 Others doubted that 
paternal involvement in nonmarital families would benefit mothers, and 
resented the state’s attempts to privatize dependence by forcing mothers either 
 
187. Id. 
188. Rena K. Uviller, Fathers’ Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 117 (1978). 
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to identify their children’s fathers and seek child support from them, or to lose 
public assistance. Feminists such as Aleta Wallach and Patricia Tenoso 
challenged the premise that women and children should be dependent upon 
men for sustenance, insisting that mothers should be “treat[ed] . . . as an 
economic resource.”193 The focus on ascertaining paternity obscured 
alternatives, such as “adequate governmental support of all unmarried mothers 
and their children.”194 Increasingly aggressive measures to secure child support 
for poor children reduced welfare expenditures but provided paltry financial 
benefit to mothers. For mothers, the old nonmarital bargain of full parental 
rights in exchange for sole responsibility was eroding, and some feared that 
any expansion of nonmarital fathers’ rights would come at their expense. 
In the context of marriage and divorce, feminists largely agreed on the end 
goal: to promote gender-egalitarian marriages and fairness at divorce. Their 
internal disagreement mostly concerned means: how best to achieve the legal 
and social changes required to transform the gendered division of family labor 
so that women and men alike could participate fully in breadwinning and 
caregiving. Feminists’ disagreement about unmarried parenthood arguably ran 
deeper, and the feminist objective was less clear where a mother and father 
never consented to a legal bond with one another. Should the law encourage 
paternal involvement in nonmarital child rearing, or merely financial 
responsibility? Was unmarried mothers’ primary responsibility for the care of 
their children inevitable, or malleable? What role should individual mothers’ 
preferences about paternal involvement play in decisions about a father’s rights 
and responsibilities? Was adoption by a two-parent family, if desired by the 
mother, a better outcome than giving custody to an unmarried father over the 
mother’s objection? And to what degree should mothers be able to rely on the 
state for support in the absence of paternal involvement? By the mid- to late-
1970s, internal feminist dissension over strategies and priorities in the fight for 
family equality had just begun to surface in public discourse; these disputes 
influenced litigation strategy in unwed fathers’ cases in ways that would only 
later become visible. 
 
193. Patricia Tenoso & Aleta Wallach, Book Review, 19 UCLA L. REV. 845, 850 (1972) (reviewing 
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i i i .  unmarried fathers vs.  husbands in the supreme court,  
 19 7 8-7 9 
Stanley v. Illinois raised serious questions for established adoption law and 
practice.195 Most states had long allowed adoption of illegitimate children 
without notice to the natural father, and some read Stanley’s infamous footnote 
nine to require a dramatic expansion of unmarried fathers’ procedural rights.196 
States scrambled to comply, implementing a patchwork of requirements 
reflecting the idiosyncratic regulation of parental rights generally. Almost half 
the states enacted statutes requiring notice only to fathers who were “either 
known, identified by the mother or ha[d] acknowledged the child.”197 A few 
states removed formal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children 
for adoption purposes, but in practice procedures developed to bypass paternal 
consent. In California, for example, a biological father could not object to an 
adoption if he did not “receive the child into his home and openly hold out the 
child as his natural child.”198 Adoption expert Ruth-Arlene Howe wrote that 
despite the initial panic and temporary halt in adoptions post-Stanley, by the 
end of the decade “the vast majority of states” placed on the unmarried father 
“the burden . . . to affirmatively assert his paternal interests in the child” to 
earn the right to notice and a hearing.199 Still, Stanley broke ground by giving 
many unmarried fathers the opportunity to have a say in their children’s 
future. 
 
195. Adding to observers’ sense that a sea change might be at hand, the Court remanded 
Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, a case involving an unwed father’s opposition to the 
adoption of his biological child, for reconsideration in light of Stanley. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). 
For a contemporaneous journalistic assessment, see, for example, Terry P. Brown, Fathers’ 
Rights: Supreme Court Rulings on Adoption Complicate the Placing of Children, WALL STREET J., 
July 9, 1973, at 1. 
196. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972) (“We note in passing that the incremental 
cost of offering unwed fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings on fitness appears 
to be minimal.”). 
197. Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 186 
(1983). 
198. Id. at 187 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1975)); see also Lynn Lilliston, Bill Spells 
Out Unwed Fathers’ Rights, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1974, at E1 (describing the California 
legislative debate). Notably, the influential Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 recommended 
equal status for the parents of marital and nonmarital children, but as Leslie Harris notes, 
“This equality principle does not dictate a basis for assigning legal parentage status.” Leslie 
Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42 
IND. L. REV. 611, 618 (2009). 
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The prospect of enhanced rights for unmarried fathers troubled many 
observers. If unwed fathers, like their married or divorced counterparts, were 
entitled to object to their children’s adoption, then the difficulty of identifying 
and locating them might derail the adoption process, consigning nonmarital 
children not only to the stigma of illegitimacy but to the poverty and instability 
of life in the care of a reluctant mother or a foster home. This genuine concern 
for the welfare of illegitimate children also reflected the widely held 
assumption that adoption into a two-parent marital family was the best 
alternative for a child born “out of wedlock,” assuming her parents were unable 
or unwilling to marry each other. As the New York Court of Appeals put it in 
1975, giving nonmarital fathers the right to veto an adoption meant that “the 
chances that such a child will have the equal rights and benefits of a home will 
be immeasurably diminished and the likelihood that he or she will be a pawn 
for the avaricious and embittered will be greatly enhanced.”200 
The third-best option for nonmarital children, according to the 
conventional wisdom, was for their mother to marry another man willing to 
adopt them, thereby legitimating the children, offering them a “normal” family 
life, and uniting the family under a single surname. The Supreme Court 
tackled stepfather adoption in two cases decided at the end of the 1970s. Unlike 
Stanley, Wiesenfeld, and Fiallo, where mothers’ and fathers’ interests aligned, 
these cases involved disputes between mothers and fathers, implicating the 
growing tensions among feminists over the meaning of sex equality for 
nonmarital parenthood. 
A. Not a “De Facto Divorced Father”: Rejecting Marital Status Equality in 
Quilloin v. Walcott (1978) 
In Quilloin v. Walcott, Leon Quilloin sought to prevent the adoption of his 
eleven-year-old son Darrell by Randall Walcott, Darrell’s mother’s husband.201 
Quilloin’s paternity was not in question, and the court gave Quilloin, unlike 
Peter Stanley, an opportunity to be heard regarding his request for “partial 
custody, in the form of visitation privileges.”202 
 
200. In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 491-92 (N.Y. 1975). 
201. Walcott’s petition for adoption, filed in March 1976, averred, “It is not necessary to attach 
the consent of the father Leon Quilloin to the adoption . . . because he and the mother were 
not married at the time of the child’s birth.” Petition for Adoption, In re Walcott, No. 8466 
(Ga. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 1976), in Appendix at 3, 4, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) 
(No. 76-6372) [hereinafter Quilloin Appendix].  
202. Writ of Habeas Corpus Establishing Visitation Rights to Minor Child, Quilloin v. Walcott, 
No. C-18672 (Ga. Sup. Ct. May 11, 1976), in Quilloin Appendix, supra note 201, at 10, 10. 
Quilloin simultaneously petitioned to legitimate Darrell. See Petition for Legitimation, 
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A hearing revealed that Darrell’s mother, Ardell, gave birth to him 
prematurely on Christmas Day in 1964.203 He had lived for the first year of his 
life with his mother and maternal grandmother, and then for four years in 
Savannah, while his mother worked in New York.204 Quilloin testified that he 
had provided some financial support when Darrell was a baby, including 
paying for surgery to repair a hernia, and that when Darrell had lived in 
Savannah, the child spent about sixty percent of his time with Quilloin and 
Quilloin’s mother, Mabel Dawson,205 and the remainder with Ardell’s mother, 
Willie Mae Smith.206 Quilloin had purchased milk and clothing for Darrell, 
and had arranged for him to start kindergarten early at the local Catholic 
school.207 Quilloin recounted building a soundproof nursery in the Savannah 
nightclub he managed so that his son could spend time with him at work, and 
arranging for his employees to drive Darrell to and from school.208 Dawson 
testified that the two grandmothers cooperated with Darrell’s parents to take 
care of his needs, and that Quilloin had furnished financial support by 
purchasing necessities or providing funds.209 
In 1969, five-year-old Darrell joined Ardell in New York, where she had a 
new husband and a baby son.210 In the two and a half years before the adoption 
hearing, Quilloin had visited Darrell in New York after a period in which the 
Walcotts “disappeared,” and he had paid for transportation by bus and 
airplane so that Darrell could visit him in Georgia.211 There was some dispute 
over the length and frequency of these visits, but all agreed that Quilloin had 
given Darrell a number of gifts, which his mother felt were “disruptive” to 
family harmony. Quilloin contended that he had always offered financial 
support for Darrell and had provided basic necessities for him when Darrell 
 
Quilloin v. Walcott, No. C-18673 (Ga. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1976), in Quilloin Appendix, supra 
note 201, at 12, 12. 
203. Transcript of Hearing, Quilloin v. Walcott, No. C-18673 (Ga. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1976), in 
Quilloin Appendix, supra note 201, at 20, 44, 51. 
204. Id. at 45. 
205. Ms. Dawson apparently was active in Savannah’s African-American community, including 
in voter registration drives. Id. at 55. At the hearing, she refuted testimony suggesting that 
she was too “sickly” to have cared for Darrell when he lived in Savannah. Id. at 61.  
206. Id. at 45. 
207. Id. at 44-47. 
208. Id. at 45. 
209. Id. at 44-47. “On both sides the family has always been agreeable, you know,” Dawson 
testified. Id. at 60. Ardell sent part of her salary to her mother each week during this period, 
and visited Darrell when she could. Id. at 24, 26. 
210. Id. at 48, 71. 
211. Id. at 27, 49-50. 
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lived in Savannah.212 Quilloin “honestly believe[d] that [Darrell’s] rightful 
place is with his mother,” and sought only visitation.213 “I was brought up 
without a father,” Quilloin recalled: 
[M]aybe if I had a father, you know, I [would have gone] on and 
finished school. . . . I’m not married, so . . . with me, he’s in a broken 
home more or less. I don’t have no objection to her keeping him. It’s 
just a matter of, it’s a little bond between the kid and myself seldom as 
it’s been.214  
Quilloin did not seek full equality with Darrell’s mother; he simply wished to 
be treated, as his lawyer put it, like a “de facto divorced father.”215 
The facts on Quilloin’s side were arguably stronger than the courts 
acknowledged: although Darrell’s parents had never lived together with him, 
Quilloin had spent significant time with his son.216 Darrell himself expressed a 
desire to continue seeing Quilloin, and to be adopted by Walcott; in a poignant 
exchange at the hearing, he seemed not to understand that the two might be 
mutually exclusive.217 Fulton County Superior Court Judge Elmo Holt 
acknowledged Darrell’s wishes, but ruled that Walcott’s adoption, not 
Quilloin’s legitimation and visitation, was in the child’s best interest.218 
Quilloin argued unsuccessfully to the Georgia Supreme Court219 that the state 
law, which considered the mother of an unlegitimated nonmarital child220 to be 
 
212. Id. at 51-54. 
213. Id. at 57. 
214. Id. 
215. Brief for the Appellant at 17, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (No. 76-6372).  
216. Quilloin made an effort to visit Darrell, sometimes against Ardell’s wishes but apparently 
with her mother’s cooperation. See Quilloin Appendix, supra note 201, at 49-52. 
217. See id. at 67-69. Quilloin’s lawyer tried to ask whether Darrell understood “that in the event 
that the Court were to approve the adoption that you might never be able to see Mr. 
Quilloin again?” Id. at 69. But the Walcotts’ attorney and the judge did not allow the 
question. Id. 
218. In re Application of Randall Walcott for Adoption of Child, in Quilloin Appendix, supra note 
201, at 70-72. Incongruously, Georgia amended its law to allow putative fathers to petition 
for legitimacy after an adoption proceeding was underway, but too late for Leon Quilloin. 
See Philip Hager, High Court Clarifies Rights of Parents, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1978, at B10.  
219. Quilloin v. Walcott, 232 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1977). In a case where the biological father had 
“[taken] no steps to legitimate the child or support him,” Stanley simply did not apply. Id.  
220. Under Georgia law, courts applied the best-interests standard to petitions for legitimation, 
which had to occur prior to a mother’s surrender of her child for adoption. See 
Memorandum from S. Elizabeth Gibson, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Byron R. 
White 3 (Nov. 10, 1977) (on file with Byron R. White Papers, supra note 122, at Box 424, 
Folder 5). 
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“the only recognized parent,” and entitled her to consent unilaterally to the 
child’s adoption—violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection.221 
Whereas adoption advocates worried that Stanley would destabilize the 
adoption process, civil libertarians lamented the trend toward terminating the 
parental rights of impoverished parents and relegating their children to 
adoption by more affluent parents or, worse yet, to the foster care system. In 
the mid-1970s, the devastating effects of child removal on Native American 
communities prompted the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act. ACLU 
Juvenile Rights Project director Rena Uviller testified before Congress in 1977 
about the “tyranny of social work in which poor families are often subjected to 
the imposition of standards upon them in the rearing of their children which 
are wholly inappropriate, to say nothing of their questionable 
constitutionality.”222 Yet feminists like Uviller also worried that equal rights for 
nonmarital fathers would undermine the autonomy of women who had borne 
primary or exclusive responsibility for their children.223 
The tension between these two imperatives—limiting government 
incursions into the lives of poor families and fighting against women’s 
subordination—came to a head when Quilloin reached the Court.224 ACLU 
leadership initially voted to file an amicus brief supporting Leon Quilloin, but 
Uviller wrote to Legal Director Bruce Ennis of dissension among the national 
office’s legal staffers. Siding with the unmarried father was “consistent” with 
the ACLU’s position on sex-based classifications, “seemingly consistent” with 
the ACLU’s position on illegitimacy-based classifications, and in keeping with 
the view that child-parent relationships “should not be permanently severed 
 
221. Leon Webster Quilloin’s Second Amendment to Consolidated Actions, in Quilloin 
Appendix, supra note 201, at 16-18. Quilloin’s lawyer cited Stanley for the proposition that 
Quilloin’s demonstrated interest in Darrell entitled him to the same rights as if he had been 
married to his son’s mother. Transcript of Hearing, in Quilloin Appendix, supra note 201, at 
33. The judge replied, “As I understand that case, what that case says . . . is that the father 
has a right to be heard. . . . And that is the purpose for this hearing right now.” Id. at 34.  
222. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the U.S. S. Select Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 95th Cong. 184 (1977) (statement of Rena Uviller, Director, Juvenile Rights Project, 
American Civil Liberties Union). 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 188-192. 
224. In contrast to other prominent cases involving the rights of nonmarital fathers such as 
Stanley, Caban v. Mohammed, Lehr v. Robertson, and Michael H. v. Gerald D., Quilloin stood 
out for its lack of amicus participation at the merits stage. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (two amici), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (two amici), Caban 
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (four amici), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 654 (1972) 
(two amici), with Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (zero amici).  
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for reasons less serious than abandonment or child neglect.”225 But a majority 
of the national office legal staff “believe[d] there [were] serious feminist 
considerations against participating in this case”: 
There is concern that we ought not be arguing that adoption decisions 
of unmarried mothers who have borne sole responsibility for their 
children be subject to the veto of men who have not assumed any 
meaningful responsibility. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of equality, 
the only real advantage that women have in this society is their children 
and even this advantage was a hard-won feminist battle of the 19th 
century, since fathers had sole right to custody of their [marital] 
children until that time.226  
Further, taking Quilloin’s side “could seriously harm the credibility of ACLU 
with the feminist movement.” Moreover, “it could help solidify the opposition 
of traditional housewives to women’s rights, and give them the feeling that 
“women’s lib” is for professional women and against traditional women . . . 
thus further eroding chances of [the ERA’s] ratification.227 
Ennis was torn. He believed the “civil liberties argument” on behalf of 
Quilloin was “extremely strong,” and that “giving fathers greater control over 
the adoption and placement of their children (both legitimate and illegitimate) 
may in fact liberate women.” Ennis reasoned: “To the extent that men accept, 
or are forced to accept, increased responsibility for their children . . . women 
will be freer to pursue other roles.”228 But he also credited the argument that 
“as a practical matter, because of pervasive discrimination against women, true 
 
225. Memorandum from Rena Uviller, Dir., Juvenile Rights Project, ACLU, to Bruce Ennis, 
Nat’l Legal Dir., ACLU 1-2 (July 7, 1977) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd 
Manuscript Library, ACLU Records [hereinafter ACLU Records], Box 2881, Folder 
(unnumbered), “Quilloin v. Walcott (unwed father)”). 
226. Id. 
227. Id.; cf. supra note 188 and accompanying text (questioning the wisdom of seeking equal 
custody rights for divorced fathers before the actual distribution of parenting 
responsibilities had caught up with the feminist egalitarian ideal). Uviller continued:  
I find the feminist implications compelling, particularly when I consider that a 
reversal could give an unmarried father who has had virtually no contact with 
either the child or the mother, and who is not seeking custody for himself, at least 
a veto over the mother’s (and the child’s) future.  
Id. The Women’s Rights Project’s Kathleen Peratis dissented from this position, suggesting 
that the ACLU file a narrowly written amicus brief supporting Quilloin. See Memorandum 
from Bruce J. Ennis, Nat’l Legal Dir., ACLU, to General Counsel Mailing List 1 (July 6, 
1977) (on file with ACLU Records, supra note 225, Box 2881, Folder (unnumbered), 
“Quilloin v. Walcott, 1977)” [hereinafter July 6 Memorandum from Bruce J. Ennis]. 
228. Id. at 3. 
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equality is not possible at the present time, and theoretical equality between 
men and women . . . will in fact disadvantage women.”229 Ultimately, the 
“social and political consequences for women” of a victory for Quilloin were 
“extremely difficult to predict” and this, combined with internal dissension, 
counseled against the ACLU’s participation.230 
It is impossible to say whether Quilloin’s claims would have fared better 
with the ACLU’s support. Quilloin did earn some sympathy from the Justices’ 
clerks. Powell clerk Jim Alt thought it “irrational to give the divorced father a 
voice in the adoption decision, but not the father who never married.”231 
Georgia allowed nonmarital fathers to legitimate their children unilaterally,232 
but, as Alt wrote, Quilloin “had no reason to go to court when, in practice, his 
relationship with his son was satisfactory.”233 Alt thought the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s equal protection ruling “extremely questionable.” He noted that “[a]ll 
of the same state policies could be served and the rigid mother/father 
distinction eliminated” if the state adopted a gender-neutral system “wherein 
the control over consent to adoption of an illegitimate rests with the parent 
‘providing for the wants of the child.’”234 
Nevertheless, Powell alone tentatively voted to reverse the lower court’s 
opinion upholding the statute.235 At oral argument, the Justices expressed 
skepticism about Quilloin’s commitment to fatherhood. They repeatedly noted 
the trial court’s factual finding that Quilloin had neither provided consistent 
 
229. July 6 Memorandum from Bruce J. Ennis, supra note 227, at 2. 
230. Id. at 3.  
231. Memorandum from Jim Alt, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 10 
(Nov. 7, 1977) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No. 
76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]). 
232. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (“[I]n Georgia only a father can by 
unilateral action legitimate an illegitimate child.”). 
233. Memorandum from Jim Alt, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 10 
(Nov. 7, 1977) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No. 
76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]).  
234. Id. at 6.  
235. Powell was not impressed with Quilloin’s facts, calling them “wholly unmeritorious,” and 
looking askance at the fact that “appellant is in the whiskey business and operates a 
nightclub,” and “when the child visited him he was kept in the nightclub.” Memorandum 
from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 3-4 (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161,  
at Box 196, Case No. 76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives 
/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http://perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]). He noted that he wished the Court 
could dismiss the case as improvidently granted, but it could not, since it was an appeal. See 
id. at 1. 
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financial support for Darrell nor taken the relatively simple step of filing a 
legitimation petition.236 Marshall’s narrowly written draft opinion won over 
the previously sympathetic Powell, as well as Blackmun.237 
In the end, the unanimous decision upheld the Georgia adoption statute as 
applied to Quilloin, leaving open the possibility of future challenges.238 But the 
opinion dealt a blow to the argument that equal protection required similar 
treatment for marital and nonmarital fathers. Although Quilloin had, under 
Georgia law, substantially the same support obligation as a separated or 
divorced father, Marshall wrote, “he has never exercised actual or legal custody 
over his child, and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility 
with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the 
child.”239 By contrast, “legal custody of children” was “a central aspect of the 
marital relationship, and even a father whose marriage has broken apart will 
have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period 
of the marriage.”240 The state “was not foreclosed from recognizing this 
difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child.”241 Marshall, 
who had been incredulous that Stanley’s lack of a marriage certificate could 
 
236. See Oral Argument at 11:15, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (No. 76-6372) http:// 
www.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-6372 [http://perma.cc/2JLE-JRQ5]. 
237. Powell’s clerk Jim Alt apologized to Powell after Marshall circulated his opinion: 
 To the extent that you were left out on a limb because of my doubts (yours was 
the only vote at Conference to reverse), I apologize. If the result on the facts of 
this case seems correct to you—as it does to me—I think you could consider 
joining the majority.  
Memorandum from Jim Alt, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
(Dec. 13, 1977) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No. 
76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]). Powell wrote to Marshall the next day: “Although I voted 
tentatively to reverse on equal protection grounds, you have written the opinion so skillfully 
(and narrowly) on an ‘as applied’ basis that I am happy to join you.” Letter from Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Dec. 14, 1977) (on file with Lewis  
F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No. 76-6372, http://law2.wlu 
.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http://perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]). 
Justice Blackmun wrote on Justice Marshall’s second draft: “narrowly & carefully drawn 
opinion. Ok to join.” See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes on Second Draft in 
Quilloin v. Walcott (Dec. 16, 1977) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, 
at Box 270, Case No. 76-6372). 
238. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256 (“[W]e conclude that §§ 74-203 and 74-403(3), as applied in this 
case, did not deprive appellant of his asserted rights under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.”). 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
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nullify his parental rights, now allowed the termination of Quilloin’s: whether 
Darrell would ever again see the man he had known as his father for eleven 
years would be at the Walcotts’ discretion. The Quilloin Court did not, 
however, pass judgment on the sex-based distinction embedded in Georgia’s 
statute, which allowed unmarried mothers but not fathers to veto an 
adoption.242 The sex discrimination question soon returned to the Court in the 
second stepfather adoption case, Caban v. Mohammed. 
B. “Shared By Both Genders Alike”: A Qualified Triumph for Sex Neutrality in 
Caban v. Mohammed (1979) 
Abdiel Caban, unlike Leon Quilloin, had lived with his two children and 
their mother, Maria, for several years, and had since married another woman, 
Nina.243 Even so, the New York Surrogate’s Court interpreted state law to 
provide that Caban could prevent Maria’s new husband, Kazim Mohammed, 
from adopting the children only if he could demonstrate that remaining with 
the Mohammeds was not in the children’s best interests.244 Caban challenged 
this application of the best-interests standard, arguing that it 
unconstitutionally elevated mothers’ rights above those of equally caring 
nonmarital fathers and violated his due process rights.245 
Caban had stronger facts than Quilloin, and his case attracted amicus 
support from the ACLU,246 the Legal Aid Society,247 and Community Action 
 
242. The question was not raised in Quilloin’s Jurisdictional Statement. After reading Alt’s bench 
memo, Powell noted his view that “it makes no sense to give either parent a veto over 
adoption. All that D/P requires is full opportunity to be heard. But there is [] E/P issue.” 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Handwritten Annotations on Memorandum from Jim Alt, 
Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Nov. 10, 1977) (emphases 
omitted) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No.  
76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]). There was, as Blackmun clerk William Block wrote, “a square 
conflict [among courts] over whether the father of an illegitimate is entitled to the same 
parental rights as the mother of the illegitimate.” Memorandum from William H. Block, 
Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 5 (Apr. 15, 1977) (on file with 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 270, Case No. 76-6372). 
243. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382-83 (1979). 
244. Id. at 387-88. 
245. Id. at 385. 
246. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Caban, 441 
U.S. 380 (No. 77-6431). 
247. Brief for Legal Aid Society of New York City as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (No. 77-6431). 
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for Legal Services (CALS).248 At the ACLU, Ennis noted that while the 
organization had “not been overly anxious to speak on this subject” in the past 
(clearly a reference to Quilloin), Caban “contains ideal facts,” in that the “father 
has had a significant relationship with his children.”249 Whereas Quilloin posed 
a dilemma for feminists like Uviller, Caban provided an “excellent 
opportunity”250 to combat the “alarming trend” toward removing children 
from their parents in the name of children’s “best interests,”251 in an amicus 
brief Uviller co-authored with parental rights advocate Martin Guggenheim.252 
Profound changes in marriage patterns and gender roles undermined 
marital-status- and sex-based distinctions in the law of parenthood, the amici 
argued. Their briefs questioned the premise underlying New York’s and many 
other states’ statutory schemes: that adoption, when it entailed termination of 
a parent’s rights, was presumptively in the best interests of illegitimate 
children. The “cruel and undeserved out of wedlock stigma” was largely “a 
thing of the past,” as the CALS brief put it253: “Not only has cohabitation 
without marriage become more respectable, but the high divorce and 
remarriage rates mean that there are many children whose last name may be 
different from that of their remarried mother.”254 Further, the two-parent 
marital family so prized by advocates of stepfather adoption might be just as 
short-lived as the nonmarital relationship that produced the child. Conversely, 
as the ACLU noted, “unmarried fathers may also get married and thus be able 
 
248. Brief for Community Action for Legal Services as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (No. 77-6431). 
249. Memorandum from Bruce J. Ennis, ACLU Juvenile Rights Project, to General Counsel 
Mailing List 3 (June 5, 1978) (ACLU Records, supra note 225, at Box 2788, Folder 
(unnumbered), “Caban v. Mohammed (father’s rights), 1978”). 
250. Id. The ACLU’s “most important goal,” Ennis wrote, was “preserving the integrity of the 
family.” Id. 
251. Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun (Oct. 26, 1978) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 
290, Case No. 77-6431).  
252. To Uviller, the best-interests standard, of questionable value in the custody context, was 
often devastating when the possible termination of parental rights was at stake. See Uviller, 
supra note 188. Martin Guggenheim later authored an important critique of the implications 
of prioritizing children’s “best interests” over the interests of their parents. See MARTIN 
GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2007). 
253. Brief for Community Action for Legal Services as Amicus Curiae, supra note 252, at 32. 
254. Id. 
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to supply a ‘normal’ home for the children.”255 Indeed, Caban had done just 
that.256 
Amici elaborated on the anti-sex-stereotyping arguments made in Stanley 
and Fiallo, citing social science literature to support their contention that many 
unmarried fathers played active and crucial roles in their children’s lives, while 
many divorced and separated fathers did not. After decisions such as 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld257 had condemned sex stereotypes, it was no longer 
permissible to generalize about unmarried fathers’ irresponsibility and 
dissolute character, amici contended. The briefs also emphasized that in other 
areas of family law, sex-based discrimination between fathers and mothers had 
receded.258 In 1973, for instance, a New York Family Court judge jettisoned the 
tender years presumption favoring maternal custody for young children as 
unconstitutionally “based on outdated social stereotypes” and a “traditional 
and romantic view” of “mother love.”259 
Caban and his amici also made substantive due process arguments. The 
Legal Aid Society brief declared that 
[t]he gravity of the deprivation and emotional turmoil imposed upon 
Mr. Caban himself cannot be overestimated. Despite the fact that he 
has shouldered far greater responsibilities for the care and supervision 
of his children than have many married, separated or divorced fathers, 
his familial bonds were afforded only the most cursory recognition in 
the adoption proceedings.260  
 
255. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, supra note 246, at 14. 
256. Some scholars have suggested that outcomes in the unwed fathers cases can best be 
explained by an emphasis on the nonmarital father’s relationship with the mother, and by a 
preference for fathers who have acted like husbands, rather than by the strength of the 
father-child relationship. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About 
Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 649-63 (1993); Murray, supra note 4, at 389-90. But see 
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 448 (2007) 
(“The Court’s emphasis on cohabitation between father and child seems driven more by its 
interest in daily caretaking than by loyalty to the nuclear family.”). 
257. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
258. See, e.g., Brief for the Legal Aid Society as Amicus Curiae, supra note 247, at 26 (describing 
the trend toward sex neutrality in child custody cases). 
259. State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288-89 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973). Compare id. with 
In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 486 (N.Y. 1975) (allowing a stepfather adoption and 
terminating the parental rights of a nonmarital father who had lived with his daughter and 
her mother for the first nineteen months of her life). 
260. Brief for the Legal Aid Society as Amicus Curiae, supra note 247, at 31-32. 
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At oral argument, Caban’s attorney Robert Silk stopped short of contending 
that all natural fathers had a constitutional right to veto adoptions, but made 
clear that a father who had developed a significant relationship with his 
children (in supposed contrast to Quilloin) deserved protection from 
termination of his parental rights.261 Nor would it be enough, Silk argued, to 
satisfy equal protection by denying both nonmarital parents the right to veto 
an adoption, because “state power does not exist to break into the private 
relationships of parents and their children when there has been no showing of 
unfitness.”262 In other words, equality between unmarried mothers and fathers 
was necessary but not sufficient: nonmarital parents of both sexes had 
fundamental rights that the Constitution should protect. 
The Justices struggled over whether their ruling in Caban should be 
grounded in equal protection or substantive due process. Both options entailed 
complications. Substantive due process might allow a decision specific to the 
facts, but the facts of Caban were in “sharp dispute,” as Powell clerk David 
Westin noted.263 Powell hesitated to paint in the broad strokes of substantive 
due process analysis, with Westin worrying about the potential 
“constitutionalization of state adoption law” and the prospect that functional 
definitions of parenthood would require infinitely finer distinctions among 
deeply contested relationships.264 White, meanwhile, insisted that his Stanley 
opinion was a procedural due process decision only—despite many wishful 
readings to the contrary.265 Stevens initially expressed willingness to rule for 
Caban on substantive due process grounds. Blackmun, as the author of Roe v. 
Wade, may have seemed positively inclined toward substantive due process, 
and less toward equal protection, given his vote joining the Chief Justice’s 
dissent in Stanley.266 
A reversal on equal protection grounds also presented ideological and 
practical challenges. If the Court focused on the distinction between unmarried 
 
261. Oral Argument, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (No. 77-6431), http://www.oyez 
.org/cases/1978/77-6431 [http://perma.cc/ZGK5-JMLA]. 
262. Id. at 29:18. 
263. Memorandum from David Westin, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. 8 (Nov. 6, 1978) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205,  
Case No. 77-6431, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/BVN5-FQ2R]). 
264. Id.  
265. In cases decided since 1972, White had resisted substantive due process analysis. See Moore 
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J. dissenting) (applying also to companion case Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
266. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
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fathers and divorced fathers, finding a fundamental interest to justify 
heightened scrutiny would, Powell feared, put them right back in substantive 
due process territory, worrying about the “‘thicket’ of ‘strict scrutiny’ and 
‘compelling state interest.’” Powell preferred instead to rely upon sex-based 
equal protection, which would allow state legislatures to decide whether to 
require the consent of both or neither of a child’s natural parents.267 
The first draft Powell circulated to colleagues endorsed a robust sex 
neutrality principle. Like White’s early drafts in Stanley, it implied that 
virtually no distinctions between unwed mothers and fathers would pass 
constitutional muster. The impulse to veto a proposed adoption “is likely to be 
the result of a natural parental interest, shared by both genders alike; it is not a 
manifestation of any profound difference between the affection and concern of 
mothers and fathers for their children.” New York law treated married mothers 
and fathers equally, so why should the same provisions not apply to unmarried 
parents?268 Further, “[e]ven if perceived differences between maternal and 
paternal relations were the basis for the gender-based distinction . . . [the] 
classification is grounded on ‘archaic and overbroad generalizations,’ 
concerning the family.”269 Legislative classifications could not typecast women 
as exclusively occupied with home and children. “Nor may we accept 
uncritically the generalization . . . that mothers are closer to their children than 
are fathers.”270 Even “[d]uring infancy . . . one cannot invariably assume that 
the father’s role in his child’s life is less than that of the mother,” Powell 
wrote.271 
This was a bridge too far for Stewart, Stevens, and Blackmun, and Powell 
needed at least one of their votes to make a majority. Justice Stevens worried 
that if the consent of both “natural” parents were required, then delay and 
uncertainty could discourage prospective adoptive parents and impede 
 
267. See Memorandum from Gary Sasso, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Byron R. White 
7-9 (Sept. 20, 1978) (on file with Byron R. White Papers, supra note 122, at Box 455, Folder 
10). The sex-based equal protection approach also seemed consistent in methodology, if not 
in outcome, with the Court’s approach in Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), decided on 
the same day as Caban. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
268. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., First Draft Opinion in Caban v. Mohammed 9-10 (Dec. 28, 
1978) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205, Case No. 77-6431, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/BVN5-FQ2R]). 
269. Id. at 12. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 13.  
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adoptions.272 Even if mere notice to nonmarital fathers were required, Stevens 
thought that publicly identifying the mother “would offend her privacy 
interests in the most outrageous fashion.”273 Stevens wrote privately to Powell 
that he was “profoundly troubled” and asked him to consider revising his 
opinion to “minimize its impact on the adoption of infants.”274 
Powell quickly retreated. In response to Stevens’s objections, which were 
shared by Stewart, Powell’s second draft “altered [Caban’s] holding 
considerably” and “invalidate[d] the . . . statute much more narrowly,” as 
Blackmun’s clerk put it.275 Powell eliminated nearly all of the broad language 
and added caveats suggesting that the adoption of newborns presented 
different problems than did the adoption of older children.276 His second draft 
focused on case-specific facts, rather than generalizing about the constitutional 
infirmity of sex-based distinctions. Comfortable with Powell’s revised opinion, 
Blackmun announced his intention to sign, giving Powell (and Caban) a 5-4 
majority.277 
 
272. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Dec. 29, 1978) (on file 
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205, Case No. 77-6431, http://law2 
.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed.pdf [http://perma.cc/BVN5 
-FQ2R]). Justice Stevens, an adoptive parent himself, consistently expressed such concerns 
in cases implicating adoption procedures. See generally BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, 
JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE (2010). 
273. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Dec. 29, 1978) (on file 
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205, Case No. 77-6431, http://law2 
.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed.pdf [http://perma.cc/BVN5 
-FQ2R]). 
274. Id. 
275. Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun 1 (Jan. 17, 1979) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 
290, Case No. 77-6431); see also id. at 2 (explaining that “L[ewis ]F[. ]P[owell] undertook 
his revisions at the instance of P[otter ]S[tewart] and J[ohn ]P[aul ]S[tevens], both of 
whom were concerned that the 1st draft would make adoptions difficult in the case of new-
born children”). 
276. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Second Draft Opinion in Caban v. Mohammed 11-13 (Jan. 12, 
1979) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205, Case No. 77-6431, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/BVN5-FQ2R]). 
277. Blackmun acknowledged that his views had evolved since he joined Burger’s Stanley dissent 
six years earlier. See Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger (Jan. 29, 1979) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 290, 
Case No. 77-6431) (“I have concluded that [Powell’s second, narrower draft opinion in 
Caban] is not basically inconsistent with our dissenting posture in Stanley v. Illinois 
(although I am frank to say I am not sure how I would vote in that case were it being 
presented today).”).  
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Stevens and Stewart dissented in Caban, emphasizing their desire to protect 
illegitimate children’s welfare by facilitating newborn adoptions. Stevens 
articulated the view of “natural differences” between mothers and fathers that 
would animate his—and ultimately a majority of the Court’s—treatment of 
nonmarital fathers’ equal protection claims for the remainder of his tenure. 
Unlike many if not most nonmarital fathers, a mother was identifiable, present 
at her child’s birth, and would have “virtually inevitable” responsibility for 
decisions made about an infant.278 As such, mothers and fathers of children 
“born out of wedlock” simply were not similarly situated, so that granting 
mothers and not fathers the right to consent to an adoption posed no 
constitutional problem. More than the majority opinion, Stevens’s dissent in 
Caban presaged the Court’s subsequent posture toward nonmarital fathers’ 
claims. 
C. “Not Similarly Situated”: Rejecting Sex Equality in Parham v. Hughes 
(1979) 
Caban marked the zenith of nonmarital fathers’ constitutional rights in the 
Supreme Court. Another 5-4 decision issued on the same day underscored the 
divisions among the Justices about the meaning of sex equality for nonmarital 
parents. When an automobile accident killed six-year-old Lemuel Parham and 
his mother, Cassandra Moreen, the boy’s father sued for his son’s wrongful 
death. Curtis Parham did not live with Lemuel and his mother, but averred 
that he had supported Lemuel financially, visited him daily, and taken care of 
him on many weekends. Parham had signed his son’s birth certificate but had 
not completed legitimation paperwork.279 
Parham v. Hughes presented a question virtually identical to the one 
decided a decade earlier in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co: 
could a state bar a parent from recovering for the wrongful death of an 
illegitimate child? The difference between Glona and Parham proved 
determinative, however: Minnie Brade Glona, who lost her son Tommy to a 
 
278. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 405-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His dissent also 
expressed the hope that the Caban ruling would affect only the relatively few situations in 
which an unmarried father had developed a relationship with his children that was truly 
comparable to the mother-child bond. Id. at 415-17. 
279. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1979). For Powell, the fact that Georgia allowed 
nonmarital fathers to “legitimate” their children unilaterally distinguished the case from 
Trimble v. Gordon, where Illinois law did not provide for legitimation except where the 
parents married. The Georgia law was, therefore, more like the New York law requiring 
illegitimate children to produce a court order of filiation, which the Court had upheld in 
Lalli v. Lalli. Id. at 359-61 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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negligent driver, was a mother, and her claim succeeded before the Warren 
Court in 1968.280 In Parham, Stewart wrote for a plurality that the Georgia law 
allowing mothers but not fathers to bring a wrongful death action for an 
illegitimate child did not offend the constitutional principle of sex equality. 
“The fact is,” Stewart wrote, “that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children 
are not similarly situated.”281 In Georgia, only fathers could, “by voluntary 
unilateral action,” legitimate a child, and, unlike a mother’s, a father’s identity 
might be unknown.282 Excluding fathers of illegitimate children from wrongful 
death recovery “does not discriminate against fathers as a class but instead 
distinguishes between fathers who have legitimated their children and those 
who have not.”283 
A majority of the Parham Court did see the Georgia law as distinguishing 
on the basis of sex, and therefore applied heightened scrutiny, but only four 
Justices voted for invalidation. Powell, author of Caban, concurred, finding the 
statute substantially related to the important governmental objective of 
“avoiding difficult problems in proving paternity after the death of an 
illegitimate child.”284 Four dissenters, including Blackmun, saw the law as 
unconstitutional sex discrimination.285 Although Parham did not involve the 
parental rights of unmarried fathers, it suggested that plaintiffs in future cases 
might find it difficult to frame legal distinctions between nonmarital fathers 
and mothers as impermissibly discriminatory. 
Moreover, Parham, like Fiallo, rejected fathers’ sex discrimination claims 
precisely when fathers’ and mothers’ interests in sex neutrality most 
converged. In these cases, granting superior rights to mothers reinforced the 
assumption that paternal involvement in the lives of nonmarital children was 
worth less than maternal bonds, no matter how well the father had nurtured 
and loved his child. Depriving fathers and their nonmarital children of 
reciprocal citizenship rights and denying nonmarital fathers the right to sue for 
the wrongful death of their children offered no benefit to mothers; indeed, 
these decisions perpetuated mothers’ burden for the primary care of 
nonmarital children by devaluing fathers’ contributions. 
To be fair, the Justices did not yet have before them a full-throated feminist 
argument for recognizing nonmarital fathers’ rights in contexts where men’s 
and women’s interests converged. In the 1970s, feminist disagreement over the 
 
280. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
281. Parham, 441 U.S. at 355. 
282. Id.  
283. Id. at 356. 
284. Id. at 359-60 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).  
285. Id. at 361-62 (White, J., dissenting). For more on Parham, see Mayeri, supra note 21. 
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relationship between sex equality and nonmarital parenthood played out 
mostly behind the scenes, in internal debates within the ACLU rather than in 
dueling briefs in the Supreme Court. The ACLU’s legal director rejected 
Ginsburg’s proposal to file an amicus brief in Fiallo, and the petitioners’ brief 
relegated to a footnote the feminist argument that women are harmed by the 
sex-stereotyping of nonmarital fathers. The fathers who defied such 
stereotypes, whom the Court presumed were a small minority, suffered the 
primary harm of the sex discrimination left intact by the unwed fathers cases. 
In Caban, the only successful case of the three, amicus briefs focused on harm 
to fathers and to children, reflecting their authors’ primary concern with unjust 
terminations of parental rights generally. In Parham, the plaintiff had no 
amicus support. 
The juxtaposition of Fiallo, Caban, and Parham highlights how, 
paradoxically, nonmarital fathers’ sex discrimination arguments fared better 
when fathers faced off against mothers than when mothers, too, stood to gain 
from a sex-neutral rule. And the paradoxes did not end there. In the 1970s, 
feminist disputes over nonmarital fathers’ rights never made their way into 
amicus briefs or otherwise influenced the Justices’ deliberations in cases before 
the Court. Nevertheless, the Court decided Fiallo, Caban, and Parham on sex-
based equal protection grounds. In the 1980s, by contrast, feminist arguments 
played a key role in two of the nonmarital fathers cases that came before the 
Court, but the Justices dodged them and instead decided two other cases 
primarily on due process grounds. Although the Court for the first time heard 
full-throated feminist arguments for and against nonmarital fathers’ parental 
rights, the Justices sidestepped questions of sex equality altogether and 
reaffirmed the state’s prerogative to privilege marital families at nonmarital 
fathers’ expense. 
iv .   avoiding equality:  feminism and fatherhood in the 
 supreme court,  19 8 0-8 9 
Feminist legal advocacy in the 1970s and 1980s often suffered from 
inauspicious timing. Feminists reasoned from race on the eve of civil rights 
retrenchment, turning what seemed like fruitful analogies in the Warren Court 
era into political and legal constraints before the Burger Court. 286 They sought 
more expansive affirmative action and disparate impact doctrines at a time 
when courts were cutting back these remedies in the context of race.287 They 
 
286. See generally MAYERI, supra note 11 (describing the historical trajectory of feminists’ use of 
analogies between race and sex inequality). 
287. See generally id. chs. 3-6. 
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presented compelling arguments that illegitimacy penalties subordinated 
women after the Court articulated the primary harm of illegitimacy-based 
classifications as their detrimental impact on “hapless” and innocent 
children.288 
Feminist advocacy in the unwed fathers’ cases suffered from a similar 
temporal disconnect: by the time the feminist dilemma was squarely before the 
Justices, with clearly articulated positions on both sides of the question, the 
Court had both drawn its battle lines on other terms and moved further to the 
right. Both of these developments likely made the Justices less receptive to 
framing the unwed fathers’ cases in terms of substantive sex equality than they 
might have been. Section IV.A. explains why the feminist dilemma came to the 
fore in the 1980s, briefly outlining the legal and political factors that 
heightened feminist disagreement over sex equality in nonmarital parenthood. 
Sections IV.B. and IV.C. juxtapose the two unwed fathers cases decided by the 
Court during this period with two other cases the Court dodged, revealing 
both the contours of the feminist dilemma and the consequences of its 
submergence in equality jurisprudence. 
A.  Parenthood After the Sex Equality Revolution 
Developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s intensified debate among 
feminists over the rights of nonmarital fathers. The divorced-fathers’ rights 
movement enjoyed relatively rapid success in winning legislative and judicial 
decisions approving joint custody. Sociologists exposed the economic 
devastation of divorce for women and children. Litigation defeats, the failure to 
achieve ratification of the ERA, and the ascendancy of conservatism in national 
politics prompted feminists to examine the shortcomings of 1970s feminist 
legal advocacy and to assess the future of sex equality. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed profound changes in child 
custody law.289 The maternal preference continued to erode and joint custody 
gained ground in many states, thanks to an uneasy coalition between feminists 
and divorced-fathers’ rights activists, as Deborah Dinner has recounted.290 For 
feminists, joint custody held the promise of relieving divorced mothers of sole 
responsibility for childcare, undermining stereotypes about motherhood as 
women’s primary destiny, and, ideally, creating incentives for fathers to spend 
more time caring for children during marriage.291 For fathers’ rights activists, 
 
288. See Mayeri, supra note 21. 
289. See Dinner, supra note 17, at 121-22.  
290. See id. at 122-23. 
291. Id. at 126. 
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joint custody was an essential element of the new “divorce bargain,” in which 
fathers received custody rights in exchange for fulfilling child support 
obligations. As Dinner describes, fathers’ rights activists and feminists not only 
favored joint custody for different reasons, they often diverged in their policy 
prescriptions.292 In debates over joint custody in California, a bellwether state 
for family law innovations, fathers’ rights activists fought for a categorical 
presumption of joint custody, while feminists who favored the presumption 
did so only when both parents wished to share custody. Without this caveat, 
feminists feared, joint custody presumptions would devalue women’s 
disproportionate responsibility for caregiving during marriage and reduce their 
bargaining power at divorce, harming women and children.293 
At the same time, feminists who had long worried about the economic 
impact of no-fault divorce and marital breakdown on women saw their worst 
fears confirmed. The “feminization of poverty” became a shorthand to describe 
the rise of female-headed households born of rising rates of divorce and 
nonmarital childbirth. Sociologist Lenore Weitzman spotlighted a chasm 
between the economic fortunes of divorced men and women.294 While the 
magnitude of post-divorce inequality remained in dispute, its existence did not, 
and some feminists identified formal sex neutrality as the culprit. Reforms that 
treated divorcing husbands and wives as if they were interchangeable spouses 
in a presumptively egalitarian partnership could not produce substantive 
equality of results, wrote feminist legal scholar Martha Fineman in 1983.295 
Fineman argued that women’s socioeconomic disadvantage meant that, “at 
least for the foreseeable future, genuine reform can only be achieved through a 
rational, but potentially unequal, division of economic assets between 
husbands and wives at divorce.”296 Treating men and women as equals under 
the law exacerbated women’s inferior status so long as women shouldered the 
 
292. Id. at 129-35. 
293. Id. 
294. For early publications of Weitzman’s research on the economic consequences of divorce, see, 
for example, Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences 
of Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981). Weitzman’s 
1985 book drew national attention to the phenomenon. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE 
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). The disparity Weitzman initially reported 
proved to be overstated, but the adverse impact of divorce on women and children was 
undeniable. 
295. Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study 
of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 
791. 
296. Id. at 792. 
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lion’s share of domestic and caregiving responsibilities and faced widespread 
discrimination in the labor market. 
Critical feminists also turned their gaze to child custody, arguing that the 
rise of ostensibly gender-neutral rules devalued mothers’ caregiving labor and 
held fathers to a “different, much less demanding standard.”297 Some feminists 
sought to balance the benefits of legal sex neutrality with a revaluation of 
women’s care work. Nancy Polikoff, writing in 1982, defended a “primary 
caretaker” presumption for child custody decision making, arguing that this 
“sex-neutral standard” would protect mothers and children in the vast majority 
of cases where women served as primary caretakers. It would also allow fathers 
to benefit from the presumption if they provided “primary nurturance and care 
during the ongoing marriage.”298 
Many feminists reevaluated their legal priorities in the early 1980s. The 
ERA’s defeat and the Reagan Administration’s threatened cutbacks in civil 
rights and social spending surfaced disagreements regarding the past and 
future of feminist legal advocacy. Fear of undermining the ERA’s ratification 
chances had constrained some advocates in their legal arguments and others in 
their willingness to dissent publicly from expedient political positions. At the 
same time, a new generation of feminists enjoyed greater access to the legal 
academy, publishing scholarship critical of judicial decisions that limited sex 
equality, and sometimes of the feminist legal strategies that helped produce 
them. Rather than inspiring caution or quiescence, the ERA’s defeat and the 
conservative ascendancy liberated feminists to own publicly more expansive 
definitions of sex equality.299 These setbacks also emboldened feminists to air 
their disagreements about substance and strategy. 
The feminist disagreement that had simmered beneath the surface in the 
early nonmarital fathers cases burst into the open in the 1980s before a 
Supreme Court that included Sandra Day O’Connor, the first female Justice. 
Between 1982 and 1988, two cases reached the Court that explicitly presented 
what one advocate termed the “feminist dilemma”: how to balance the desire 
to overcome women’s default responsibility for nonmarital children with 
concerns that the realities of gender inequality rendered legal sex neutrality 
antithetical to women’s autonomy and to substantive sex equality. In 
 
297. Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: 
Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 119. For an excellent summary of 
these critiques, see Dinner, supra note 17, at 142-44. 
298. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody 
Determinations, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 235, 237 (1982).  
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Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene and McNamara v. San Diego 
Department of Social Services, feminists on both sides of the debate made their 
case to the Justices. But the Court sidestepped the sex equality question—and 
the cases themselves—entirely, and framed the two unmarried fathers’ cases it 
did decide, Lehr v. Robertson and Michael H. v. Gerald D., as due process 
disputes in which husbands prevailed over fathers. The winner in all of these 
cases, it would seem, was marital supremacy. 
1. “The Feminist Dilemma”: Unwed Mothers Against Sex Neutrality in 
Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene 
Kirkpatrick was the first case to present the Court with a feminist argument 
against sex neutrality in nonmarital parental rights. In a small Nebraska town, 
Donald Kirkpatrick and Laura S. began an intimate relationship when he was 
22 and she was 14.300 At 15, Laura became pregnant, and decided, in 
consultation with her parents, to place the child for adoption.301 An adoptee 
herself, Laura “had great concern for the stigma attached to a child born out of 
wedlock in a small town.”302 She did what many white girls had done for 
generations: entered a home for unwed mothers (in Texas), and remained 
there until she gave birth.303 
When Laura informed him of the pregnancy, Kirkpatrick proposed 
marriage, but Laura declined.304 In Texas, biological fathers were entitled to 
receive notice of adoption proceedings, but could not veto an adoption and take 
custody of an unlegitimated child unless a court agreed that legitimation was in 
the child’s best interests.305 The trial court denied Kirkpatrick’s legitimation 
petition and placed the infant in foster care pending appeal.306 The state 
appellate court affirmed. “We are not nearly so far down the road to 
unrestrained egalitarianism as to hold that the Constitution guarantees an 
 
300. Appendix at 117a-19a, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460 U.S. 1074 (1983) 
(No. 82-647) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick Appendix]; Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Kirkpatrick, 460 
U.S. 1074 (No. 82-647) (on file with ACLU Records, supra note 225, Box 2804, Folder 2 
(untitled)). 
301. Kirkpatrick Appendix, supra note 300, at 118a-19a, 128a-29a. 
302. Nancy S. Erickson, The Feminist Dilemma over Unwed Parents’ Custody Rights: The Mother’s 
Rights Must Take Priority, 2 L. & INEQ. 447, 452 (1984). 
303. See KUNZEL, supra note 34, at 65-90 (describing the movement of unmarried mothers to 
maternity homes); SOLINGER, supra note 34, at 1-3 (describing the divergent paths of white 
and black unmarried mothers in the 1950s). 
304. See Kirkpatrick Appendix, supra note 300, at 157a. 
305. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 300, at 4-5 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE § 13.21). 
306. See In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App. 1982). 
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unwed father parental rights in violation of the best interests of the child,” the 
Texas Supreme Court had proclaimed in 1976.307 Four years later, over the 
dissent of three Justices, the same court explained: 
While the mother who is unmarried and pregnant is trying to figure 
out what she will do with the child, the father is totally free from any 
responsibility . . . . To classify him as a parent simply because he is a 
biological father would give him a powerful club with which he could 
substantially reduce the options available to the unmarried mother.308  
As for the wide gulf between the rights of married and unmarried fathers, there 
was “a rational basis for the State to distinguish” between “a sperm donor, a 
rapist, a ‘hit and run’ lover, an adulterer and the like” and “the father who has 
accepted the legal and moral commitment to the family.”309 
Supporters said Kirkpatrick was a responsible, upstanding young man 
devoted to his daughter and eager to marry her mother; detractors claimed he 
was an irreligious statutory rapist with inconstant paternal instincts who 
planned to turn the child over to the care of his female relatives.310 Both 
characterizations enjoyed some support in the record. Laura testified that 
Kirkpatrick was a “wonderful man,” but that at 15, she was not ready to marry 
and start a family, and she wanted her daughter raised by “two Christian 
parents.”311 
After “an apparently bitter internal dispute,”312 the national ACLU agreed 
to represent Kirkpatrick before the U.S. Supreme Court.313 The ACLU argued 
that substantive due process and equal protection required that unmarried 
fathers be permitted to legitimate their children over the mother’s objection, 
veto an adoption, and obtain custody unless they were proven unfit. The Court 
 
307. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1976). 
308. In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1980). 
309. Id. Three Texas justices disagreed with the majority’s assessment, believing it to be 
inconsistent with federal and state constitutional sex equality provisions. Id. at 798-800 
(Steakley, J., dissenting); see also In re K, 535 S.W.2d at 175 (Pope, J., dissenting). The U.S. 
Supreme Court denied certiorari over the dissents of Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. 
Order Denying Certiorari, Oldag v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Galveston-Hous., 
450 U.S. 1025 (1981). 
310. See Kirkpatrick Appendix, supra note 300, at 191a. 
311. Id. at 151a, 191a. 
312. Erickson, supra note 302, at 454.  
313. The Children’s Rights Project’s primary interest in the case was in challenging the use of the 
best-interests standard in termination of parental rights proceedings. See IRA GLASSER & 
MARGARET LOWRY, ACLU, THE CHILDREN’S RIGHTS PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 15 (1983). 
 
the yale law journal 	 125 :229 2   20 16  
2356 
 
should, the ACLU argued, declare the best-interests standard 
unconstitutionally vague, at least with respect to terminations of parental 
rights.314 And the Texas statute was “freighted with the ‘baggage of sexual 
stereotypes’ so often condemned by this Court.”315 The injury to “caring 
fathers” was “patent.”316 “Less obvious but equally invidious” was “the harm 
done to women,” who were “inevitably locked into the childcare role, unable to 
share childrearing responsibilities equally with men.”317 
Before Kirkpatrick, the interests of unmarried mothers had been in the 
background, as in the ACLU’s decision not to intervene in Quilloin, but never 
at the forefront. Kirkpatrick was different. Feminist attorney Nancy Erickson 
authored an amicus brief on behalf of “unwed mothers” who opposed 
unmarried fathers’ asserted right to veto an adoption and obtain custody for 
themselves.318 She quoted unmarried mothers who said they would not have 
pursued adoption if it meant that the father might gain custody. Instead, these 
mothers might have felt pressured to have an abortion or to raise an unwanted 
child, Erickson asserted, violating their right to privacy and decisional 
autonomy and flouting the child’s best interests. Mothers should also have the 
right to give up their children for adoption anonymously, Erickson argued, and 
men should not be allowed to use their sexual partners as involuntary surrogate 
mothers.319 
Erickson denied that the Texas statutory scheme reflected “an 
impermissible gender bias”320 or promoted “sexual stereotypes that portray 
men as incapable of good parenting.”321 Kirkpatrick himself seemed to assume 
that various female relatives—his mother, sister, or grandmother—would care 
for the baby if he were to obtain parental rights and custody.322 Most recently, 
 
314. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22-27, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460 
U.S. 1074 (1983) (No. 82-647) (on file with ACLU Records, supra note 225, Box 2804, Folder 
5 (untitled)). 
315. Id. at 31 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979)). 
316. Id. at 31. 
317. Id. at 31-32; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 300, at 70; see also id. at 70-71 (“Great harm, both 
psychological and social, is done to women and men who do not fit the stereotyped mold. 
Women are unfairly condemned by society when they lose or relinquish custody of their 
children, and men disparaged when they assume primary caretaking roles.” (citing, inter 
alia, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975))). 
318. Brief of Nancy S. Erickson, et al. as Amici Curiae on Behalf of Unwed Mothers, Kirkpatrick, 
460 U.S. 1074 (No. 82-647). 
319. See Erickson, supra note 302, at 465. 
320. Id. at 470. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
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Kirkpatrick had married a “full-time homemaker” who allegedly was eager to 
raise the child, leading Erickson to observe that awarding custody to a man 
who did not intend to assume a caregiving role hardly served feminist 
objectives.323 Feminists like Erickson embraced the goal of greater paternal 
involvement in the care of children, but they worried about the effects of 
formal equality on unequal social circumstances. “Our desires, as feminists, to 
see men assume the parental duties that in the past they have abandoned to 
women should not prevent us from recognizing that a legal rule granting an 
unwed father exactly the same rights as an unwed mother could lead to 
extreme oppression of women,” Erickson wrote.324 
Blackmun clerk Cory Streisinger thought that Kirkpatrick had “a serious 
claim of gender-based discrimination,” and advised Blackmun to support 
granting certiorari.325 At first only White and Blackmun voted to grant, but 
White’s draft dissent apparently persuaded Burger and Brennan to change 
their votes.326 White expressed qualms about the Texas statutory scheme on 
both due process and equal protection grounds.327 He reminded his colleagues 
that earlier Court decisions had strongly implied that a state could not, 
constitutionally, “terminate a natural parent’s rights without a showing of 
parental unfitness.”328 Significantly, White also believed that Kirkpatrick had a 
 
323. Id. at 471. “Yet another woman appears to take over the childcare responsibilities!” Erickson 
exclaimed. Id. 
324. Id. at 455. 
325. See Memorandum from Cory Streisinger, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun 7 (Dec. 3, 1982) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 
386, Case No. 82-647). Streisinger noted that the sex discrimination issue was not so clearly 
presented in Lehr v. Robertson, which was simultaneously before the Court. 
326. Compare Certiorari Vote Count (Jan. 7, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers,  
supra note 161, at Box 25o, Case No. 82-647, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell 
%20archives/82-647_Kirkpatrick_ChristianHomeofAbilene.pdf [http://perma.cc/QDL4 
-5ZNU]) (recording votes to grant certiorari from Justices White and Blackmun), with 
Certiorari Vote Count (Jan. 14, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra  
note 161, at Box 25o, Case No. 82-647, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell 
%20archives/82-647_Kirkpatrick_ChristianHomeofAbilene.pdf [http://perma.cc/QDL4 
-5ZNU]) (recording votes to grant certiorari from Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Brennan, White, and Blackmun). 
327. Justice Byron R. White, Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari in Kirkpatrick v. Christian 
Homes of Abilene at 2 (Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-647) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 
supra note 161, at Box 25o, Case No., http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives 
/82-647_Kirkpatrick_ChristianHomeofAbilene.pdf [http://perma.cc/QDL4-5ZNU]). 
328. Id. Justices Blackmun, Burger, and Brennan were prepared to join White’s dissent from the 
denial of certiorari. See Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Byron R. White 
(Jan. 12, 1983) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 386, Case No. 
82-647); Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice Byron R. White (Jan. 12, 
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“weighty equal protection claim” that “the challenged laws are based simply on 
the sexual stereotype that women can be more trusted with children than 
men.”329 Kirkpatrick’s “argument is not without force,” White wrote.330 “At the 
least, there is sufficient doubt to merit this Court’s attention.”331 All in all, he 
concluded, “The importance of these issues to many unwed fathers and their 
children can hardly be overstated.”332 
Despite the evident interest of at least four of its members who voted to 
grant certiorari, the Court sidestepped the thorny issues presented in 
Kirkpatrick by remanding on a state law question.333 Kirkpatrick provided an 
unprecedented—and ultimately missed—opportunity for the Court to grapple 
with explicitly feminist arguments for and against nonmarital fathers’ parental 
rights.334 In a second case, McNamara v. San Diego Department of Social 
Services,335 the ACLU seized the chance to elaborate on the feminist argument 
for sex neutrality. 
2. The ACLU Fights for Sex Neutrality in McNamara v. San Diego 
Department of Social Services 
Edward McNamara, a thirty-four-year-old carpenter, part-time salesman, 
and divorced father of two, had a brief sexual relationship with a nineteen-
 
1983) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 386, Case No. 82-647); 
Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Byron R. White (Jan. 12, 1983) (on file 
with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 386, Case No. 82-647). Powell wrote 
on White’s draft dissent: “Still inclined to deny—but BRW makes a good argument.” 
Handwritten Notes by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on White, Draft Dissent from Denial of 
Certiorari in Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, supra note 327, at 1. 
329. Justice Byron R. White, Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari in Kirkpatrick v. Christian 
Homes of Abilene, supra note 327, at 3. 
330. Id. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. 
333. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, 460 U.S. 1074, 1074-75 (1983). Justice Blackmun 
initially was very concerned that Kirkpatrick be expedited in order to avoid further 
uncertainty over the now two-year-old little girl’s parentage. Then the Texas Attorney 
General suggested that Texas law could be interpreted to grant Kirkpatrick another means 
of establishing paternity. See Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the 
Conference (Apr. 4, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at  
Box 25o, Case No. 82-647, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/82-647 
_Kirkpatrick_ChristianHomeofAbilene.pdf [http://perma.cc/QDL4-5ZNU]). On remand, 
however, the Texas court upheld its earlier ruling against Kirkpatrick. See In re Baby Girl S., 
658 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
334. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).  
335. 488 U.S. 152 (1988).  
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year-old woman in the fall of 1980.336 The two lost touch, and McNamara  
did not know he had fathered a baby girl until, over dinner two weeks after  
her birth in the summer of 1981, her mother asked him to relinquish his 
parental rights.337 McNamara initially requested that the baby be placed with a 
childless couple from his church who sometimes looked after his sons, but the 
mother preferred adoption by a family who knew neither biological parent.338 
After spending half an hour holding his weeks-old daughter, McNamara  
later recalled, he requested custody. “I decided I wanted her, and could raise 
her . . . . And I informed the county that I wanted her, and I was not going to 
agree to the relinquishment.”339 
But it was too late. The Department of Social Welfare placed Katie with a 
foster family over McNamara’s objections,340 and a protracted legal battle 
followed. When Katie was just five months old, a California trial court ruled 
against McNamara, declaring that it was in Katie’s best interests to remain 
with Pamela and Robert Moses, the foster parents who sought to adopt her.341 
In 1984, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that 
custody should not be awarded to a nonparent unless parental custody would 
be detrimental to the child.342 But when the case went back to the trial court, 
Katie was three and a half years old and had lived with the Moses family almost 
since birth. The judge found that a change of custody under these 
circumstances would be detrimental, terminated McNamara’s parental rights, 
and granted the adoption petition.343 McNamara appealed again, to no avail.344 
When the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear McNamara’s appeal, he was 
still seeking custody of Katie, who was seven years old and had seen 
McNamara only once or twice, as an infant. The prospect of removing Katie 
from the only home she had ever known made McNamara, as Isabelle Katz 
Pinzler of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project put it, “the perfect example of 
 
336. Cynthia Gorney, The Disputed Kinship of Katie Moses, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 1988), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1988/11/28/the-disputed-kinship-of-katie-mose 
s/55af462a-b507-42b0-adae-6c8b64437d20 [http://perma.cc/6EBD-VM3L]. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. (alteration in original). 
340. In re Baby Girl M., 688 P.2d 918, 920 (Cal. 1984). 
341. Id. 
342. Id. at 925. 
343. In re Baby Girl M., 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 661 (Ct. App. 1987). 
344. Id. at 666. By the time the California intermediate appellate court decided McNamara’s case, 
Katie was five years old. Id. at 661. 
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‘hard cases make bad law.’”345 An early draft of the ACLU’s amicus brief 
opened with a plea for the Court to dismiss the case for want of a substantial 
federal question and strategically avoided the equal protection issue.346 
A few weeks later, Pinzler and her colleagues learned, to their relief, that 
McNamara was no longer seeking custody of Katie but merely visitation rights. 
This decision transformed the ACLU’s brief into a full-throated argument for 
sex neutrality. Unlike Caban and Lehr, McNamara did “not seek to limit the 
rights of Katie’s natural mother.”347 Instead, McNamara challenged “the  
right of the State to sever his parent-child relationship on grounds which 
patently discriminate on the basis of sex.”348 Unmarried mothers’ parental 
rights could not “be severed absent their consent or a showing of unfitness  
or abandonment,” whereas an unmarried father who had no opportunity  
to develop a relationship with his child could have his rights terminated under 
a much less stringent “best interests” or “detriment” standard.349 This, the 
ACLU argued, was sex discrimination pure and simple. 
The ACLU’s McNamara brief articulated the strongest version yet of the 
feminist argument for sex neutrality in parental rights. The only “respect in 
which the interests of mothers and fathers are profoundly and inherently 
different,” the brief declared, concerned a woman’s “fundamental right . . . to 
terminate a pregnancy.”350 After a child is born, “no reason exists, outside of 
social custom and stereotyped notions of the proper roles for women and men, 
to support a gender based distinction in parental rights and obligations.”351 
 
345. Memorandum from Isabelle [Katz Pinzler], Dir., ACLU Women’s Rights Project, to 
Steve[n R. Shapiro], Assoc. Legal Dir., ACLU 1 (May 13, 1988) (on file with ACLU Records, 
supra note 225, Box 3527, Folder B2100, “McNamara v. San Diego Correspondence”). She 
continued: “In saving this child undeniable trauma we run the risk of making very bad law 
which may result in greater trauma for more families.” Id. 
346. Memorandum from Steve[n R. Shapiro], Assoc. Legal Dir., ACLU, to Ira [Glasser], Exec. 
Dir., ACLU, et al. 2 (May 12, 1988) (on file with ACLU Records, supra note 225, Box 3527, 
Folder B2100, “McNamara v. San Diego Correspondence”).  
347. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae & Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU & the 
ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties in Support of Appellant at 12, McNamara v. Cty. 
of San Diego Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 488 U.S. 152 (1988) (No. 87-5840) (on file with ACLU 
Records, supra note 225, Box 3527, Folder (unnumbered), “McNamara v. San Diego ACLU 
Amicus Brief”) [hereinafter Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae]. 
348. Id. 
349. Id. at 13-14. “[W]hatever standard California uses in terminating the parental rights of an 
unwed parent, it must be the same for both parents. The standard applied to mothers is 
plain: desertion, relinquishment, or, in certain cases, failure to pay for care, support, and 
education. Fathers are entitled to be judged by the same rule.” Id. at 17-18 (citation omitted). 
350. Id. at 22-23. 
351. Id. at 23-24. 
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Echoing Ginsburg’s arguments of the preceding decade,352 the brief contended 
that women, men, and children all suffered harm when the State presumed 
“that either gender has a monopoly on nurturance, love, concern, or the 
willingness to support and care for children.”353 Channeling Sylvia Law’s 
position in a classic 1984 article, the ACLU called gender-differentiated 
parental rights a self-fulfilling prophecy. Law had written: “Although sex-
based classifications are unjust in relation to individuals . . . who do not fit the 
stereotypes . . . the primary constitutional infirmity in such classifications is 
not that they are inaccurate, but rather that they are self-fulfilling.”354 The 
ACLU brief noted: “An official presumption that unwed fathers are 
uninterested . . . can surely help to create or perpetuate such a result.”355 Now 
that nonmarital fathers could be compelled to support their biological children 
financially, to deprive them of rights risked “contribut[ing] to the anger and 
resentment of some fathers” and causing them, “however unjustifiably,” to 
shirk both childcare and financial responsibilities.356 
The ACLU’s brief in McNamara went further than any previous 
submission to the Court in arguing that women’s welfare ultimately was best 
served by recognizing greater rights for nonmarital fathers. More common was 
the view expressed by Norah Whiting in a letter to the Washington Post: “It is a 
hard fact to face,” she wrote, “but if we mothers honestly want (as we say we 
do) a society filled with men who are committed, involved fathers, we cannot 
also demand that men who are fathers simply disappear quietly whenever their 
presence proves inconvenient for us.”357 Others disagreed. Of the California 
Supreme Court decision requiring that custody be given to a willing father 
unless “detrimental” to the child, adoption lawyer David Keene Leavitt 
declared, “The mother can abort it; she can kill the fetus. But if she wants to 
bear it to term, she needs the permission of the fellow who got her pregnant 
 
352. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 10-13, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (No. 73-
1892), 1974 WL 186057 (arguing that to deny the “mother’s insurance benefit” to fathers 
shortchanged mothers, fathers, and children). 
353. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, supra note 347, at 24. 
354. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 995 (1984). 
355. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, supra note 347, at 24. 
356. Id. In closing, the ACLU warned that if the Court ruled “that unwed fathers do not share 
equal rights as well as equal responsibilities for their children,” it would “send precisely the 
wrong message to these fathers and may further trap the mothers of these children and the 
children themselves in the cycles of poverty and dependence in which they all too often find 
themselves.” Id. at 25.  
357. Norah Whiting, Letter to the Editor, Equal Rights in the Nursery, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1988, 
at A22. 
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before she can put it up for adoption. It’s a nightmare for women.”358 
Syndicated columnist Ellen Goodman took a more balanced approach, arguing 
that an unwed father’s rights “should be calibrated in terms of his 
commitment. There’s a vast difference between the father who has lived with 
his children, and the one who has deserted them.”359 But in McNamara, 
“neither the mother nor the California law ever gave Ed McNamara the chance 
to act like a father.”360 
Once again, the Court declined to pass judgment on the relationship 
between sex equality and parental rights. O’Connor clerk Sharon Beckman 
judged the equal protection issue “insubstantial,” and maintained that, in any 
event, it was neither raised nor decided below.361 Blackmun clerk Kevin 
Kearney agreed that the equal protection issue was not “properly presented” 
and that “on the merits the claim is not strong, as there are reasons for the state 
to treat the mothers of newborns differently [from] fathers.”362 He wrote to the 
Justice: “My strongest impression is that this case should not be here, and that 
its ultimate resolution, unless it is dismissed, will be messy.”363 At oral 
argument, “several justices challenged McNamara’s lawyer to point to a place 
in the court record where the issue of ‘equal protection’ was raised. ‘When you 
find it, say “Bingo!”’ snapped Justice Antonin Scalia.”364 Justice O’Connor also 
reportedly voiced skepticism about “why someone who engages ‘in a so-called 
one-night stand’ would have a constitutional right to control the fate of the 
 
358. Dan Morain, “Casual” Fathers Win More Control in Adoption Cases, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1984, 
at B18. Leavitt had long been a proponent of unwed mothers’ right to place their babies for 
adoption. See Lilliston, supra note 198, at E4 (“A man can have seven minutes of pleasure 
with a girl and then come back later and ruin her life and that of the child. . . . If there is no 
affection and cooperation between the two, someone has got to have the rights and it has 
got to be her.” (quoting Leavitt)).  
359. Ellen Goodman, Exploring the Rights of Unwed Fathers, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1978, at A19. 
360. Ellen Goodman, If a Father Has a Duty, Can He Be Denied Rights?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1988, 
at E4. 
361. Memorandum from Sharon Beckman, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Conference 12 
(Jan. 5, 1988) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 529, Case No. 
87-5840). 
362. Memorandum from Kevin Kearney, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun ii (Nov. 14, 1988) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 
529, Case No. 87-5840). At the same time, the clerk was “not comfortable with a due process 
standard which would recognize a mother’s fundamental interest and ignore a father’s. . . . 
Where the mother has kept the father in the dark, there is nothing he can do during the 
pregnancy to show his commitment.” Id. at 25-26. 
363. Id. 
364. David G. Savage, High Court Dismisses Case of Unwed La Habra Father, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
1988, at OC1. 
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child who accidentally results from the affair.”365 In an anticlimactic conclusion 
to a seven-year court battle, a majority of the Court voted to dismiss 
McNamara for want of a properly presented federal question.366 
B. Unwed Fathers vs. Husbands in the Supreme Court, Redux 
The direct involvement of feminists in Kirkpatrick and McNamara framed 
these cases as centrally concerned with questions of sex equality in nonmarital 
parenthood, but the Court decided neither on the merits. The two unwed 
fathers’ cases that the Court did decide in the 1980s, Lehr v. Robertson367 and 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,368 included sex-based equal protection claims as well, 
but like the 1970s cases did not bear overt hallmarks of feminist intervention, 
and rendered mothers largely invisible. Lehr and especially Michael H. 
resoundingly rejected marital status equality for fathers and submerged almost 
entirely the sex equality questions simultaneously and starkly presented to the 
Court in Kirkpatrick and McNamara. 
1. “A Bias in Favor of the Formal Family”: Lehr v. Robertson (1983) 
Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Martz met after Lorraine’s father was killed in 
Vietnam and Jonathan’s mother, Helen, took the troubled teenage girl, 
estranged from her mother and stepfather, under her wing.369 Jonathan and 
Lorraine became intimately involved and lived together sporadically along with 
Lorraine’s daughter from a previous relationship, Renee.370 Their daughter 
Jessica was born in 1976, and the couple was at one point engaged.371 Lehr 
visited Lorraine and Jessica in the hospital after the birth but did not accede to 
Lorraine’s request that they marry.372 
 
365. David G. Savage, Justices Cool to Unwed Father’s Appeal for Child, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1988, 
at E19. 
366. See McNamara v. Cty. of San Diego Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 488 U.S. 152, 152 (1988) (per 
curiam); Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes in McNamara v. Cty. of San Diego 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (Nov. 30, 1988) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, 
at Box 529, Case No. 87-5840). 
367. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
368. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
369. See Joint Appendix at 87-88, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 81-1756) 1982 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 216. 
370. See id. at 89. 
371. Id. at 39. 
372. Id. at 39, 109. 
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What happened next was the subject of vigorous dispute. Lehr maintained 
that he did everything in his power to ascertain Lorraine’s whereabouts when 
she moved with her children to another part of New York State and then 
married Richard Robertson.373 Lorraine insisted that Lehr showed no interest 
in Jessica until Richard commenced adoption proceedings, though Lehr visited 
with Renee on several occasions after Jessica’s birth.374 In any event, Lehr filed 
a petition to establish paternity in late January 1979.375 However, filing a 
paternity suit was not one of the seven circumstances that entitled a putative 
father to notice and a hearing in adoption proceedings under New York’s post-
Stanley statutory scheme. Though all parties—including the judge—were aware 
of Lehr’s paternity suit, the court approved Richard’s adoption of Jessica, 
effectively foreclosing Lehr’s parental rights.376 
The judge’s apparent eagerness to finalize the adoption despite knowing 
that Lehr had petitioned for paternity disturbed several of the Justices.377 But 
after passing on the first round of voting at conference, both Burger and 
Brennan voted to affirm the New York Court of Appeals decision upholding 
the adoption.378 Burger assigned the majority opinion to Stevens, a dissenter in 
Caban. Stevens’s first draft was, according to Justice Powell, “a mish-mash of 
an opinion. Can’t believe JPS wrote it.”379 As law clerk Rives Kistler wrote to 
Powell, the first part of Stevens’s opinion “refocus[ed] the constitutional 
inquiry,” characterizing precedents such as Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and the 
illegitimacy cases in ways that “give only grudging approval to the Court’s 
 
373. Id. at 19. 
374. Id. at 88-90. It seems from the record that Lehr had developed a bond with Renee, 
Lorraine’s other daughter, but the absence of a biological tie apparently precluded him from 
asserting any visitation rights with respect to Renee. See id. at 56-57, 92. 
375. See id. at 2. 
376. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 253 (1983). 
377. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Handwritten Annotations to Memorandum from D. Rives 
Kistler, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Dec. 6, 1982) (on file 
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http:// 
law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK 
-ZYDX]) (“I could reverse if we address merits of N.Y. law as applied in this case, where 
identity + interest of putative father were known. N.Y. law is valid facially.”). 
378. Powell’s conference notes indicate that both Burger and Brennan voted to affirm on the 
second round of voting, but were “not at rest.” Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference 
Notes in Lehr v. Robertson at 1 (Dec. 10, 1982) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 
supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell 
%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]). 
379. Powell wrote: “I’ll await other writing. J[ohn]P[aul]S[tevens]’s op. appears unsatisfactory.” 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Handwritten Annotations to Memorandum from D. Rives 
Kistler, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 377, at 1. 
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cases that recognize constitutional protection for non-traditional family 
relationships.”380 Stevens explicitly endorsed “formal family” and recognized 
family relationships as superior, citing and quoting at length a recent article by 
Bruce Hafen, a prominent conservative law professor and Mormon leader.381 
As Hafen interpreted recent jurisprudence, the Court had not effected a 
revolutionary change in the laws of reproduction and the family in the 1970s.382 
Despite easing some of the legal burdens imposed on nonmarital children and 
their parents, legalizing contraception and abortion, and removing many 
overtly sex-based classifications from the law, the Justices—even at their most 
liberal and expansive—had never dethroned the marital family or formal family 
relationships.383 Despite much wishful and creative thinking by liberal 
constitutional lawyers and scholars (and a few lower court judges), “marriage 
and kinship are still the touchstones of constitutional adjudication in family-
related cases,” Hafen concluded.384 “The Court has limited some traditional 
policies, but has done so only in an effort to remedy exceptional inequities.”385 
And critically, “[e]ven the exceptional cases have been treated in such a way 
that constitutional protection has not been extended to relationships between 
unmarried adults.”386 
Stevens’s majority opinion in Lehr seemed to ratify Hafen’s account, even 
after Stevens removed the long quotations from Hafen’s article. Stevens wrote 
to Brennan: 
I know the [Hafen] article as a whole exhibits a bias in favor of the 
formal family, but I do not believe that bias is any stronger than the 
stance the Court has taken in several opinions. I really think all of us 
 
380. Id. at 2.  
381. Justice John Paul Stevens, First Draft Opinion in Lehr v. Robertson 8 n.12 (May 10, 1983) 
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/G6AK-ZYDX]). 
382. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing 
the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 465 (1983). 
383. Id. at 544 (describing the “historical position of preference this society has so long assigned 
to the institution of marriage”). 
384. Id. at 471. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. Hafen’s assessment was shared by a number of scholars with diverse political views. See, 
e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1980, at 90. 
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would agree with each of the statements that Hafen makes in what I 
have quoted.387  
Stevens added, “I would rather have your vote than Mr. Hafen’s quotation but 
wonder how strongly you feel about it.”388 Brennan eventually withdrew his 
objection to the longer Hafen quotation, but Stevens left it out after Powell 
registered his discomfort as well.389 Still, the final opinion privileged the 
“formal family” and “recognized family unit.”390 
Removing the extended homage to Hafen was not the only revision 
Stevens made to assuage his colleagues’ concerns. Justice O’Connor expressed 
qualms about the treatment of the sex-based equal protection issue. Stevens 
had written in an early draft: 
Before birth, the mother carries the child; it is she who has the 
constitutional right to decide whether to bear it or not. And from the 
moment the child is born, the mother always has a relationship of legal 
responsibility toward the child. Because the natural father of an 
illegitimate child can often be legally and practically anonymous if he 
chooses, responsibility does not devolve upon him in the same 
automatic fashion.391 
 
387. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 2 (June 3, 1983)  
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/G6AK-ZYDX]). 
388. Id. 
389. See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 (June 6, 1983) 
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/G6AK-ZYDX]); Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 
(June 3, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 
81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice John Paul 
Stevens (June 6, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, 
Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]); Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice William 
J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 387, at 1-2.  
390. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983). 
391. Justice John Paul Stevens, First Draft Opinion in Lehr v. Robertson, supra note 381, at 19 
(citation omitted). The discussion in Stevens’s Lehr draft is remarkably similar to his 
published opinion in Miller v. Albright fifteen years later. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 
436 (1998) (“The blood relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious and is 
typically established by hospital records and birth certificates; the relationship to the 
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O’Connor found this discussion “disturbing.”392 She “agree[d] that, as a 
practical matter, it is easier for the natural father of an illegitimate child to 
evade legal responsibility because of his anonymity.”393 She continued: 
I recognize that the clause ‘responsibility does not devolve upon him in 
the same automatic fashion’ is probably intended to be descriptive only. 
Nevertheless, the language contains connotations of approval of a 
scheme that imposes less legal responsibility on the natural father, and I 
would prefer to avoid any implication of that kind.394  
O’Connor thought “this generic discussion of the difference between natural 
mothers and natural fathers [was] not necessary” to dispense with Lehr’s equal 
protection challenge.395 Instead, she urged Stevens to rely on Quilloin and on 
Lehr’s lack of a “substantial relationship” with his daughter.396 Stevens revised 
the draft accordingly.397 O’Connor’s intervention appears to have been the first 
time a Justice expressed concern about the detrimental effect on women of 
basing superior parental rights on the assumption of weightier maternal 
responsibilities. 
In the end, none of the Justices disputed the majority’s ruling that 
unmarried mothers and fathers could be treated differently in adoption 
proceedings so long as the father had not formed a significant relationship with 
his biological child and the mother had.398 The majority and dissenters White, 
 
unmarried father may often be undisclosed and unrecorded . . . .”). For a trenchant critique 
of the opinions in Miller, see Collins, supra note 5. 
392. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice John Paul Stevens 2 (May 23, 1983) (on 
file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http:// 
law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK 
-ZYDX]). 
393. Id. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. 
396. Id.; see also Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 1 (May 23, 
1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/G6AK-ZYDX]) (proposing revision).  
397. See Justice John Paul Stevens, Second Draft Opinion in Lehr v. Robertson 19 (May 25, 1983) 
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/G6AK-ZYDX]). 
398. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983). Powell agreed that Lehr’s equal protection 
claim was “meritless,” though he was skeptical that Stevens’s lengthy substantive due 
process discussion in Part I of his opinion was necessary. See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Handwritten Annotations to Memorandum from D. Rives Kistler, Clerk, U.S. Supreme 
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Marshall, and Blackmun disagreed over a different question: whether, given 
Lehr’s efforts to form such a relationship—including the filing of a paternity 
petition—the strict application of the statute’s requirements violated due 
process. 
Lehr somewhat cryptically confirmed that marital status was a legitimate 
basis for sex-differentiated treatment of parental rights and responsibilities. 
The briefing in Lehr addressed the sex-based equal protection question, with 
Lehr and his supporters arguing that to give notice and a hearing to all unwed 
mothers but only a select category of unwed fathers violated the principles 
articulated in Stanley, Caban, and the Court’s constitutional sex equality 
jurisprudence.399 Opponents argued that cases such as Parham had established 
the constitutionality of distinguishing between unmarried mothers, whose 
identity could easily be established at birth, and unmarried fathers, whose 
parentage often was shrouded in ambiguity.400 Justice O’Connor’s intervention 
saved the Lehr opinion from incorporating what she viewed as damaging 
assumptions about mothers’ inevitable responsibility for nonmarital children, 
but White’s dissent avoided the sex-based equal protection question 
altogether.401 In denying even the most basic procedural rights to Lehr, the 
Court appeared to retreat from its earlier precedents.402 And Reagan’s next 
appointments to the Court would not bode well for nonmarital fathers’ rights. 
 
Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (June 4, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages 
/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]); Letter from 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens (May 17, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu 
/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]). 
Brennan did not wish to pass judgment on the issues of consent to newborn adoption 
presented by cases such as Kirkpatrick. See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to 
Justice John Paul Stevens (June 6, 1983), supra note 389; Letter from Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens 2 (June 1, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages 
/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]). On Kirkpatrick, 
see infra Section IV.A.1. 
399. See Brief for Appellant at 1-2, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 81-1756). 
400. See Brief of National Committee for Adoption as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 
14-15, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 81-1756). 
401. White’s dissent did not pass judgment on “whether [the statute] violates the Equal 
Protection Clause by discriminating between categories of unwed fathers or by 
discriminating on the basis of gender.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 276 (White, J., dissenting). 
402. Neither Quilloin nor Caban raised the question whether a putative father was entitled to a 
hearing—both cases involved what one commentator called “the more extensive, substantive 
right of an unwed father to veto an adoption approved by the natural mother.” Jennifer J. 
Raab, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed Fathers and Adoption—How Much Process Is Due?, 7 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 265, 272 (1984). For a contemporaneous account of the state of the law in this 
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2. Affirming Marital Supremacy, Avoiding Equality: Michael H. v.  
Gerald D. (1989) 
By the time the Supreme Court heard McNamara and Michael H. at the end 
of the 1980s, William Rehnquist, its most conservative member, had become 
Chief Justice, replacing Warren Burger. Conservative D.C. Circuit Judge 
Antonin Scalia had taken Rehnquist’s seat as an Associate Justice. And, after a 
bruising and ultimately unsuccessful battle over the confirmation of 
conservative scholar and former Solicitor General Robert Bork, Ninth Circuit 
Judge Anthony Kennedy had replaced Lewis Powell, a swing voter in earlier 
nonmarital father cases. These appointments solidified the rightward shift that 
commenced with Nixon’s appointments of Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Having dodged McNamara, the Court decided Michael H. v. Gerald D.,403 
another contest between husbands and fathers decided on due process 
grounds. Even more than Lehr, Michael H. buried questions of equality and 
almost entirely ignored the interests of women and mothers. The mother in 
Michael H., Carole D., had given birth to a daughter, Victoria, in May 1981.404 
A fashion model married to an oil executive, Carole was involved in an extra-
marital relationship with Michael H. in Los Angeles, while her husband, 
Gerald D., lived primarily in New York and traveled abroad on business.405 
Victoria always remained with Carole, but they moved frequently between 
households as a series of separations and reconciliations with Michael, Gerald, 
and a third man followed.406 
Though the parties disputed nearly everything else, Michael’s paternity was 
not in question: blood tests had established the biological link with more than 
ninety-eight percent certainty.407 Soon thereafter, Michael filed an action to 
establish legal paternity.408 For two periods of several months—once when 
Victoria was an infant, and again when she was two years old—Carole, 
 
area, see Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr 
v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984).  
403. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
404. Id. at 113. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. at 114. 
407. Id. By the late 1980s, the accuracy of blood tests to determine paternity had increased 
dramatically. For a contemporaneous assessment, see D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an 
Ultimate Issue: The Strange Case of Paternity Testing, 75 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1989). 
408. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114. 
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Michael, and Victoria lived as a family in California.409 Carole left Michael for 
good in 1984, and soon thereafter, Carole and Gerald reconciled again.410 By 
this time, Gerald, Carole, and Victoria were living together in New York.411 An 
attorney and guardian ad litem representing Victoria’s interests sought 
visitation rights for Michael.412 
The psychologist who evaluated the parties in order to recommend a 
visitation arrangement produced a largely unflattering report, depicting Carole 
as “child-like,” with a “limited capacity to be intimate or self-sacrificing to the 
degree which normally characterizes relationships between parents and 
children . . . .”413 For his part, Michael allegedly “exhibit[ed] virtually all of the 
characteristics associated with parents who engage in incestuous-type 
relationships,” though the psychologist found no evidence of inappropriate 
sexual contact.414 Only Gerald, Carole’s husband, seemed promising parental 
material,415 but the psychologist believed he was the least committed to 
Victoria’s long-term care.416 Ultimately, the psychologist recommended that 
Michael be afforded limited visitation, the best of what he evidently regarded 
as an unfortunate set of options.417 
Whatever their individual strengths and shortcomings, Victoria had 
formed attachments to all three adults. Michael apparently had grasped the 
opportunity to establish a relationship with Victoria, which, under Lehr, 
presumably meant that he had a liberty interest earning him the right to notice 
and a hearing before his parental rights were terminated. But Michael H. 
differed from the earlier cases in one crucial respect: when Victoria was born, 
Carole was legally married, to Gerald. California’s century-old marital 
presumption, recently amended, provided only very limited circumstances 
under which a mother’s husband would not automatically be declared the sole 
legal father of any child born during the marriage.418 Accordingly, the 
California trial court granted summary judgment to Gerald, declaring him 
 
409. Id. at 114-15.  
410. Id. 
411. Id. at 115. 
412. Specifically, Michael H. sought visitation pendente lite. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal. 
Rep. 810, 813 (Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
413. Id. 
414. Id. 
415. Id. 
416. Joint Appendix at 52, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (No. 87-746) 1988 U.S. 
S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1138 [hereinafter Michael H. Appendix]. 
417. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115. 
418. Michael H. Appendix, supra note 416, at 30.  
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Victoria’s legal father and terminating Michael’s parental rights.419 In 1987, an 
appellate court affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review.420 
By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Michael H. was 
framed as a contest between Gerald and Michael for legal recognition as 
Victoria’s father.421 Procedural and substantive due process claims loomed 
large, consuming the lion’s share of the briefs and commentary on the case. As 
in earlier unwed father cases, though, it was also possible to view the 
challenged statute as discriminating based on sex. Michael argued that 
California’s statutory scheme “constitutes gender-based discrimination”: 
Under its terms, the right of a biological mother to remain a parent is 
never open to question without access to a full panoply of due process 
protections. On the other hand, a biological father is deprived of 
parental rights without any determination of his fitness and precluded 
from ever asserting his parental rights notwithstanding his established 
relationship with the child.422 
Gerald contended that Michael was “simply wrong. . . . [T]he mother’s right to 
dispute the presumption is coextensive with the putative father’s.”423 Even 
assuming a gender-based distinction, Gerald argued that the statute bore “a 
substantial relationship to the state’s interest of assuring parentage for the 
child and protecting the family into which the child is born.”424 An amicus brief 
filed by the ACLU sidestepped the equal protection question, and instead 
pressed the argument that to sever the bond between Michael and Victoria 
violated Michael’s fundamental right to maintain an established parent-child 
relationship.425 
In the end, the Court addressed only Michael’s due process claim, dealing 
him a resounding defeat. The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, 
exuded barely veiled disdain for Michael’s claim and for the complicated family 
 
419. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 491 U.S. 110. 
420. Id. at 821. 
421. See, e.g., 2 Fathers Claim Right to Daughter, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1988, at 32 (discussing 
Michael H.). 
422. Brief for Appellant Michael H. at 29, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746).  
423. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm for Appellee at 7-8, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746). 
424. Brief for Appellee at 31, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746).  
425. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation and ACLU Foundation of Southern California in Support of 
Appellants, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746); Brief of the National Council on 
Children’s Rights Supporting Appellants, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746).  
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situation that produced it.426 Scalia scoffed at the notion that a biological father 
could invoke constitutional protection for his relationship to a child conceived 
in an “adulterous” affair when his parenthood would intrude upon the 
harmony of an intact marital family.427 In his concurrence, Stevens agreed with 
the dissenters that Michael’s biological and relational connection to Victoria 
earned him the right to notice and a hearing, but concluded that Michael had 
such an opportunity.428 The dissenters expressed dismay at what they 
perceived as a stunning retreat from the principles that animated Stanley, 
Caban, and even Lehr, where the Court had emphasized that a biological tie 
plus an established relationship sufficed to create a protected liberty interest.429 
The only mention of Michael’s equal protection claim came in the plurality’s 
brief note that “it was neither raised nor passed upon below.”430 Michael H. 
seemed, therefore, to stand primarily for the Court’s endorsement of marital 
supremacy, and for a cramped conception of due process rights more generally. 
Capping almost two decades of debate over their proper scope and 
constitutional pedigree, Michael H. stands as the Supreme Court’s final word 
on the parental rights of nonmarital fathers. A question originally framed as 
discrimination based on sex and marital status had become a battle over the 
process due to nonmarital fathers threatened with termination of their parental 
rights. From the beginning, some of the Justices had considered an equality 
framing: early drafts of the majority opinions in Stanley and Caban endorsed a 
robust rule of formal sex neutrality in nonmarital parental rights and rejected 
unflattering generalizations about unmarried fathers as dissolute, 
irresponsible, and uncaring. But this unqualified version of nonmarital sex 
neutrality never garnered enough support to prevail. Nor were the Justices—
even those most sympathetic to nonmarital families’ plight, even in the heyday 
of nonmarital fathers’ rights—ever prepared to embrace full equality for 
marital and nonmarital fathers. In short, though nonmarital fathers achieved 
some due process protections, they never won a constitutional guarantee of 
equal treatment based on sex and marital status. And the Court never directly 
engaged with the fundamental question that divided feminists: when does 
legal sex neutrality serve substantive sex equality? However one believes those 
questions should be answered, the consequences of avoiding them have 
implications beyond the unwed fathers parental rights cases. 
 
426. Michael H., 491 U.S. 110. 
427. Id. at 113. 
428. Id. at 132-33 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
429. Id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
430. Id. at 116-17 (plurality opinion). 
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v.  divergences:  nonmarital parenthood in the age of 
equality 
When Peter Stanley brought the first unwed father case to the Supreme 
Court in 1971, he posed novel questions of sex and marital status 
discrimination to a nation engulfed in cultural and constitutional change. 
Though nonmarital fathers won unprecedented due process rights in the 
decades that followed, they remained in many ways in a class by themselves. 
Unlike many other groups that claimed constitutional rights in the Supreme 
Court, unwed fathers did not have the support of established organizations or 
mobilized social movements who represented their particular interests. Instead, 
various groups and interests fought for their own causes on the battleground of 
nonmarital fatherhood. Social movements left their mark on the constitutional 
treatment of nonmarital fathers, but not in the usual way. 
This Part examines the causes and consequences of nonmarital fathers’ 
failed pursuit of constitutional parity with mothers and marital fathers. Section 
V.A considers nonmarital fathers’ unsuccessful quest to be treated as “de facto 
divorced fathers” and suggests reasons for this failure. Section V.B examines 
the divergence between Justices’ and feminists’ concerns in the debate over 
unwed fathers’ rights. This divergence had significant ramifications for 
constitutional equality law, and for the relationship between sex equality and 
marital supremacy, as Section V.C. explains. 
A. Nonmarital Fathers vs. Divorced Fathers 
Between the 1960s, when nonmarital fathers began to attract the attention 
of legal and social work professionals, and the 1980s, when the Supreme Court 
last considered nonmarital fathers’ parental rights, sex neutrality became the 
rule in the law of divorce. This transformation began in the early 1970s, as 
feminists and divorced fathers’ rights activists—for somewhat different 
reasons—began to advocate for the abandonment of maternal custody 
preferences, and continued through the 1970s and 1980s as joint custody and 
paternal involvement gained ground. Divorced fathers won greater access to 
their children, in part through arguments for equal treatment and against 
mothers’ inherently superior parenting ability. Nonmarital childbearing 
became more common and less stigmatized. As a result, singling out 
nonmarital fathers for inferior parental rights seemed increasingly anomalous. 
Even before the sex equality revolution, nonmarital fathers could cite the 
1965 case Armstrong v. Manzo,431 where the Court had recognized a divorced 
 
431. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).  
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father’s procedural right to notice and a hearing in an adoption proceeding. In 
Stanley, the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law’s amicus brief noted that 
Manzo was “almost directly on point.”432 In Quilloin, Justice Marshall framed 
the equal protection question as whether “the state was required to treat 
[Quilloin] the same as a divorced father.”433 Quilloin’s attorney called his client 
a “de facto divorced father. . . . He has done everything as far as a nurturing 
instinct is concerned that a normal divorced father would.”434 But Quilloin 
could not overcome the trial court’s apparent finding that he had neither 
legitimated his son nor provided consistent financial support. Marshall’s 
opinion for the unanimous Court affirmed the validity of distinctions between 
divorced and never-married fathers, at least in cases where the father had 
“never shouldered any significant responsibility” for the child.435 
Advocates for nonmarital fathers continued to press the divorced father 
analogy in Caban, Lehr, and Michael H. In Caban, for instance, the Legal Aid 
Society’s amicus brief highlighted 
the juxtaposition of Mr. Caban’s plight with the status of a divorced 
father who has had no contact whatsoever with his children. Regardless 
of the duration of the marriage, the amount of support provided, or 
indeed, whether the divorced father had even been made aware of the 
birth of the child, the child of such a father could not be adopted 
[without the father’s consent under New York law].436  
In Michael H., the parallel between nonmarital and divorced fathers seemed 
especially strong: like many divorced fathers, Michael had maintained a 
relationship with his daughter through court-ordered visitation during the 
 
432. Brief for Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law as Amicus Curiae at 5, Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (No. 70-5014).  
433. Opinion Announcement at 1:40, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (No. 76-6372), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-6372 [http://perma.cc/3PDX-KV5Q]. 
434. Oral Argument at 9:46, Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 (No. 76-6372), http://www.oyez.org/cases 
/1977/76-6372 [http://perma.cc/3PDX-KV5Q]. 
435. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256. “[E]ven a father whose marriage has broken apart will have borne 
full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of the marriage,” 
Marshall wrote. Id. 
436. Brief for Legal Aid Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 54, Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1978) (No. 77-6431); see also Brief for Community Action for 
Legal Services as Amicus Curiae at 44-46, Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (No. 77-6431) (making 
similar arguments). Community Action for Legal Services elaborated this comparison in 
Lehr, repeatedly invoking Armstrong v. Manzo. See Brief for Community Action for Legal 
Services, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae at 50, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 81-
1756) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545). 
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times when he was estranged from her mother.437 As Michael Hirschensohn 
(the plaintiff in Michael H.) told the Los Angeles Times in 1987, “I lived with the 
woman I loved, we split up and I think I’m entitled to see my daughter. I’m not 
asking to be treated other than [as] a divorced father.”438 
Nonmarital fathers’ efforts to highlight their similarities to divorced fathers 
belied crucial differences, however. One key distinction was unmarried fathers’ 
relative lack of organization. Like feminists, divorced fathers had mobilized as a 
movement by the 1970s, though they did so primarily at the state and local 
rather than national level.439 Fathers’ rights activists had developed and 
published critiques of the divorce system since the 1960s, and successfully 
lobbied state legislatures in the following decades.440 In contrast, there is little 
evidence that unmarried fathers mobilized before the 1980s, though it is 
possible that they took earlier action under the radar at the state and local level. 
By the early 1980s, some fathers’ rights organizations supported unmarried 
fathers’ efforts to gain custody of their children, and journalists began to write 
about the rights of “single dads” as a group, glossing over distinctions based on 
marital status.441 Some unmarried fathers started their own organizations later 
in the decade: Hirschensohn founded Equality Nationwide for Unwed Fathers 
(ENUF) and claimed some credit for changing California law to eliminate the 
conclusive marital presumption that deprived him of parental rights.442 
 
437. The ACLU’s Michael H. brief acknowledged that the “state may indeed have a legitimate 
interest in protecting families that conform to the traditional nuclear model,” but argued 
that interest “would not bar a biological father from visiting a child after divorce has 
dissolved a marital unit.” Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae 
of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and ACLU Foundation of Southern 
California in Support of Appellants, supra note 425, at 28.  
438. Roxane Arnold, Fatherhood: Law Facing a Challenge, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1987, at B1 (quoting 
Michael Hirschensohn). 
439. Other stakeholders in the nonmarital fathers cases, such as adoption advocates and social 
workers, had long enjoyed the benefits of professionalization and organization. 
440. See Dinner, supra note 17, at 5-6. 
441. See, e.g., Marci DeWolf, United By Divorce: Single Fathers Flex Legal Muscles, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 
1, 1981, at J1 (describing the efforts of the Northern Virginia Chapter of Fathers United for 
Equal Rights); James T. Yenckel, Men Organizing in the Battle for “Equal Rights,” L.A. TIMES, 
June 18, 1981, at I14 (describing a Houston conference uniting various fathers’ and men’s 
rights organizations). 
442. Susan Karlin, The Family Way, L.A. TIMES MAG., June 21, 1992, at 6. It is not clear how large 
or active these organizations were. Hirschensohn told a reporter in 1992 that ENUF had 
“several hundred members.” Id. ENUF was affiliated with larger fathers’ rights 
organizations that focused on divorced fathers, the National Council for Children’s Rights 
in Washington, D.C., and the Joint Custody Association of California. See Charles-Edward 
Anderson, Unwed Dads’ Setback, 75 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 24. Hirschensohn later attracted 
the support of the Palo Alto group Fathers’ Rights and Equality Exchange (F.R.E.E.). See 
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However, nonmarital fathers’ organizations did not participate in federal 
constitutional litigation; the Supreme Court heard their claims through the 
filter of civil libertarian and legal services groups with their own agendas and 
priorities. 
Nonmarital fathers also framed their arguments somewhat differently from 
divorced fathers. In the 1980s, Dinner has shown, the divorced fathers’ rights 
movement began to justify claims for paternal or joint custody as rights owed 
to fathers in exchange for their obligation to pay child support.443 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, nonmarital fathers and their allies were slower to invoke fathers’ 
child support obligations as the legal or moral basis for parental rights.444 
Many unmarried fathers, including Stanley, were in no position to support 
their children. Three of the four plaintiffs in the 1980s nonmarital fathers cases 
had not had an opportunity to establish parental rights or a relationship with 
their children, and so had no support obligation to fulfill. Moreover, the 
organizations that filed amicus briefs on nonmarital fathers’ behalf represented 
indigent and low-income individuals and families in danger of having their 
parental rights terminated because of “neglect,” which many civil libertarians 
and anti-poverty lawyers saw as little more than a code word for poverty. And 
judges and commentators frequently drew the connection between support and 
rights to the detriment of nonmarital fathers: in Quilloin, for instance, the 
Court made much of the plaintiff’s alleged failure to provide consistent 
financial support for his son. It was not until McNamara that the ACLU 
highlighted nonmarital fathers’ support obligations as a rationale for affording 
them reciprocal parental rights. By then, Congress and state governments had 
enacted increasingly aggressive child support enforcement measures that fell 
most heavily on poor and low-income, often unmarried, fathers.445 
 
Press Release, Fathers’ Rights & Equality Exchange, F.R.E.E. Announces Support of 
Hirschensohn Case (Oct. 24, 1994) (on file with author). The Los Angeles Times reported in 
1989 that John Ryan had founded an organization called the National Organization for 
Birth Fathers and Adoption Reform, which claimed 125 members. Paul Dean, Two Men and 
a Baby: Birth Fathers, Adoption’s Once-Silent Partners, Seek Role in Their Children’s Lives, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-10-29/news/vw-527_1_birth-father 
[http://perma.cc/SKK3-5LNV]. 
443. Dinner, supra note 17, at 87. 
444. Unmarried fathers did sometimes make this argument in individual custody cases, of 
course, just as individual fathers emphasized their own contributions to children’s financial 
support in parental rights and adoption cases. In other words, it is not that support 
obligations did not figure into nonmarital fathers’ arguments, but rather that support 
obligations did not play a prominent role in their justifications for retaining parental rights 
themselves.  
445. See Dinner, supra note 17, at 112-13. 
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Finally, and significantly, nonmarital fathers began their quest for rights 
burdened by deep-seated cultural images, inflected by race and class, branding 
them as derelicts and deadbeats.446 Divorced fathers were not immune from 
the deadbeat depiction, especially as child support enforcement became a 
national political imperative. Nevertheless, spokesmen for the divorced fathers’ 
rights movement tended to embody, and represent, a predominantly white and 
increasingly middle-class constituency. By the 1980s, divorced fathers claimed 
rights based upon their ability to fulfill child support obligations, in sometimes 
explicit contrast to nonmarital fathers, whose delinquency forced unwed 
mothers onto the welfare rolls.447 Unmarried fathers presented a direct threat 
to privatized dependency at a time when politicians traded on racialized tropes 
such as the “welfare queen.”448 The very term “unwed fathers” conjured for 
many a racialized image of the “undeserving poor,” presumptively unworthy of 
rights.449 The racial politics of nonmarital parenthood were overt in the 1960s 
and early 1970s: then, African-American mothers and children predominated 
as plaintiffs in the “illegitimacy” cases, and advocates exposed the racial 
motivation and impact of morals regulations and welfare restrictions in an 
effort to undermine their constitutionality.450 Though many plaintiffs in the 
unwed fathers cases were men of color, advocates did not bring race 
discrimination claims on their behalf. Still, race functioned as a powerful 
subtext in the unwed fathers cases and helped to shape divergent perceptions 
of divorced and nonmarital fathers. 
From the beginning, nonmarital fathers and their supporters protested 
marital status discrimination in parenthood. Nonmarital fathers pointed to the 
legal status of divorced fathers as an appropriate baseline against which to 
measure their own parental rights. That baseline moved significantly during 
the 1970s and 1980s, as divorced fathers won joint custody statutes in many 
states, and formal sex neutrality with respect to financial allocations at divorce. 
Nonmarital fathers also won important new rights during this period, to be 
sure: if a biological father successfully seized the opportunity to develop a 
relationship with his child and faced no competing claims to fatherhood, he 
might seek constitutional protection of his parental status. Still, increasingly 
rigorous and marriage-neutral child support enforcement mechanisms did not 
 
446. See Roberts, supra note 16. 
447. See Dinner, supra note 17, at 128, 136-37.  
448. MARISA CHAPPELL, THE WAR ON WELFARE: FAMILY, POVERTY, AND POLITICS IN MODERN 
AMERICA 199-241 (2010); Lefkovitz, supra note 13, 595-98. 
449. See Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 127, 
130 (2011); Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897, 898-99, 901-04 (2013). 
450. See Mayeri, supra note 21. 
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translate into fully equal parental rights for nonmarital fathers. For them, the 
“divorce bargain” remained out of reach.451 
B. Justices vs. Feminists 
Throughout the unwed fathers litigation, both Justices and feminists 
grappled with the meaning of sex neutrality, and the significance of marital 
status, for nonmarital parental rights. Despite some overlaps and intersections, 
however, feminists and the Justices debated the unwed fathers cases on 
fundamentally different terms.452 Feminists struggled over the implications of 
nonmarital fathers’ claims for women’s rights, substantive sex equality, and the 
desired transformation of gender roles. Those with civil libertarian sympathies 
also worried about unwarranted state intrusion into the lives of poor families. 
For members of the Court, by contrast, the unwed fathers cases were battles 
between husbands and biological fathers over the rights of men, the integrity 
of the adoption process, and the superiority of the marital family. The Court’s 
discussions bore the ideological imprint of the divorced fathers’ rights and 
traditional family values movements more than of feminism. 
For the Justices who were open to seeing nonmarital fathers’ claims as a 
question of equal rights, sex and marital status discrimination arguments had 
purchase primarily because the challenged laws deprived fathers of rights, 
unjustly relegating them to second-class status regardless of their individual 
circumstances or dedication to their children. There is little evidence that these 
Justices regarded paternal involvement as part of a larger feminist agenda of 
upending traditional gender roles and challenging mothers’ primary 
responsibility for childrearing. In other words, whereas Justices who were 
sympathetic to equality arguments were primarily concerned with whether 
fathers, as a group or individually, were deserving of rights, feminists who 
favored equal treatment for fathers did so largely because they hoped mothers, 
and women generally, would benefit from disrupting gendered assumptions 
about parenting. 
For feminists’ civil libertarian allies, this commitment to sex equality for 
mothers intersected with a growing concern about state authorities 
 
451. See Dinner, supra note 17, at 140 (arguing that tying custody rights to financial support 
“undermined poor men’s capacity to experience fatherhood as a relationship defined by 
caregiving rather than breadwinning”); id. at 147 (describing how the divorce bargain 
“helped to legitimize cutbacks in welfare supports for mothers and children” by “affirm[ing] 
child support, rather than public assistance, as the normative source of provisioning for 
children outside of intact marriages”). 
452. For a perspective that emphasizes the convergence between the Court’s decisions and 
feminist principles, see Hendricks, supra note 256, at 443-53.  
 
foundling fathers 
2379 
 
extinguishing poor parents’ rights in the name of children’s welfare. 
Terminating the parental rights of nonmarital fathers based on nothing more 
than a best-interests-of-the-child determination had troubling implications for 
mothers and fathers alike. Indeed, terminations based on “neglect” arguably 
had the greatest impact on mothers, who were more likely to have assumed 
primary responsibility for children’s care and therefore had the most to lose 
from state intervention.453 
Similarly, the Justices and feminists who were skeptical of nonmarital 
fathers’ rights claims diverged in their reasoning and in their underlying 
motivations. For several members of the Court, the specter hanging over the 
nonmarital fathers cases was that of adoptions thwarted by the need to 
identify, locate, and notify biological fathers whose consent had previously 
been immaterial. For these Justices, the state’s interest in finding stable marital 
homes for illegitimate children outweighed the interests of nonmarital fathers, 
at least those who had not developed relationships with or legitimated their 
children. The desire for a smooth path to adoption at a time when the supply 
of adoptable infants had plummeted converged with a persistent belief in the 
superiority of marital families to motivate these Justices’ resistance to 
nonmarital fathers’ claims. In contrast, feminists who were skeptical of formal 
sex equality in parental rights were concerned primarily about women’s 
autonomy to make meaningful choices about their own and their children’s 
futures without interference from the state or from nonmarital fathers.454 
Justices and feminists also disagreed among themselves and with each 
other about what role, if any, marital status should play in determining 
parental rights. For some feminists on either side of the fathers’ rights 
question, marital status was largely beside the point. Unlike fathers’ rights 
skeptics on the Court, most feminists did not assume the superiority of marital 
 
453. Justice O’Connor, the only Justice to express concern about assuming mothers’ primary 
responsibility for nonmarital children, did not align with feminists’ civil libertarian allies on 
questions of parental rights. O’Connor joined the majority in Lehr and Michael H.; 
moreover, she—and Chief Justice Burger and Justice White—joined the dissent in Santosky 
v. Kramer, which struck down a New York parental rights termination scheme on 
constitutional grounds, see 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
454. The Justices who resisted formal sex neutrality were not wholly unconcerned with mothers’ 
autonomy, to be sure. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 408 (1979) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning that to require the consent of both parents to an adoption “would 
remove the mother’s freedom of choice in her own and the child’s behalf without also 
relieving her of the unshakable responsibility for the care of the child”). Nevertheless, the 
skeptical Justices most consistently expressed concern about facilitating adoptions, 
especially of newborns. And whereas feminists and their civil libertarian allies wished for a 
robust consent requirement for all birth parents, the Justices were more likely to believe that 
states should be permitted to withhold veto power from both birth parents. 
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families. Nor were feminists particularly invested in the efficiency of adoption 
procedures except to the extent that they vindicated a mother’s truly voluntary 
decision to surrender her child. And many feminists who were skeptical of 
formal sex neutrality for nonmarital parents had similar qualms about the 
equal treatment of men and women at divorce. 
Marital status mattered to many participants in the debate over parental 
rights, but in different ways and for different reasons. For the Court, formal 
marriage signaled a man’s commitment to accept the full responsibilities of 
fatherhood; in exchange, he received the full complement of parental 
prerogatives. Nonmarriage raised a presumption, rebuttable only in certain 
circumstances, that a father lacked such commitment. For many of the 
feminists who were skeptical of nonmarital fathers’ claim to equal treatment, 
marital primacy was a means to an end rather than an end in itself. In other 
words, if sex neutrality was now required for marital parents who divorced, 
then marital status-based distinctions at least helped to preserve nonmarital 
mothers’ autonomy against further incursions. For others, marriage was 
morally significant, but not for what it said about a man’s commitment to 
fatherhood; rather, marriage signaled a woman’s consent to her partner’s (now 
presumptively equal) parental rights. The Court and some feminists agreed 
that nonmarital fathers should be held to a higher standard than mothers or 
marital fathers. But the Justices and feminist skeptics reached this conclusion 
through very different conceptions of the relationship between sex equality and 
marital supremacy. 
In other areas of constitutional sex equality law, social movements—often 
in dialogue with countermovements—shaped each other’s positions and 
together influenced outcomes in the Supreme Court. As Reva Siegel has 
shown, conflict over the ERA tempered the arguments of its friends and foes 
and contributed to a “de facto ERA”—an equal protection jurisprudence that 
reflected mutually imposed limitations on the scope of sex equality.455 Hints of 
this dynamic appear in the unwed fathers cases, such as when feminists 
worried that siding with Quilloin might send the wrong signal about the 
meaning of the ERA for mothers’ autonomy and parental prerogatives.456 By 
and large, though, the nonmarital fathers’ cases reflect a profound disconnect 
between feminist arguments and the terms of federal constitutional 
jurisprudence. In part, this was a matter of timing: it was not until the 1980s 
that the “feminist” dilemma made its way into Supreme Court briefs. By then, 
path dependency and an increasingly conservative political climate may have 
foreclosed significant feminist influence in either direction. Two other 
 
455. See Siegel, supra note 151, at 1332-39. 
456. See supra notes 222-230 and accompanying text. 
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movements, divorced fathers’ rights and traditionalist conservatism, instead 
left their ideological fingerprints on the nonmarital fathers cases. 
To the extent that the Court embraced nonmarital fathers’ rights, it was 
largely on terms that resonated with the divorced fathers’ rights movement. As 
scholars have shown, divorced fathers’ rights activists often co-opted the 
principle of formal sex neutrality to advance paternal prerogatives at women’s 
expense.457 Whereas feminists hoped that legal sex neutrality would advance 
substantive sex equality by unsettling traditional gender roles, fathers’ rights 
advocates sought to maintain gender hierarchies within marriage.458 Fathers’ 
rights leaders eventually sought a “divorce bargain” that exchanged custody 
rights for the fulfillment of child support obligations.459 The Court’s emphasis 
on the provision of consistent financial support as a prerequisite for nonmarital 
fathers’ right to consent to adoption reflects a similar calculus, in which a 
father proved his mettle by assuming the traditional male breadwinner role. 
Moreover, the Justices who embraced nonmarital fathers’ claims, like divorced 
fathers’ rights activists, never did so on the ground that women would benefit 
from shared responsibility for parenting or from the disruption of gender role 
stereotypes. 
Insofar as the Justices resisted nonmarital fathers’ claims, they often did so 
in ways that reflected traditionalist views about gender roles and marriage. The 
dissenting opinions in Stanley and Caban and the majorities in Fiallo and 
Parham embraced a deeply gendered conception of parenthood. On this view, 
mothers, irrespective of marital status, inevitably formed strong bonds with 
their offspring, whereas fathers needed marriage to anchor them to children. 
Motherhood as women’s highest calling is, of course, a mainstay of the 
traditionalist vision of family.460 And Parham has long been featured on Eagle 
Forum’s “Top Ten Cases that Prove the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 
Would Have Been a Disaster,” joined more recently by Miller v. Albright, which 
upheld citizenship laws that placed greater burdens on nonmarital fathers and 
their children than on other parent-child pairs.461 
 
457. See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, DEFIANT DADS: FATHERS’ RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA 263-
64, 266, 269 (2008); Dinner, supra note 17, at 110 (describing how fathers’ rights activists 
“harnessed the ideals of formal equality and liberalized gender roles to better men’s 
bargaining position at divorce”).  
458. Dinner, supra note 17, at 139. 
459. Id. at 87. 
460. See, e.g., PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 45-52 (1977). 
461. Top Ten Cases That Prove the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) Would Have Been a Disaster, 
EAGLE F. (2002), http://www.eagleforum.org/era/2002/top-ten.shtml [http://perma.cc 
/2TT8-C3BH] (listing as number ten Miller v. Albright and as number nine Parham v. 
Hughes, “which upheld the state’s ability to disfavor procreation outside of marriage by 
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The Justices’ attitudes toward nonmarital families varied significantly, to 
be sure. When it came to fatherhood, those attitudes did not neatly align with 
other ideological preferences. White, who took conservative positions on 
abortion rights, homosexuality, and constitutional standards for parental rights 
terminations,462 was fathers’ most ardent champion. Douglas, a liberal icon, 
initially scorned Peter Stanley’s claim. Marshall sympathized with nonmarital 
families in Stanley but stopped short of full equality for divorced and 
nonmarital fathers in Quilloin. Brennan took fathers’ side in most cases, but 
joined the Lehr majority. And Stevens, considered one of the more liberal 
Justices on many issues, was among the most hostile to nonmarital fathers’ 
rights.463 
Still, many of the Justices shared a commitment to marital supremacy. In 
the stepfather adoption cases, the Court assumed the inherent superiority of a 
two-parent marital family unit almost regardless of biological or social ties. In 
the newborn adoption cases, parental rights advocates defending the integrity 
of poor families battled adoption proponents who worried that consent 
requirements would interfere with smooth transfers of parental rights. On 
balance, many of the Justices, across the ideological spectrum, believed 
nonmarital children were best raised by married parents and spared the 
“stigma of illegitimacy.” In the early 1980s, Justice Stevens could credibly tell 
his colleagues in the Lehr majority that they all shared Hafen’s “bias in favor of 
the formal family.”464 By the end of the decade, the majority embraced the legal 
primacy of marriage, upholding the termination of Hirschensohn’s parental 
rights notwithstanding his established relationship with the biological 
daughter who called him “daddy.” 
 
denying certain rights to the father of an illegitimate child . . . . [The] ERA would have 
precluded this [case]”).  
462. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986) (White, J., authoring majority opinion 
upholding Texas anti-sodomy law); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (White, 
J., joining dissenting opinion in a case holding New York’s parental rights termination 
statute unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting from 
a decision upholding abortion rights).  
463. Notably, all of the Justices agreed that states could not place stringent statutes of limitation 
on unmarried mothers’ paternity claims. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 463 (1988) 
(holding a six-year statute of limitations on paternity suits to be an unconstitutional denial 
of equal protection to illegitimate children); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983) (same 
result for a two-year statute of limitations); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982) 
(same result for a one-year statute of limitations). 
464. See supra notes 381-382 and accompanying text. 
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C. After the Constitutional Equality Revolution 
In the years after Michael H., feminist ambivalence and disagreement about 
unwed fathers’ rights persisted. Some, in the tradition of Ginsburg and Law, 
continued to worry that maintaining traditional maternal preferences 
perpetuated gender stereotypes and patterns of inequality.465 Others, such as 
Mary Becker,466 Karen Czapanskiy,467 and Martha Fineman,468 rejected formal 
sex neutrality for unmarried parents and for family law more generally, as 
perpetuating rather than ameliorating substantive inequality. Mary Lyndon 
Shanley,469 Katharine Bartlett,470 and others sought middle ground through 
more functional or less exclusive conceptions of parenthood. Indeed, as legal 
and cultural definitions of family became less formal, and as open adoption, 
third-party visitation, and blended families grew increasingly common, the 
imperative to choose between fathers became less evident. Focusing on 
function rather than on marriage, biology, or gender, and thinking beyond the 
two-parent dyad advanced sex neutrality and shared parenting by emphasizing 
the importance of care and nurture for all parents regardless of sex. These 
interventions held the promise of circumventing the feminist dilemma without 
relinquishing shared feminist goals. 
At century’s end, the states diverged, sometimes dramatically, in their 
approach to the constitutional rights of nonmarital fathers. Courts in Texas 
and California, for instance, took a more expansive view of nonmarital fathers’ 
rights than they had in earlier cases such as Kirkpatrick and McNamara. In 
1987, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted the state Equal Rights Amendment 
to invalidate the statute challenged in Kirkpatrick, which required nonmarital 
fathers, but not mothers, to satisfy a best-interests test in order to legitimate a 
 
465. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflection on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 
1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 15-16. 
466. See Mary E. Becker, The Rights of Unwed Mothers: Feminist Approaches: The Social Service 
Review Lecture, 63 SOC. SERV. REV. 496, 503 (1989). 
467. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. 
REV. 1415, 1417-41 (1991). 
468. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). 
469. See Shanley, supra note 5, at 63-65. 
470. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the 
Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 882-83 (1984) [hereinafter 
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood]. 
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child.471 In In re Raquel Marie X., the New York Court of Appeals held 
unconstitutional a statute that required nonmarital fathers seeking to block the 
adoption of an infant under six months old to have lived with the child’s 
biological mother for a certain period of time.472 The California Supreme 
Court, in the 1992 case In re Kelsey S., held unconstitutional a state statutory 
scheme because it enabled a biological mother unilaterally to prevent a 
biological father from establishing the presumed father status necessary to veto 
an adoption.473 Many states, however, maintained legal barriers that limited 
nonmarital fathers’ ability to withhold consent for the adoption of their 
infants, and otherwise restricted the circumstances in which biological fathers 
could assert parental rights.474 High-profile cases in which courts returned 
children to their biological parents after many years living with adoptive 
parents spurred state legislative efforts to curtail birth parents’ rights and 
stabilize adoptions.475 By the turn of the century, states’ laws regarding 
parentage and consent to adoption were a complex patchwork of statutes and 
case law that reflected widely varying interpretations of federal and state 
constitutional law.476 
 
471. In re Unnamed Baby McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987); 1 JOAN HEIFETZ 
HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.04[2] (2015). In 1994, the Texas Supreme 
Court rejected the analysis of Michael H. to hold that the conclusive marital presumption 
violated the Due Course of Law guarantee of the Texas Constitution. In re J.W.T., 872 
S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994). For more on states’ treatment of the marital presumption 
post-Michael H., see June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 
45 FAM. L.Q. 219 (2011). On the trend in uniform laws toward “an emphasis on quick and 
easy adoption of desirable newborns,” see Berger, supra note 5, at 347. 
472. In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 427 (N.Y. 1990). 
473. 823 P.2d 1216, 1238 (Cal. 1992). 
474. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985) (upholding a statute granting a 
nonmarital mother the unilateral right to consent to her child’s adoption unless the father 
had legitimated the child). For a discussion of states that took a similarly restrictive 
approach, see 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 471, §§ 2.04[2], 2.54-55 (discussing the laws of 
Oregon, Utah, Nebraska, Kansas, and South Dakota). See also Berger, supra note 5, at 347 
(noting that “[o]nly a minority of states have statutes that permit unmarried fathers to 
assert rights if they can show they were thwarted in their desire to parent or support a 
child”).  
475. On the trend in uniform laws toward “an emphasis on quick and easy adoption of desirable 
newborns,” see Berger, supra note 5, at 347. On the heart-wrenching cases that gave political 
impetus to this trend, see David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of 
the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 753-56 (1999); see also id. at 770 (describing 
legislative responses). 
476. On the cases the Court avoided in the 1990s, see Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried 
Fathers and the Constitution: Biology “Plus” Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the 
Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 102-106 (2004). See also id. at 102, 106-07 
(describing provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act promulgated after two wrenching, 
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In recent years, a new generation of progressive and feminist scholars has 
called for legal, institutional, and cultural reforms to bolster the role of 
nonmarital fathers in the lives of their children.477 Citing the benefits to 
children of fathers’ involvement and the importance of encouraging co-
parenting after the dissolution of nonmarital relationships, these 
commentators regret the law’s complicity in maternal gatekeeping that allows 
mothers to exclude willing biological fathers from their children’s lives. Others 
remain skeptical, inclined to protect mothers’ autonomy and wary of fathers’ 
rights claims that appear insensitive to women’s subordination within and 
outside the family.478 Once on the cutting edge of constitutional sex equality 
law, debates over nonmarital parents’ parental rights now occur largely outside 
its ambit. 479 
1. Collateral Consequences: The Derivative Citizenship Cases 
Whether one sees the Court’s withdrawal from this constitutional 
controversy as a salutary opportunity for federalist experimentation or a 
regrettable instance of judicial abdication, the Court’s avoidance of equality 
questions in the unwed fathers’ parental rights cases has had significant 
collateral consequences for constitutional sex equality law.480 Although the 
Court ignored feminist arguments in the “unwed fathers” cases of the 1970s 
and 1980s, at the turn of the twenty-first century equal protection challenges to 
sex-discriminatory citizenship transmission requirements forced a reckoning. 
 
high-profile “failed adoption” cases). Oren notes that the general trend in state courts is 
toward enforcement of a “biology plus” standard, even in newborn adoption cases. See id. at 
109.  
477. See Huntington, supra note 4; Maillard, supra note 4; Maldonado, supra note 6, at 336-350. 
478. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
(2004) (arguing that public policy should support caregiver/dependent dyads rather than 
assuming the privatization of women’s and children’s dependency within the nuclear 
family); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 3, at 1229 (describing “a new system of family law” 
which “accords unmarried women greater power in the family by looking the other way”). 
479. The recent case Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl involved a nonmarital father who would have 
had only a limited right to object to his child’s adoption under the law of South Carolina 
and many other states. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). His claim to parental rights rested upon the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Several briefs in Adoptive Couple addressed the 
fundamental right of unmarried mothers to place their children for adoption, but these 
discussions generally avoided the language of sex equality or equal protection for mothers 
and fathers. Professor Bethany Berger has offered a compelling analysis of the race, gender, 
and class implications of Adoptive Couple. See Berger, supra note 5. 
480. In other words, one could remain agnostic, as I do here, about the proper resolution of the 
feminist dilemma and still lament the Court’s failure to engage the questions it presents. 
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Miller v. Albright481 and Nguyen v. INS.482 at last impelled the Court to grapple 
with the feminist case for—though not against—sex neutrality for nonmarital 
parents. Lorelyn Penero Miller and Tuan Anh Nguyen challenged provisions of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that operated to prevent their 
fathers from passing on U.S. citizenship, under circumstances in which a 
citizen mother, marital or not, would automatically have been able to do so. 
Unlike the parental rights cases, these citizenship cases posed no “feminist 
dilemma.”483 As in Stanley, Wiesenfeld, and Fiallo, the fathers’ opponent was the 
state, and a victory for sex neutrality would not come at mothers’ expense. 
Indeed, feminists made powerful arguments in law review articles and amicus 
briefs that limiting fathers’ ability to transmit citizenship to illegitimate 
offspring hurt women at least as much as men by perpetuating mothers’ 
primary responsibility for the care and support of nonmarital children.484 As 
director of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project more than two decades earlier, 
Ginsburg had badly wanted to present such arguments as amicus in Fiallo.485 
Now a Supreme Court Justice, she made them in dissent.486 In Miller, Justice 
Stevens’s plurality opinion elaborated the views first articulated in his Caban 
dissent almost two decades earlier, deeming sex-differentiated laws to be 
justified by “the undisputed assumption that fathers are less likely than 
mothers to have the opportunity to develop relationships” with nonmarital 
children.487 Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, declared “singularly 
unpersuasive” the contention that erecting higher barriers to citizenship 
transmission for nonmarital fathers promoted gender-based stereotypes about 
paternal disengagement.488 
 
481. 523 U.S. 420 (1998). 
482. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
483. The unwed fathers’ parental rights and derivative citizenship cases are analyzed together 
relatively rarely. For exceptions, see, for example, Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to 
Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405 (2013); and 
Katharine Silbaugh, Miller v. Albright: Problems of Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 
B.U. L. REV. 1139 (1999). 
484. See Brief of the National Women’s Law Center, et al. in Support of Petitioners, Nguyen v. 
INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL 1702034; Davis, supra note 56; Cornelia T. 
L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive 
Branch Decision Making in Miller v Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Collins, supra note 5. 
485. See supra note 172and accompanying text. 
486. Ginsburg’s dissent in Miller was not as strong on this point as perhaps it might have been, 
due to an incomplete history of citizenship transmission laws and their implementation, 
later excavated by Kristin Collins. See Collins, supra note 5. 
487. Miller, 523 U.S. at 444. 
488. Id. at 434. Stevens relied on his own majority opinion in Lehr for support. See id. at 441. 
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A torrent of criticism greeted Justice Stevens’s position. Even scholars 
sympathetic to the feminist arguments against sex neutrality in the parental 
rights and adoption contexts condemned the challenged INA provisions, 
noting that the concerns Stevens raised in Caban and Lehr simply did not 
apply.489 
Because only four Justices reached the merits of the equal protection 
question in Miller, the same provisions came before the Court again in Nguyen 
three years later.490 This time, a 5-4 majority upheld the disparate requirements 
for nonmarital fathers, over Justice O’Connor’s vehement dissent. Eighteen 
years earlier, O’Connor had persuaded Stevens to omit his language about 
mothers’ inevitable responsibility for nonmarital children in Lehr. Now, armed 
with quotations from 1930s National Woman’s Party leaders supplied by 
scholars and amici,491 and with three decades of constitutional sex equality 
precedents,492 she wrote that the challenged law was “paradigmatic of a historic 
regime that left women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, 
for nonmarital children.”493 Most recently, in Flores-Villar v. United States, 
scholars and advocates submitted briefs articulating the feminist case for sex 
neutrality.494 Though Justice Elena Kagan’s recusal left the Court equally 
 
489. See Silbaugh, supra note 483; see also Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 484, at 30 (noting that 
“[a] sex-neutral INA would not have the same zero-sum effects as between fathers’ and 
mothers’ choices” as it might in cases like Lehr). 
490. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56 (2001). 
491. Id. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Burnita Shelton Matthews’s 1932 protestation 
that “when it comes to the illegitimate child, which is a great burden, then the mother is the 
only recognized parent, and the father is put safely in the background”). An amicus brief 
from the National Women’s Law Center and other feminist organizations, and the 2000 
Yale Law Journal Note by Kristin Collins on which the brief heavily relied, had also quoted 
from Matthews’s testimony. See Brief of the National Women’s Law Center, et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071), 2000 
WL 1702034; Collins, supra note 5, at 1695. 
492. See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The majority, however, rather 
than confronting the stereotypical notion that mothers must care for [nonmarital] children 
and fathers may ignore them, quietly condones ‘the very stereotype the law condemns.’”) 
(quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994)). For another trenchant critique of 
Nguyen, see Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination 
in Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J.L. & GENDER 222 (2003). See also Nina Pillard, Comment: 
Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 835 (2002) (suggesting that the plenary power doctrine, though not directly applicable, 
operated to dilute the sex discrimination analysis in Nguyen). 
493. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
494. See, e.g., Brief of the National Women’s Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (No. 09-5801), 2010 WL 
2602010; Brief for Professors of History, Political Science, and Law as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Flores-Villar, 564 U.S. 210 (No. 09-5801). 
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divided, resulting in affirmance of the lower court decision upholding the 
challenged provisions,495 these laws are likely to come before the Court 
again.496 
The limitations of the Court’s reasoning in Miller and Nguyen suggests that 
the Justices’ failure to engage with feminist arguments for and against sex 
neutrality in the adoption cases had consequences beyond the parental rights 
context. The Court failed to acknowledge, much less answer, the fundamental 
question posed by the unwed fathers cases: what would true sex neutrality look 
like in the context of nonmarital parenthood, and when does sex neutrality 
serve women’s autonomy and equality interests? In other words, when is 
formal equality an effective tool to combat substantive inequality, and when 
does it fall short? If the Court had seen the central question posed by 
nonmarital fathers’ rights as one of the relationship between formal sex 
neutrality and substantive sex equality, then the answer in the citizenship 
transmission cases should have been clear. Sex neutrality in derivative 
citizenship served the interests of both men and women and posed no feminist 
dilemma.497 
2. Beyond Marital Supremacy: Unintended Consequences? 
Today, the constitutional law of the family stands at a crossroads. As the 
advent of marriage equality coincides with an unprecedented socioeconomic 
and racial marriage gap, the future of marital supremacy is among the most 
pressing outstanding constitutional questions. In the years since the Court 
 
495. Flores-Villar, 564 U.S. 210, aff’g 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
496. See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding gender-based 
discrimination in the physical presence requirement for derivative citizenship 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). As Kristin Collins’s incisive historical 
work has demonstrated, these requirements are constitutionally vulnerable on grounds 
beyond their gender asymmetry, namely their nativist, racially exclusionary origins. See 
Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of 
Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of Sex 
and Citizenship: The Historians’ Amicus Brief in Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1485 (2011); see also Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, No. 5:15-CV-122, 2015 WL 4887462 (W.D. 
Tex. Aug. 17, 2015) (citing Collins’s work to support holding the differential physical 
presence requirement unconstitutional).  
497. It is possible that the interests of non-U.S. citizen mothers might be adverse to those of U.S. 
citizen fathers in a small number of instances in which the transmission of American 
citizenship to a child would preclude that child from being recognized as a citizen of her 
mother’s nation. Most countries today, however, allow for dual citizenship. It is also 
possible that a U.S. citizen father might, for example, gain the upper hand in a custody 
dispute with a noncitizen mother if he alone is able to transmit U.S. citizenship to his child. 
I am grateful to Kristin Collins for alerting me to this point. 
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decided the unwed fathers cases, lesbian and gay individuals and families have 
fought state-level battles for legal recognition of parental rights irrespective of 
marital status or biology. Many have worried that marriage equality—
especially given the majority’s glorification of marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges—
bodes ill for the constitutional status of nonmarital families.498 Recent work by 
Douglas NeJaime suggests, to the contrary, that marriage equality may 
support, rather than impede, the recognition of intentional and functional 
parenthood, with salutary implications for nonmarital as well as marital 
families.499 In the absence of marriage rights, some states have granted 
parental status to unmarried women and men based on intent and function, 
rather than gender and biology; contemplated the possibility of recognizing 
more than two legal parents; and reconsidered the historic link between 
marital status and parental rights.500 
Notably, advocates for LGBT parents made creative use of the unwed 
fathers cases as they sought to detach parentage from biology, gender, and 
marriage. The Court’s emphasis in Lehr on whether or not a nonmarital father 
had “grasp[ed]” the “opportunity” to parent offered by his biological tie 
suggested that, in the absence of marriage, parental status depended on 
conduct rather than on a mere genetic link. In a trio of landmark California 
Supreme Court cases decided in 2005, LGBT rights advocates used the unwed 
fathers cases to support their argument that parentage should depend on 
whether a biological parent’s partner intended to, and did, function as a parent, 
rather than on formal marital status or on biology.501 Remarkably, these 
advocates even harnessed Michael H.’s protection of the “unitary family” to 
suggest that a same-sex couple’s marriage-like relationship should support a 
finding of parental rights for a nonmarital partner.502 
The unmarried fathers cases, with their emphasis on parental conduct 
rather than mere biology, unexpectedly aided non-biological LGBT parents 
who lacked access to marriage but who clearly had demonstrated their 
 
498. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, The New Marriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016) (arguing that Obergefell’s reasoning marginalizes nonmarital families and undermines 
their constitutional rights). I take up this question in greater depth in Serena Mayeri, 
Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126 (2015). 
499. See NeJaime, supra note 23. 
500. Id. 
501. Id. at 1228 n.263. 
502. Id. at 1223 n.231. Basing parental rights on partners’ marriage-like relationships, of course, 
arguably reinforces marital supremacy in a functional, rather than formalistic, guise. For 
more on how functional definitions of family can reinforce traditional family law values such 
as the privatization of dependency and the primacy of marriage, see Melissa Murray, Family 
Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (2015). 
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commitment to parenthood. Conversely, conferring parental status based upon 
functional and intent-based criteria rather than formal categories such as 
marital status and biology could redound to the benefit of many committed 
nonmarital fathers. Even more promising is the prospect of legal recognition 
for more than two parents.503 If courts had not felt compelled to choose one 
father to the exclusion of the other, after all, Quilloin, Lehr, and Hirschensohn 
might have maintained relationships with their children without precluding 
the establishment of legal relationships with new stepfathers.504 Open 
adoptions, in which birth parents maintain ties with their children,505 could 
have allowed Laura S. and the mother of Ed McNamara’s biological daughter 
to effectuate their preference for adoption by legal strangers without 
terminating Kirkpatrick’s and McNamara’s (or their own) parental rights 
altogether.506 Whether the sequel to marriage equality is a challenge to marital 
supremacy or its retrenchment, a departure from legal formalism or its 
reinstantiation, only time will tell.507 
 
503. Louisiana is a rare state to officially recognize the possibility of “dual fatherhood.” See, e.g., 
Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854 (La. 1989) (holding that the existence of a nonbiological 
legal father with a support obligation did not extinguish the support obligation of a 
biological father). California recently passed a law permitting the legal recognition of more 
than two parents under certain circumstances. See S. Bill 274, ch. 564, § 1, Legislative 
Counsel’s Digest, Oct. 4, 2013, (abrogating In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2011)). 
For discussions of the potential impact of non-exclusive parenthood on nonmarital fathers, 
see, for example, Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 470; Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple 
Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007). See also Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-
Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. REV. 715 (2015) (arguing for the benefits of 
multiple parenthood for children in foster care); Meyer, supra note 475, at 813-45 (proposing 
an alternative model of adoption in which the parental rights of birth parents need not be 
terminated).  
504. The guardian ad litem representing Victoria’s interests in Michael H. recommended that 
both Gerald and Michael be afforded some parental rights. See Brief for Appellant Victoria 
D., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (No. 87-746), 1987 WL 880074. 
505. On the rise of post-adoption visitation arrangements, see Carol Sanger, Bargaining for 
Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309 (2012). 
506. There are, of course, costs as well as benefits to recognizing multiple legal parents, but a 
deep consideration of the topic is beyond the scope of this article.  
507. See Serena Mayeri, The Functions of Family Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 331 (2015) 
(responding to Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (2015)). 
Though it is too soon to identify a long-term trend, the early years of marriage equality 
suggest that racial disparities in marriage among same-sex couples may be significantly 
smaller than among heterosexual couples. See Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United 
States, WILLIAMS INST. 1, 5 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content 
/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4LU-YTY4]. 
 
foundling fathers 
2391 
 
conclusion 
The unwed fathers cases receive little attention from constitutional 
scholars, and they are often relegated to a footnote in the history of sex equality 
law despite a significant (albeit small) body of feminist scholarship that 
critically engages them. In part, this neglect reflects how the Court framed 
these cases as questions of due process, rather than equal protection, and as 
contests between nonmarital fathers and prospective stepfathers, rather than as 
questions of sex and marital status equality vis-à-vis mothers and divorced 
fathers. 
Integrating the unwed fathers cases into the larger history of equality 
jurisprudence helps to illuminate the nature of the law’s limitations. Since the 
1970s, scholars have observed that the Justices have misconstrued sex 
differences as “natural” or “biological” rather than socially constructed and 
essentially malleable. As a result, the Court has often been unwilling to see men 
and women as “similarly situated” for the purposes of equal protection 
analysis. 
The unwed fathers cases invite us to consider how the rhetoric of sex 
differences intersects with and sometimes obscures another primary axis of 
differentiation in constitutional equality law: marital status. In cases involving 
marital households, formal sex neutrality largely prevailed in the Supreme 
Court; no longer could the government distinguish between husbands and 
wives, widows, and widowers in the provision of public benefits such as Social 
Security. States could neither limit alimony to wives, nor, increasingly, overtly 
discriminate between marital mothers and fathers as presumptively preferable 
custodial parents. Stereotypes about women as naturally superior nurturers 
and caregivers and men as primary breadwinners became illegitimate bases for 
differentiating between spouses—and to a large degree, between marital 
parents. 
Ironically, then, while the law of marriage had long been a bastion of 
gender differentiation, in the 1970s and 1980s, marriage effectively became a 
prerequisite for formal legal equality in parental rights. A sex-neutral approach 
to parenting within marriage seemed clearly to advance feminist aspirations for 
an egalitarian division of labor at home, a prerequisite for freedom and equal 
opportunity in the public sphere. Divorce tested the utility of sex neutrality in 
parenting, but the feminist dilemma proved particularly acute in the context of 
nonmarital parental rights. Absent the definitive moment of maternal consent 
to paternal involvement in a child’s life implicit in marriage, feminist skeptics 
required more than a biological tie and good intentions to overcome maternal 
prerogatives. 
Like the feminist campaign against illegitimacy penalties, the feminist 
debate over nonmarital fathers’ parental rights never infiltrated the Justices’ 
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deliberations, much less Court opinions. Unlike the feminist campaign against 
illegitimacy penalties, debates over parental rights reflected real differences 
among feminists over the utility of sex neutrality as a principle of legal reform. 
For some, parental sex equality seemed like a luxury only the privileged could 
afford. Others believed the time had come to negotiate a new nonmarital 
bargain. 
The story of nonmarital fathers’ quest for equality complicates our 
understanding of the historical relationship between feminism and marital 
supremacy. Where mothers’ and fathers’ interests coincided, feminists could 
wholeheartedly attack the legal privileging of marriage. When fathers’ rights 
threatened mothers’ freedom, marital primacy shielded unmarried women 
from the downside of sex neutrality. But that protection came at a price: the 
Court’s failure to grapple with the demands of substantive sex equality or to 
question the superiority of marital families. 
The revolution in constitutional sex equality law laid important 
groundwork for the success of the marriage equality movement. By making 
marriage formally gender-neutral, feminists unseated the most powerful 
traditional argument for limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman. 
Marriage equality for same-sex couples is now the law of the land,508 but the 
marriage gap shows no sign of closing. Nonmarital parenthood increasingly is 
the rule rather than the exception, especially among lower-income Americans, 
and in communities of color. How, if at all, the Constitution will speak to 
burgeoning inequalities between marital and nonmarital families in this new 
age of marriage equality remains to be seen. 
 
 
508. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“[S]ame-sex couples may exercise the 
right to marry. . . . [T]he reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply 
with equal force to same-sex couples.”). 
